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The Demise of "Green" Protectionism: The
WTO Decision on the US Gasoline Rule.
JENNIFER SCHULTZ*
I.

INTRODUCTION

On January 17, 1996, the World Trade Organization (WTO)' Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) delivered its first ruling since coming into
existence on January 1, 1995.2 The DSB ruling addressed complaints
by Venezuela and Brazil against United States environmental restrictions on gasoline imports.3 The DSB concluded that the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) regulation governing imported gasoline
was inconsistent with WTO obligations. Commentators hailed the
decision as a triumph for the developing South against the developed
North' and as a death knell for tough U.S. environmental laws.' The
decision reignites a long-standing debate over the compatibility of
national sovereignty and free trade.6

* Lecturer in Law, Monash University, Australia. BA and LLB from Monash
University. LLM from University of Michigan.
1. Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, [hereinafter WTO Agreement or WTO], Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1125,
1144 (1994) [hereinafter Results of the Uruguay Round].
2. The Dispute Settlement Body administers the GATT/WTO dispute settlement
process. The scope of its responsibility and the new Dispute Settlement rules of the
GATT/WTO system are outlined in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 2, WTO Agreement, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 112 (1994) [hereinafter DSU]. Pursuant to Art. IM(3) of the WTO
Agreement, the WTO administers the DSU. When the WTO General Council meets
to discharge its duties under Art. IV(3), it convenes as the Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB). WTO Agreement, supra note 1, at 1145. The DSB inherited most of the functions formerly exercised by the Contracting Parties to the WTO Agreement. The
Contracting Parties are now referred to as members of the WTO Agreement.
3. Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 274 (1996) [hereinafter Gasoline Panel Report].
4. See Humberto Marquez, Trade-Commodities: South Triumphs in WTO's First
Flight, INTL PRESS SERV., Jan. 19, 1996.
5. Evelyn Iritani, First WTO Ruling Provides Grist for Opponents Citing Threat
to U.S. Law, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1996, at D-1.
6. Dole Calls for Passage of Bill to Set Up WTO Review Commission, 13 INT'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 19, at 748 (May 8, 1996); see also Finlay Lewis, Hunter
Wants U.S. Out of WTO, Hits Ruling on Gasoline Imports, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB.,
Jan. 25, 1996, at C-3.
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On April 29, 1996, the WTO's Appellate Body7 (Appellate Body)
affirmed the DSB's ruling regarding the gasoline regulation; however,
it reversed the DSB panel finding that would have limited the scope of
an exception
for measures on conservation of exhaustible natural re8
sources.
The gasoline dispute dealt with a U.S. environmental regulation
enacted to facilitate U.S. environmental clean air policy and aimed at
reducing a variety of smog causing contaminants in gasoline.9 The
regulation results in disparate treatment of foreign gasoline producers.
The regulation is facially discriminatory and its purpose appears protectionist. The regulation appears to have been a political response to
the pressure applied by an influential lobby group. American gasoline
refiners argued in support of the regulation. The refiners contended
that U.S. air pollution regulations imposed significant costs which they
were forced to absorb, giving foreign producers, faced with less stringent environmental regulations outside the United States, a competitive advantage. The regulation allowed foreign refiners to sell their
'dirty' fuel cheaply in the United States."0
The purpose of this article is to evaluate this first ruling of the
new WTO Appellate Body from a trade/environment perspective. The
gasoline decision demonstrates the recurring tension between domestic
environmental policies and the international trade regime." The regulation increased the costs of importing a product into the U.S. market, effecting non-tariff barriers to trade. The decision reinforces the
tension between environmentalists concerned about the GATT/WTO"2

7. One of the most striking features of the WTO settlement system is the creation of the appellate review body which conducts legal reviews of panel decisions.
DSU, supra note 2, art. 17. The body is to be a standing organ, comprised of 7
persons appointed by the DSB for staggered 4 year terms. Id. art. 17, para. 1-2.
Cases are to be heard by 3 of the 7 members, selected on rotation without reference
to nationality or the wishes of the party. Id. art. 17, para. 1-3. As a general rule,
the appeal proceedings should not exceed 60 days from the date of notification of
the appeal to the circulation of the appellate report. Id. art. 17, para. 5.
8. Report of the Appellate Body in United States-Standards for Reformulated
and Conventional Gasoline, reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 603 (1996) [hereinafter the Appellate Body Report].
9. Signed into law as Clean Air Act, Amendments, P.L. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399
(1990).
10. DANIEL C. EsTY, GREENING THE GArr: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE FuTURE 270 (1994).
11. The most significant case dealing with the trade/environment conflict is the
well published Tuna Dolphin decision, which determined that U.S. import restrictions on tuna to protect dolphins from incidental kill during purse seine fishing
operations violated the GATT. See United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna,
GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.), at 155 (1993) [hereinafter Tuna Dolphin Report] (discussed at the GATT Council meetings on Feb. 18, Mar. 18, and Apr. 18, but not yet
adopted by the Council).
12. The GATT/WTO will refer to the World Trade Organization and associated
agreements which are contained under the Results of the Uruguay Round. Results of
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fate of important environmental laws and trade advocates who generally view decisions such as this and the Tuna Dolphin case"3 as logical applications of the GATT rules against protectionism. Those involved in trade policy focus on the potential protectionism disguised as
environmental action or protectionism in "green disguise." At the heart
of the trade and environment debate is a fear that flexible loopholes,
created under the banner of the environment, will deprive the GATT
nondiscrimination principles of all meaning.
Part II of this article examines the conflict between international
trade and the environment and reviews the debate prior to the gasoline dispute. Part III outlines the GATT approach to environmental
regulations and discusses some past Panel decisions which examined
environmental provisions. Part IV reviews the Gasoline Panel Report
and the Appellate Body decision in detail. Part V evaluates the impact
of the Gasoline decision and considers options for the United States.
Part VI concludes the article urging WTO Members to continually
assess the relationship between trade regulation and the environment,
so that only those measures that are truly operating as 'green' protectionism are found to be inconsistent with the GATT.
II. THE

CONFLICT

The potential conflict between trade rules and environmental
rules has captured significant international attention. Many articles
and books provide a detailed analysis of the elements of this conflict.14 The interrelationship between trade and the environment is a
critical issue also addressed in the negotiation of the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)"5 and in the Uruguay Round of trade
negotiations."6

the Uruguay Round, supra note 1. The GATT refers to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11 (1947), 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (1950)
[hereinafter GATT]. The GATT also refers to the institutional framework which implemented the General Agreement prior to the establishment of the WTO.
13. Tuna Dolphin Report, supra note 11.
14. See, e.g., ESTY, supra note 10; The Greening of World Trade Issues (Kym
Anderson et al. eds., 1992); Steve Charnovitz, GATT and the Environment: Examining the Issues, 4 INTL. ENVTL. AFF. 203 (1992); Robert F. Housman & Durwood J.
Zaelke, The Collision of the Environment and Trade: The GATT Tuna/Dolphin Decision, 22 ENVTL. L. REP. 10, 268 (1992); John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and
Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1227
(1992); Peter L. Lallas et al., Environmental Protection and International Trade:
Toward Mutually Supportive Rules and Policies, 16 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 271
(1992); Eliza Patterson, GATT and the Environment: Rules Changes to Minimize
Adverse Trade and Environmental Effects, 26 JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE 99 (1992).
15. The North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S.,
reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993).
16. Because the relationship between trade and the environment was such a
critical issue at the meeting for the signing of the Final Act Embodying the Results
of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations at Marrakesh between
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The proliferation of national and international environmental
laws and the increased complexity of international trade policies results in a greater potential conflict between these two policy areas.
Trade policy now deals with the indirect effects on trade of domestic
policies such as those dealing with the environment. Environmental
regulations impose non-tariff barriers to trade by increasing the complexity and diversity of product standards exporters must satisfy in
order to trade in certain markets. Exacting pollution control requirements increase domestic production costs, reducing international competitiveness. These constraints lead to lobbying by domestic producers
for trade remedies against imports produced under less stringent standards. Conversely, escalated trade levels increase use and degradation
of resources in production and in transportation, aggravating environmental concerns. Environmental production standards lowered to facilitate trade and international competitiveness add to these concerns.
The GATT and now the new GATT/WTO, as the most prominent
institution dealing with free trade, is increasingly forced to deal with
this interrelationship between trade and the environment. Consequently, the GATT has come under severe criticism as an anti- environmental organization because it dictates whether an environmental regulation is GATT consistent. The more frequent outcome of GATT review is
decisions against environmental measures. 7
Despite the potential for conflict, it is clear that each policy area
has legitimate and worthwhile objectives. Environmental protection is
essential to human survival and the maintenance of the planet's natural resources."8 While trade is not essential in itself, free trade war-

April 12 and 15, 1994, the Members of GATT agreed to establish a Committee on
Trade and the Environment under the auspices of the WTO to examine the matter.
See Jennifer Schultz, The GATTIWTO Committee on Trade and the EnvironmentToward Environmental Reform, 89 AM. J. INTL L. 423, 438 (1995), for a discussion
of the issues that need to be examined by the Commission and the environmental
issues involved in the Uruguay Round.
17. See Steve Charnovitz, Free Trade, Fair Trade, Green Trade: Defogging the
Debate, 27 CORNELL INTL L.J. 459, 468 (1994), arguing that "the supervisory function of the GATT is controversial because its influence on environmental policy can
only be negative.' He perceptively points out that because the GATT has no rules to
regulate the environment, the most positive recommendation that can ever be made
is that the environmental measure in question does not contravene GATT.
18. John Stuart Mill, more than 100 years ago, recognized the legitimacy of
government intervention in environmental matters when he said:
Is there not the Earth itself, its forests and waters, above and below
the surface? These are the inheritance of the human race . . . . What
rights, and under what conditions, a person shall be allowed to exercise
over any portion of this common inheritance cannot be left undecided.
No function of government is less optimal than the regulation of these
things, or more completely involved in a civilized society.
See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1982)(1859). The challenge for governments is
to mesh the best environmental management with market incentives to produce the
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rants protection because of its crucial role in creating economic wealth.
Trade allows countries to increase production and consumption and
hence economic welfare. For developing countries in particular, economic growth through trade is essential to ease poverty and its associated problems, which can include environmental damage.
Conflicts also arise from the imposition of trade restrictions for
environmental reasons. The GATT represents a negotiated balance of
reciprocal trade rights and obligations that is easily upset when trade
restrictions are implemented to achieve national social objectives. This
imbalance leads to international friction and claims for compensation.19 Unilateral trade action supporting the environment upsets this
negotiated balance and inevitably creates animosity that leads to conflicts. The GATT/WTO is concerned with only preventing disguised
discrimination or 'green' protectionism, not preventing environmental
regulation. Any environmental law ° that applies equally to imports
and domestic products and does not discriminate between different
trading partners, should in theory, be consistent with the principles of
the GATT.
III. THE GATT APPROACH
The most familiar context in which environmental laws are challenged is based on the application of GATT Articles III,21 XI,22 and
XX. 2s Environmental regulations which affect imports may violate

kind of environmental regulation that John Stuart Mill philosophically embraced.
19. Under the GATT, Article XXIII(1), a contracting party can complain and seek
a remedy if it considers that "[alny benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under
this Agreement is being nullified or impaired ...

is the result of ...

(b) the

application of another contracting party of any measure, whether or not it conflicts
with the provisions of this Agreement .

. . ."

GATT, supra note 12, at A-64.

20. Except a quantitative restriction that violates GATT, Article XI. See infra
note 22.
21. GATT, Article III is the "national treatment" clause which prohibits discrimination against goods once they are across the border. GATT, supra note 12, at A18.
22. GATT, Article XI imposes a general prohibition on quantitative measures
such as quotas and embargoes. Id. at A-32. Article XI embodies one the fundamental
principles of GATT: if protection is accorded to domestic industry it should be
through tariffs and not through commercial measures.
23. GATT, Article XX(b) and (g) are considered as the environmental exceptions.
Article XX (b) and (g) states:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a
disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this agreement
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
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Article III if they treat an import less favorably than a domestic product. Quantitative limits on imports may violate Article IX. Whether a
GATT panel finds a violation depends upon the application of the environmental exceptions in Article XX(b) and (g)." The preamble to Article XX contains two tests on the motivation of the government imposing the measure. Measures must not "constitute... arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination"25 nor a "disguised restriction on international
trade.""
Over the past ten years, several GATT Panels have found particular health, conservation, and environmental measures applied by a
GATT contracting party inconsistent with GATT Articles and not otherwise justified under GATT Article XX The most significant panel
decisions, which appear to raise legitimate environmental concerns,
include the Herring and Salmon Panel,28 the Thai Cigarette Panel,2"
the Tuna Dolphin Panels° and the more recent CAFE Panel."'These
decisions illustrate the approach taken by GATT panels when environmental legislation has a disparate impact on foreign producers. In
most of these cases the environmental exceptions were construed narrowly and the environmental legislation was challenged as GATT illegal.
In 1988, the Herringand Salmon Panel ruled on the conservation
exception in Article XX(g)."2 The Canadian ban on unprocessed herring and salmon prevented U.S. fishermen from bringing certain fish
caught in Canadian waters directly back to the United States. The

23.12(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if
such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on
domestic production or consumption.

Id. at A-60-61.
24. GATT, Article XX does not explicitly mention the "environment;" however,
clauses (b) and (g) address environmental based trade measures. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, June 17, 1987, GATT B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.), at 136 (1988) [hereinafter Superfund
Panel Report] (holding that the U.S. tax on petroleum was GATT illegal as a discriminatory measure on its face); Canada-Import Distribution and Sale of Certain
Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial Marketing Agencies, Feb. 18, 1992, GATT B.I.S.D.
(39th Supp.), at 27 (1993); United States- Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (II), 33
I.L.M. 839 (1994) [hereinafter Tuna Dolphin II] (this decision has not yet been
adopted by the GATT Council).
28. Canada-Measures

Affecting Exports of Unprocessed

Herring and Salmon,

Mar. 22, 1988, GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) (1989) [hereinafter Herring and Salmon
Panel].

29. Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes,
Nov. 7, 1990, GAIT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) (1991) [hereinafter Thai Cigarette Panel].

30. Tuna Dolphin Report, supra note 11.
31. Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States Taxes on Automobiles,
Oct. 11, 1994, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1397 (1994) [hereinafter the CAFE Panel].

32. Herring and Salmon Panel, supra note 28, at 114-15.
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panel found the ban was inconsistent with Article XI:1. In examining
the Article XX(g) exemption, the panel held that the measure must be
"primarily aimed" at conservation in order to qualify as an exemption.3 The measure did not include comparable restrictions on domestic consumption and production; thus, it could not satisfy the Article
XX(g) exemption.'
In 1991, the Thai Cigarette Panel examined Thailand's ban on the
importation of cigarettes. 3 The ban was enacted to achieve Thailand's
health policy objectives to reduce smoking. The Panel found that the
practice of prohibiting the importation of foreign cigarettes while continuing the sale of domestic cigarettes was inconsistent with GATT
and not "necessary" within the meaning of Article XX(b). " Moreover,
the bans were not the "least GATT inconsistent" measures available.
The Panel concluded that other nondiscriminatory controls on the
importation of cigarettes were available to achieve the health policy
goals such as labelling requirements, fiscal measures, anti-smoking
education, advertising bans, and bans on smoking in public places.
The Thai Cigarette Panel ruling raised some interesting issues
regarding the application of the GATT Panel process to environmental
regulations. The Panel imposed an onerous burden on any contracting
party attempting to defend its environmental measure by ruling that
Article XX(b) demands the least GATT inconsistent measure to achieve
the environmental goals. This test effectively forces the Panel to grade
the measure according to its GATT consistency. Inherent in the process
is the assumption that alternative measures are politically and practically capable of achieving the same environmental goals. After changes
made in the new DSU, a GATT panel without the expertise to determine these issues may now employ experts to assist the panel in making determinations of this kind."
The Tuna Dolphin dispute 9 provides the most famous and emotive example of a GATT Panel decision regarding an environmental
provision." In ruling that a U.S. import ban on tuna from Mexico was
inconsistent with GATT, the Panel examined the application of Articles
III, XI, XX(b) and (g). The Panel found that the United States embargo

33.
34.
35.
36.

See id.
Id.
Thai Cigarette Panel, supra note 29.
Id.

37. Id.

38. Under the new DSU Expert Review, groups may be established to facilitate
the decision making process. See DSU, supra note 2, art. 13, para. 2.
39. Tuna Dolphin Report, supra note 11.
40. See Matthew H. Hurlock, Note, The GAT7T, U.S. Law and the Environment:
A Proposal to Amend the GATT in Light of the Tuna/Dolphin Decision, 92 COLUM.
L. REV. 2098 (1992), for a detailed discussion. See also Housman & Zaelke, supra
note 14.
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on Mexican tuna was a quantitative restriction inconsistent with Article XI. The Panel concluded the United States ban discriminated
against "like" products based on their production process in violation of
GATT's Article III. Article III's national treatment requirement prevents trade measures based on differences in production processes. The
Panel found that the U.S. ban did not fall within the Article XX(b) or
(g) exceptions, and that these exceptions could not be applied
extrajurisdictionally."1
The Tuna Dolphin dispute sparked a heated debate over the ability of the GATT to resolve environmental disputes, despite the fact that
Mexico did not attempt to have the Panel Report adopted by the GATT
Council. 2 The Panel's finding drew criticism for the GATTs continued narrow application of the Article XX exceptions, particularly for
limiting the environmental exceptions to products and for failing to
consider production processes.
The 1994 CAFE Panel considered a number of U.S. environmental
laws, including the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standard" and the gas guzzler tax." The CAFE standard required automobile manufacturers to meet certain levels of overall fuel economy for
their entire fleet. The gas guzzler tax imposed a tax on individual car
sales that failed to meet certain mile per gallon requirements. The
European Community claimed these laws disproportionately affected
European made cars; thus, they constituted discrimination disguised
as environmentalism.4 5
The panel found the CAFE standard applied equally to foreign
and domestic producers, but violated Article III:4 because of its discriminatory effect. The methodology to determine the fleet wide average mileage differed depending on the location of the manufacturer.
The separate foreign fleet accounting provision placed foreign cars at a
disadvantage due to their foreign origin. The Panel held that the entire law was incompatible with the GATT. The Panel concluded the
provision failed the Article XX(g) test because the separation of automobile fleets by country of origin was not a conservation policy and
because the fleet averaging and separate fleet accounting provisions
were inextricably linked in the CAFE standard. 6
The European Community argued that while the gas guzzler tax
was facially neutral when applied, it was discriminatory in effect. Certain categories of vehicles, which happened to be the same class of

41. Tuna Dolphin Report, supra note 11, at 1620.
42. The decision, therefore, has only the weight of an unadopted Panel Report.
43. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2002-2013 (1988), repealed by Pub. L. 103-272 § 7(b), July 5,
1994, 108 Stat. 1379.

44. 26 U.S.C. § 4064 (1994).
45. CAFE Panel, supra note 31.
46. See id.
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vehicles which were not exported by European auto makers, 7 were
exempt from the tax. The Panel found that the tax applied equally to
foreign and domestic automobiles such that it was consistent with
Article 111:2. Consequently, it did not consider the Article XX exceptions. 8
The European Commission blocked the adoption of the report by
the GATT Council claiming the report in relation to the gas guzzler
tax provided a loophole for protectionists who can now use environmental regulations to discriminate against imported products. 9 However, the CAFE standard has subsequently been repealed in the United States. 0
As the cases illustrate, environmental laws that discriminate
between domestic and foreign producers are likely to be challenged.
Moreover, most environmental legislation has been found to be inconsistent with GATT because the environmental exceptions apply only if
there is no "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination."5 1

IV. THE GASOLINE RULE DISPUTE
The latest WTO Appellate Body decision, the Gasoline decision,
provides another example of a domestic environmental policy contravening the GATT.52 The Gasoline decision is significant in that it is
the first decision under the new dispute settlement rules in the
GATT/WTO system and the first GATT Panel decision to be appealed.
The creation of the DSU makes significant changes to the GATT
dispute settlement framework. Under the new rules, unless a consensus of the parties votes against the adoption of the Appellate Body's
report, the report is automatically adopted thirty days after circulation
to its Members.53 This reverses the previous GATT rule, which required a consensus to adopt a panel decision. The new rule limits the
parties' ability to block the adoption of panel decisions, as illustrated
in the CAFE Panel. This limitation may increase the potential for

47. For example, the tax did not apply equally to light trucks or vans. See id.
48. Id.
49. European Commission, 1995 Report on U.S. Barriers to Trade and Investment (May 1995) at 40. It has been argued that the CAFE Panel Report allowed a
deliberately protectionist measure to slip through the GATT system. See generally
Charles T. Haag, Comment, Legitimizing "Environmental" Legislation Under the
GATT in Light of the CAFE Panel Report: More Fuel for Protectionists?, 57 UNIV.
PITT. L. REV. 79 (1995).
50. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2002-2013 (1988), repealed by Pub. L. 103-272 § 7(b), July 5,
1994, 108 Stat. 1379.
51. GATT, supra note 23, art. XX(b) and (g).
52. Appellate Body Report, supra note 8.
53. DSU, supra note 2, art. 17, para. 14. Panel reports are automatically
adopted unless a party to the dispute formally notifies the DSB of its decision to
appeal, or the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt a report. Id. art. 16, para 4.
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direct conflicts between GATT/WTO obligations and environmental
protections. Although members can no longer block the adoption of
contentious panel reports, they are not obligated to implement the
results of the decision in domestic arenas."
The first WTO Appellate Body decision widens the divide between
North and South5 in trade negotiations and environmental regulation. One theme of the trade and environment debate is the accusation
that the industrialized countries are practicing environmental imperialism or colonialism. Developing countries argue that the use of trade
pressure enables them to effectively impose their environmental policies, thus denying the developing countries their sovereign right to
decide their own policies.
At the same time, differences in environmental standards, especially between developed economies in the North and developing economies of the South, may create "pollution havens" for firms and industries seeking less regulatory oversight. Differing environmental provi54. A taste of this has already been given by the United States legislation implementing the Uruguay Round. The introduction of the Dole Bill illustrates that the
U.S. may not automatically accept all WTO panel decisions and could even threaten
to leave the WTO. See the U.S. Implementing legislation of the Uruguay Round
Agreements, H.R. DOC No. 103-316 at 3 (1994). In an agreement between the U.S.
Clinton Administration and Senator Robert Dole, provisions were made which may
force the U.S. to leave the WTO if too many adverse decisions are adopted against
it. The Agreement set up a WTO Dispute Settlement Review Commission which will
review all final WTO dispute settlement reports adverse to the United States to
determine whether the panel exceeded its authority or acted outside the scope of the
Agreement. In this Agreement, the following text was adopted:
The Administration will support legislation next year to establish a
WTO Dispute Settlement Review Commission ....

It will review all

final WTO dispute settlement reports adverse to the United States to
determine whether the panel exceeded its authority or acted outside the
scope of the agreement. Following issuance of any affirmative determination by the Commission, any member of each House would be able to
introduce a joint resolution calling on the President to negotiate new
dispute settlement rules that would address and correct the problem
identified by the Commission. If there are three affirmative determinations in any five year period, any member of each House may introduce
a joint resolution to disapprove U.S. participation in the WTO-and if the
resolution is enacted by Congress and signed by the President, the United States would commence withdrawal from the WTO Agreement. Our
goals here are straightforward: (1) to assure that the dispute settlement
process is accountable; (2) that it is a fair process; and (3) that it works
as we expect it to work. From the Administration's standpoint, we are
confident that the dispute settlement process will work fairly and that
the concerns expressed by many will not materialize. However, if panels
do exceed their authority, this proposal gives us a fail-safe device.
Documents Relating to the Clinton Administration's Agreement with Sen. Robert Dole
(R-Kan.) Concerning the Uruguay Round Agreement, Issued by the White House, Nov.
23, 1994, 11 Intl Trade Rp. (BNA) No. 47, at 1865 (Nov. 30, 1994).
55. The North/South tension refers to the tension between developed and developing countries.
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sions may also induce domestic regulators to relax environmental protection requirements or enforcement, both to attract industries and to
prevent any disadvantage to domestic firms relative to competitors in
other countries.56 The Gasoline decision illustrates the importance of
prioritizing the interrelationship between trade and the environment
on the WTO agenda in order to decrease the tension of the debate.
A. The History of the Gasoline Dispute
This dispute involves a challenge to regulations promulgated under the 1990 U.S. Clean Air Act Amendments.57 The Clean Air Act requires gasoline producers to "reformulate" the gasoline they sell in
major U.S. population centers in order to control auto emissions and
improve air quality in the most polluted areas of the U.S. The law
requires refiners of reformulated gasoline to reduce by 15% a variety of
smog causing products from their gasoline. Reformulated gasoline was
required to be 15% cleaner by 1995 than gasoline which was sold in
1990. 58
In December 1993, the U.S. EPA promulgated regulations under
the Clean Air Amendments59 for establishing 1990 baselines (the Gasoline Rule).' Pursuant to the regulations, U.S. refiners established
individual baselines for 1990 using actual data on their fuel composition or several alternative methodologies for reconstructing their fuel
composition. In contrast, importers were required to satisfy a statutory
baseline. The statutory baseline was calculated by taking the average
level of contaminants in the U.S. refining industry in 1990.61 The
Gasoline Rule allowed U.S. producers to measure their improvement
against the quality of reformulated gasoline that they actually produced in 1990, while foreign producers had to apply the statutory baseline.
The EPA justified the disparate treatment of imports by concluding that rules governing U.S. refiners could not be applied to imports

56. See e.g., OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AND ASSESSMENT, BACKGROUND PAPER,
TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT:. CoNFLICTS AND OPPORTUNITIES 64 (1992).
57. Signed into law as Clean Air Act, Amendments, P.L. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399
(1990).
58. In addition, conventional gasoline emissions are also required to stay as they
were in 1990, so that there was no degradation of air quality outside the major
population centers.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 7545 (k) (1994).
60. The Rule devised by the EPA December 15, 1993, was formerly entitled
"Fuels and Fuel Additives-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline."
59 Fed. Reg. 7716 (1994) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 80) [hereinafter the Gasoline Rule].
61. If the importer was also a foreign refiner they were entitled to establish
their own individual baseline provided they imported at least 75 percent of the gasoline they produced at their refinery into the U.S. This was referred to as the 75%
rule. See Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 3, at 278.
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without raising substantial concerns about foreign data availability,
enforcement problems, and environmental consequences. U.S. gasoline
refiners argued that without this safeguard, the new pollution control
requirements would increase domestic production costs, giving imports
a competitive advantage and a chance to sell their "dirty" fuel in the
United States. Venezuela claimed that the EPA regulations were facially discriminatory because importers were denied the opportunity to
establish individual baselines. In practice, this meant that imported
gasoline with certain parameter levels below the statutory baseline
could not be directly sold into the U.S. market; whereas, U.S. gasoline
with the same qualities could be freely sold in the U.S. market provided the gasoline satisfied the refiner's individual baseline.
Venezuela originally filed a complaint in 1994 under the dispute
settlement mechanism of the 1947 GATT. Venezuela claimed the EPA
regulations were inconsistent with the national treatment obligations.
The complaint was subsequently withdrawn as part of a negotiated
settlement. On March 23, 1994, the EPA offered to change the Gaso62
line Rule in exchange for Venezuela's promise to drop its complaint.
The details of this negotiated settlement evolved during secret meetings between Venezuela and the EPA, the Energy Department and the
office of the U.S. Trade Representative.'
When Congress became aware of this deal, it blocked the proposed
rule change. Subsequently, Venezuela relodged its complaint in January 1995, this time before the WTO." Brazil joined the dispute a. a
complainant after the WTO DSB accepted Venezuela's request for a
dispute settlement panel.

62. See EPA Announces Fuel Plan for Venezuela; Threatened GATT Complaint is
Shelved, 11 Int'l. Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 504 ( Mar. 30, 1994).
63. See Steve Charnovitz, Free Trade, Green Trade: Defogging the Debate, 27
CORNELL INVL L. J. 459, 521-522 (1994) (criticizing the Clinton Administration's
policy in this regard, and arguing that the administration had worked out an arrangement with Venezuela whereby Venezuela agreed to a quota on gasoline imports
at the current level in exchange for dropping the GATT case, thereby demonstrating
evidence of the secretive and anti-democratic way that GATT rules can influence
environmental laws). See also Aubry D. Smith, Executive-Branch Rulemaking and
Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization:A Proposal to Increase Public
Participation,94 MICH. L. REV. 1267, 1268 (1996) (criticizing executive branch actions which are secrative and suggesting that there is a need for greater domestic
participation in such actions).
64. On 23 January 1995, Venezuela requested the United States to hold consultations pursuant to GATT 1994, Article XXII(1) Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade, Article 14(1), and DSU, Article 4, regarding the December 15, 1993 rule issued by the EPA titled "Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline." After failing to reach a satisfactory settlement, and upon the request of Venezuela, the DSB set up a panel 10 April 1995.
See Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 3.
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B. The Gasoline Panel Report
Venezuela and Brazil requested the Panel to find that the Gasoline Rule devised by the EPA was:
(a) contrary to the most-favored-nation provision of Article I and
the national treatment provisions of Article III: and 4 of GATT 1994;
(b) not covered by any of the exceptions under Article XX of GATT
1994; and
(c) contrary to Article 2 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade (TBT).
The United States denied these claims and set forth two arguments. 1. The Gasoline Rule was justified under the exceptions contained in Article XX, paragraphs (b), (d), and (g); and 2. The Gasoline
Rule did not come within the scope of Article 2 of the TBT Agreement.
The Panel rejected these arguments concluding that the baseline establishment methods contained in the Gasoline Rule were inconsistent
with Article III:4 and were not justified under paragraphs (b), (d), or
(g) of Article XX. The Panel recommended that the DSB request the
United States to change this part of the Gasoline Rule so that it conformed with its obligations under GATT.
C. The GATT's Article III
The Panel decision rested on the application of one of GATT's
central objectives, the principle of nondiscrimination,' in particular,
the national treatment principle derived primarily from Article III.
Venezuela and Brazil argued that the Gasoline Rule violated Article
III:4 by denying foreign refiners the possibility to establish an individual baseline. The Gasoline Rule accorded less favorable treatment
because it required imported gasoline to conform with the more stringent statutory baseline; whereas, U.S. gasoline had only to comply
with each refiner's individual baseline. 7
Article III: of the GATT provides that internal taxes and other
charges, laws, regulations, and requirements that affect the sale or
65. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade April 15, 1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Annex IC,
reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 316-2, at 1318 (1994) [hereinafter TBT]. The Panel did
not make a determination on the issue of whether the regulation violated the TBT,
as they had already decided that the EPA rule did not qualify for any of the exceptions in Article XX. As a consequence, the relationship between the TBT and the
GATT rules will have to be determined at a later date.
66. The first principle of non discrimination is the "most favoured nation obligation" under Article I, which requires a member to provide all other members with
the most favourable treatment in trade that it provides to any country. See GATT,
supra note 23, art. I, at A-12.
67. Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 3.
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distribution of products should not be applied so as to afford protection
to domestic products.68 Those laws, regulations, and requirements are
also subject to a more stringent test under Article III:4, which provides
that imported products must be given treatment no less favorable than
that given to like domestic products. 9
The Article III test has two parts. First, it must be decided whether the products being differentiated between are "like products." If
products are not "like" then any differentiation will be consistent with
Article III. If they are "like," then differentiation can only be consistent
if it does not afford either protection to domestic production or less favorable treatment to imported products.
In the gasoline dispute, the Panel determined that chemically
identical imported and domestic gasoline are "like products" because
they have exactly the same physical characteristics, end-uses, tariff
classification, and are perfectly substitutable. Secondly, the Panel
determined that the imported products were treated less favorably
because their refineries did not have the possibility of establishing an
individual historical baseline. The Panel noted that domestic gasoline
benefited in general from the fact that the seller/refiner used an individual baseline while the seller/refiner of imported gasoline did not.
This less favorable treatment is illustrated by the case of a batch of
imported gasoline which was chemically identical to a batch of domestic gasoline that met its refiner's individual baseline, but not the statutory baseline levels.
The U.S. argued that not all imported gasoline was disadvantaged
by the statutory baseline. The statutory baseline by the nature of its
calculation was an average of gasoline quality consumed in the U.S. in
1990; therefore, at least half of the domestically produced gasoline

68. Article III:l states:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the

territory of any other contracting party shall be exempt from internal
taxes and other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied
directly or indirectly to like products of national origin. Moreover, in
cases in which there is not substantial domestic production of like products of national origin, no contracting party shall apply new or increased internal taxes on the products of the territioriesof other contracting parties for the purpose of affording protection to the production
of directly competitive or substitutable products which are not similarly
taxed; and existing internal taxes of this kind shall be subject to similar
negotitation for their reduction or elimination.
69. Article III:4 states:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no
less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in
respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal
sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use ....
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would have a higher individual baseline than the statutory baseline.7"
The imports were given less favorable treatment relative to those domestic producers whose baseline was below the average. The domestic
producers represented roughly half of the domestic production.
The Panel acknowledged the disparity, but concurred with the
reasoning of an earlier panel decision,71 that under Article III:4 less
favorable treatment of particular imported products in some instances
could not be balanced by more favorable treatment of other imported
products in other instances. The Panel, quoting an earlier Panel, stated "[t]he words 'treatment no less favorable' in paragraph 4 call for
effective equality of opportunities for imported products in respect of
applications of laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use
of products."72 In this case, under the baseline establishment methods, some imported gasoline" was effectively prevented from benefiting from as favorable sales conditions as those afforded to domestic
gasoline by an individual baseline tied to the producer of a product;
therefore, imported gasoline was treated less favorably than domestic
gasoline.
The U.S. also argued that there was a significant quantity of
domestic gasoline from new suppliers assigned the statutory baseline.74 Relative to the "similarly situated" domestic producers, foreign
producers were treated no less favorably.75 According to the U.S., post
1990 domestic producers were given similar treatment to pre 1990

70. Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 3, at 281.
71. United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, Nov. 7, 1989, GATT
B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 345 (1990). The Panel had found that:
[Tihe "no less favorable" treatment requirement of Article III:4 has to be
understood as applicable to each individual case of imported products.
The Panel rejected any notion of balancing more favourable treatment of
some imported products against less favourable treatment of other imported products. If this notion were accepted, it would entitle a contracting party to derogate from the no less favourable treatment obligations
in one case, or indeed in respect of one contracting party, on the ground
that it accords more favourable treatment in some other case, or to
another contracting party. Such an interpretation would lead to great
uncertainty about the conditions of competition between imported and
domestic products and thus defeat the purposes of Article III.
Id. para. 5.14.
72. Id. para. 5.11.
73. Note that the statutory baseline was calculated by averaging the level of
contaminants in the U.S. industry in 1990. Therefore, some refiners would have
individual baselines which were higher than the statutory baseline. When comparing
the requirements for foreign producers under the statutory baseline and U.S. refiners
with a high individual baseline, it would appear that the U.S. refiners were being
given a higher standard tWiachieve.
74. The new suppliers were U.S. suppliers that had started production after
1990 and therefore did not have 1990 data on which to base an individual baseline.
75. Gasoline Panel Report supra note 3, at 281.
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foreign producers due to their lack of data. The Panel rejected this
argument declaring that Article III:4 does not "allow less favorable
treatment dependent on the characteristics of the producer and the
nature of the data held by it."7" The Panel concluded the EPA rule
violated Article III:4. Consequently, the Panel did not examine the
complaint under Article III:.17

D. The GATT Article XX Exceptions
Unilateral environmental measures inconsistent with Article III
are GATT consistent if they fall within one of the Article XX exceptions, which are also defenses. The burden of showing that Article XX
applies belongs to the respondent state, 8 in this case the United
States. The protection the exceptions offer has historically been construed as narrowly as possible within the meaning of the words. 9
This is reinforced by the preambular conditions that exceptions must
not " .

.

. [c]onstitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimina-

tion between countries where the same conditions prevail," ° nor be
"[a] disguised restriction on international trade .... "8 1 In the Gasoline dispute the Panel considered Articles XX(b), (d), and (g).

76. Id. at 294. See also Steve Charnovitz, The WTO Panel Decision on U.S.
Clean Air Act Regulations, 13 INTOL TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 11, at 459 at 5, where
he argues that the Panel in relation to this point should simply have held that
national treatment "does not mean average treatment (which the EPA rule approximates). Nor does it mean treatment as favourable as some domestic subclass receives. National treatment means that the best treatment offered to domestic products must also be offered to foreign products."
77. The Panel did not find it necessary to examine the consistency of the Gasoline Rule with Article III:l, because it is a more general provision than Article III:4
and as such the Gasoline Rule would be caught under this Article if caught under
Article III:4. See Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 3. The panel followed the Malt
Beverages case which had examined a claim made under paragraphs 1, 2, and 4 of
Article III and had concluded that "because Article III:1 is a more general provision
than either Article 111:2 or III:4, it would not be appropriate for the Panel to consider Article III:1 allegations to the extent that the Panel were to find measures to
be inconsistent with the more specific provisions of Articles 111:2 and III:4." United
States-Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, June 19, 1992, GATT
B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.), at 270 (1993). The Panel did not proceed to examine the Gasoline Rule in relation to Article 1 as it considered that its findings on treatment
under the baseline establishment methods under Articles III:4 and XX(b), (d), and (g)
would, in any case, have made unnecessary the examination of the 75% rule under
Article 1:1. Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 3, at 296.
78. The result being that the U.S. must prove the absence of alternative measures that could meet its environmental objective.
79. See Tuna Dolphin Report, supra note 11, para. 5.22.
80. Id.
81. GATT, supra note 23. See also Tuna Dolphin Panel, supra note 11, para. 4.8
and United States Imports on Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies, May 23, 1986,
GATT, B.I.S.D. (30 Supp.) 107, paras. 54-56 (1984).

1996

DEMISE OF GREEN PROTECTIONISM

E. Article XX(b) Exception
Article XX(b) sanctions the use of trade-restricting measures when
they are "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health."'2 The Panel's examination of this article considered whether
the measure was intended to implement an enumerated policy. The
Panel agreed with the United States' that the pollution control policy
was a policy within the range of those enumerated in Article XX(b).
The remaining issue was whether the aspect of the Gasoline Rule
found inconsistent with the General Agreement was "necessary" to
achieve the stated policy objectives under Article XX(b). Necessary in
this context means "necessary ...
only if there were no alternative
measures consistent with the [GATT], or less inconsistent with
it ... ."" which could reasonably be expected to be employed to
achieve the gas emissions policy objectives. After the Tuna Dolphin
Panel decision, the interpretation of the "necessary" test as the "least
GATT-inconsistent" measure available was widely criticized as being
too open-ended. Conceivably, any measure might have hypothetical
alternatives more consistent with the GATT. Despite these criticisms,
the Panel affirmed its interpretation.
The U.S. argued that there were no alternative measures available. The EPA had considered giving foreign refiners individualized
baselines, but had rejected this option because it did not have reliable
data to establish such baselines or to verify the refinery of origin for
imported gasoline. In the Panel's view, reasonably available alternative measures existed to achieve the environmental objective. The
Panel suggested giving all producers the statutory baseline or alternatively giving foreign refiners individual baselines.'
F. Article XX(d) Exception
Article XX(d) provides that measures may be applied if necessary
to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the GATT.86 The Panel dismissed the United States' arguments regarding Article XX(d). The United States argued that the
baseline establishment methods secured compliance with a law or
regulation that was not inconsistent with GATT. The Panel commented that the U.S. scheme might constitute a law or regulation for the
purposes of Article XX(d) "not inconsistent" with the GATT, assuming

82. GATT, supra note 23.
83. Venezuela and Brazil did not disagree with this point. See Gasoline Panel
Report, supra note 3, at 296.
84. Thai Cigarette Panel, supra note 29, para. 75.
85. See infra, part III. H. for a discussion regarding the feasibility of the alternative measures.
86. GATT, supra note 23.
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that a system of baselines by itself was consistent with Article III:4.
Nevertheless, the Panel found that sustained discrimination between
imported domestic gasoline contrary to Article III:4 did not "secure
compliance" with the baseline system. 7 The Panel emphasized that
the methods were not an enforcement mechanism," but were simply
rules for determining the individual baselines. As such, they were not
the type of measures contemplated by Article XX(d).
G. Article XX(g) Exception
Article XX(g) provides that measures may be taken "relating to
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are
made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production
or consumption."89 The Panel applied a three part analysis to determine whether the conservation exception applied. The analysis is set
forth below:
First, it had to be determined whether the policy in respect of
which these provisions were invoked fell within the range of policies to conserve exhaustible natural resources.
Second, it had to be determined whether the measure for which the
exception was being invoked-that is the particular trade measure
inconsistent with the obligations under the General Agreement-was "related to" the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources, and whether it was made effective "in conjunction" with
restrictions on domestic production or consumption.
Third, it had to be determined whether the measure was applied in
conformity with the requirements set out in the introductory clause
to Article XX, that the measure not be applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail or in a
manner which would constitute a disguised restriction on international trade.°
The Panel acknowledged that clean air was a depletable natural resource and the policy to reduce the depletion of clean air clearly satisfied the first part of the test. It was not prepared to conclude that the
measures in dispute "related to" the conservation of this resource. The
Panel adopted the Herring and Salmon Panel's9' interpretation of the
"related to" rule in which the measure had to be "primarily aimed" at
the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource to be considered as
"relating to" conservation within the meaning of Article XX(g). Similarly, a trade measure was considered to be "made effective in conjunction

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 3.
An example of an enforcement mechanism would be a fine.
Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 3.
Id.
Herring and Salmon Panel, supra note 28, at 114-15.
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with" production restrictions if it was "primarily aimed" at rendering
effective these restrictions.92
The Panel believed that the "precise aspects" of the EPA rule that
violated GATT Article III were not "primarily aimed" at the conservation of natural resources. According to the Panel, the United States
could reach the desired level of conservation of national resources
under the Gasoline Rule without being inconsistent with the national
treatment obligation. In light of this finding, the Panel did not find it
necessary to consider the third prong of the test."
H. The First GATTI WTO Appeal
The Panel's interpretation of Article XX(g) prompted the United
States' appeal, which was lodged on March 4, 1996. The U.S. claimed
the Panel erred in its interpretation of Article XX as a whole, and in
particular, that it erred by holding that the baseline establishment
rules were not justified under Article XX(g). The U.S. also claimed the
Panel misinterpreted whether the baseline establishment rules constituted a "measure" "relating to" the conservation of clean air within the
meaning of Article XX(g).
The issue on appeal was the narrowness of the Panel's interpretation of the wording in Article XX(g). Article XX states that it is the
"measures" which are to be examined under Article XX(g), not the
legal finding of "less favorable treatment."94 The U.S. contended the
panel looked at whether the "discrimination" in itself "relates to conservation" rather than at whether the "measure" relates to conservation. The Appellate Body agreed finding that the Panel referred to its
legal conclusion on Article III:4 instead of the "measure" in issue."
The Appellate Body also concluded that the baseline establishment
rules were "primarily aimed" at the conservation of natural resources
for the purposes of Article XX(g) and therefore satisfied the second
prong of the test. 6

92. Id.
93. Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 3, at 295.
94. GATT, supra note 23.
95. Appellate Body Report, supra note 8, (stating that there is "no direct connection between less favourable treatment of imported gasoline . . . and the U.S.
objective of improving air quality in the United States," Id. at 619 (emphasis added),
and concluding that the rules that afforded less favourable treatment were not primarily aimed at the conservation of natural resources. Id.).
96. The Appellate Body also applied the "necessary" test, not only in examining
Article XX(b), but also in applying Article XX9g). Id. at 620. In applying these
words they found that the Panel had overlooked a fundamental rule of treaty interpretation by failing to take into account the words actually used by Article XX(g).
Id. The Panel should have used the "relating to" test in (g), which has been interpreted by the Herring and Salmon Report as catching a measure that is "primarily
aimed at" conservation of exhaustible natural resources. Id. at 621-22.
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The Appellate Body considered next whether the rules met the
requirements of the chapeau of Article XX. It concluded that the rules
constituted "unjustified discrimination" and a "disguised restriction on
international trade." Although the rules were within the terms of Article XX(g), they were not entitled to the justifying protection afforded
by Article XX as a whole. The numerous alternative courses of action
available to the U.S. in implementing the rules influenced the Appellate Body's conclusion. The alternative nondiscriminatory measures
identified, included the imposition of statutory baselines without differentiation between domestic and imported gasoline. The environmental
downside, however, would be that gasoline of high quality could slip
down to the average standard in order to obtain a competitive advantage, consequently affecting overall air pollution. The alternative enabled both foreign and domestic refiners to have individual baselines.
The problem with that option, apart from data difficulties, is that
foreign refiners with a low standard are able to sell their "dirtier" fuel
at a competitive advantage. "Clean" gasoline producers are required to
continue to produce gasoline which satisfied their high individual baseline.
The Appellate Body did not assess the likely environmental impact of these suggested options. Implicit in its decision is an assumption that the alternative measures are capable of achieving the
same environmental goals in practical terms. This type of assumption
made by trade policy experts behind the closed doors of the Appellate
Body is troublesome. It leads environmentalists to question whether
GATT Panels and now Appellate Bodies, have the expertise or institutional legitimacy to determine such an issue.
Speculation by the U.S. claim that administrative burdens would
accompany the alternative measures was viewed as insufficient to
justify the denial of individual baselines to foreign refiners. On this
issue, the Appellate Body agreed with the Panel Report, suggesting
that the U.S. had not pursued the possibility of cooperation with the
governments of Venezuela and Brazil in order to mitigate potential
administrative problems.
The Appellate Body concluded that the discrimination was foreseen; therefore, the baseline establishment rules in their application
constituted "unjustifiable discrimination" and a "disguised restriction
on international trade."97 Thus, the Gasoline rule was outside the justifying protection afforded by Article XX as a whole.

97. Appellate Body Report, supra note 8.
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V. U.S. OPTIONS

For the United States, the Appellate decision will be seen by some
as a pyrrhic victory. The error of law related to Article XX(g) was corrected, however, when the correct interpretation of the law was applied, the result was the same. The GATT exceptions for health and
environmental policies, which allow countries to pursue such policies
even if they lead to trade barriers, have been narrowly interpreted;
this case continues that practice.98 The legal conclusions of the Panel
and the Appellate Body were clearly correct in finding that the EPA
rule was in violation of Article III and that none of the Article III exceptions applied. The gasoline rule is an example of an environmental
regulation that was clearly discriminatory on its face. The rule provides a clear example of protectionism being disguised as an environmental measure.
The Gasoline case, like the Tuna Dolphin, the Salmon Herring,
the Thai Cigarette, and the CAFE Panel decision, concerned an environmental measure that operated as a nontariff trade barrier. In contrast to these previous decisions, in particular the Tuna Dolphin decision, the Gasoline decision cannot be used by environmentalists to
bolster claims that the GATT is institutionally hostile to environmental protection. The decision provides a very lucid example of how environmental measures can function as disguised non tariff barriers to
trade. It once again raises the conflict between environmental policies
which impose trade burdens and trade regulation under the GATT. It
is a clear case of "green" protectionism." For the environmental
movement, this is a poorly drafted regulation which undermines legitimate attempts to protect the environment without unjustifiable discrimination. It also undermines calls for the GATT/WTO to become
more environmentally sensitive. If environmental policies are more
carefully structured so that the burdens imposed on the domestic and
foreign markets are equal, then they will be less likely to be perceived
by the nations affected as unjustified and therefore should be able to
survive international scrutiny.

98. The Office of Technology Assessment of the U.S. Congress has noted that of
all dispute resolution panel reports from 1947 to 1990, nine involved the environmental exceptions. Of the nine, two did not contain a ruling on their applicability,
six found that they did not apply, and only one found that they did. Thus, GATT
panel rulings offer little support for the argument that environmental measures
imposing trade burdens are subject to these exceptions. ESTY, supra note 10, at 49
n.9. See also PIERRE PESCATORE ET. AL., HANDBOOK OF GATT DIsPuTE SETILEMENT

(1991).
99. In terms of the result, it appears that the "right party ' was succesful in this
dispute because here the discriminatory measure could not be supported or justified
by any environmental arguments. The regulation did not encourage domestic producers with low baselines to improve the quality of their fuel. In that sense, the regulation did not really support its environmental objectives of lowering air pollution.
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The Clinton Administration and other free trade supporters contend that the economic stakes in this case are trivial and that the
administration has a number of options, none of which would compromise the objectives of the clean air program. They argue that in the
long term, the WTO's role in settling trade disputes will work to
America's advantage far more often than the reverse." Under WTO
procedures, the U.S. has a degree of latitude in determining how to
conform with the Appellate Body ruling. One option is to simply ignore
the ruling, as the effect of Appellate Body decisions on U.S. law is the
same under the WTO as it was under GATT. Nothing in the DSU
authorizes the dispute settlement system to repeal U.S. laws. If the
U.S. disregarded the Appellate Body decision, Venezuela and Brazil
could impose sanctions such as punitive tariffs on U.S. goods, but only
to the extent of the damage inflicted on them by the EPA regulations.
The U.S. would be unlikely to take such a confrontational approach in
this instance.
When a country enters into any international agreement, it necessarily relinquishes some measure of sovereignty. Therefore, the critical
question is not whether the U.S. is relinquishing sovereignty, but
whether the U.S. has inappropriately relinquished sovereignty in the
case of the WTO. Arguably, the sovereignty of the U.S. will be enhanced by the dispute resolution procedures because the U.S. will be
able to enforce legal rights more effectively. In addition, the U.S. retains its right to withdraw from the WTO at any time. In fact, the
implementing legislation established a special panel to evaluate
whether the U.S. should withdraw from the WTO.' 1
The impact of the Appellate Body ruling does not constitute a
threat to the U.S. implementation of environmental provisions. The
ruling merely emphasizes that trade restrictive measures disguised as
protectionism will be found to be discriminatory. Criticism of the new
WTO and its DSU for such a stance is unjustified. The decision is not
a death warrant for tough U.S. environmental laws, nor a relinquishment of U.S. sovereignty; however, it could be viewed as a small victory for the developing South. 2

100. SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., supra note 6.
101. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
102. As Petersmann points out, the "[G]ATT dispute settlement proceedings offer
an effective means, at low transaction cost, for defending weaker countries against
unilateral power politics and for clarifying and adjudicating market access rights
under GATT law." Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Trade Law and International Environmental Law, Prevention and Settlement of International Environmental
Disputes in GATT, 27 J. WORLD TRADE 43, 79 (1993).
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VI. CONCLUSION

Questions abound as to whether the GATT/WTO requires major
institutional changes to accommodate the "green agenda" and to
achieve a balanced relationship between trade and the environment.
As Geza Feketekuty noted, "[tihere is wide agreement among GATT
members that the GATT's trade rules need to be adapted to better
support the achievement of environmental goals at both the national
and global levels.""° At the meeting for the signing of the Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations in Marrakesh in April 1994, the Members of the GATT
agreed to establish a Committee on Trade and the Environment under
the auspices of the WTO. The institutional structure, content, timetable, and mechanisms by which this environmental committee will carry
out its work will largely determine whether trade can become a more
effective agent of sustainable development."0 4 Matters to raise in this
fora include procedural reforms to facilitate the resolution of environmental disputes.
The gasoline dispute gives rise to a number of procedural criticisms. In particular, the Panel and Appellate Body were comprised
solely of trade specialists who did not appear to have environmental
expertise. In environmentally inspired disputes, it would be preferable
for a panel to call for the establishment of an expert review group' °
to facilitate fact finding and provide technical advise on certain aspects
of the dispute. Increased public participation and environmental expertise in the dispute resolution process could go a long way towards
overcoming the gap between free trade advocates and environmentalists. The inclusion of experts with environmental knowledge in the
adjudicatory process would facilitate the resolution of interpretational
difficulties which occur due to the competing policy objectives between
trade and the environment. Environmental experts will be able to help
determine the appropriate principles to differentiate between acceptable and unacceptable environmental measures. As outlined above, the
GATT does not prohibit environmental protection per se. The GATT is
concerned only with discriminatory measures which restrict trade.
The Gasoline decision illustrates that in relation to domestic environmental laws, the GATT requires that these laws be non-discriminatory or "necessary" for the protection of the environment or "related
to" conservation. The decision illustrates that domestic environmental
laws need to satisfy the GATT exceptions to be acceptable and it reinforces just how difficult it will be to satisfy these requirements, partic-

103. Geza Feketekuty, The Link between

MINN. J. GLoBAL TRADE 171, 199-200 (1993).
104. See Schultz, supra note 16.
105. DSU, supra note 2, art. 13, para 2.
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ularly the chapeau of Article XX. In applying the GATT exceptions,
Panelists and Appellate Body members are often required to make
technical and scientific rulings on questions of fact and interpretations
of law based on the imprecise and general tests of the Article XX provisions.
In this instance, the GATT rules were applied in a manner in
which achieved the "right" result. The Gasoline rule illustrates a poorly drafted, inefficient environmental regulation which could be characterized as an attempt at 'green' protectionism. The EPA rule was clearly facially discriminatory. In contrast to the situation afforded to domestic producers the rule denied foreign gasoline producers the opportunity to establish individual baselines. While the environmental objective of reducing gasoline pollution is clearly commendable, the rule
made no attempt to deal with improving the quality of gasoline from
"dirty" domestic producers with a low individual baseline. It was entirely appropriate for this regulation to be struck down by the new
WTO system." However, its fate should not be used by trade advocates as an excuse to stop work on assessing the relationship between
trade and the environment. It is essential to the long term future of
this planet that only those environmental regulations that are truly
discriminatory are found to be GATT illegal.

106. As Petersmann perceptively pointed out in relation to the Tuna Dolphin
Report,
[elven if there were a need to formally amend the GATT on environmental grounds-there is no convincing case for 'aggressive unilateralism'
and justified disobedience' so as to impose one's own national environmental standards on another country by means of unilateral discriminatory import restrictions. Self-righteous doctrines of 'creative
illegality', calling for breaches of GATT law as a means of improving
the law, and unilateral definitions of unfair trade are inconsistent with
a rule-orientated trading system and with the symmetry of reciprocal
GATT rights and obligations.
Petersmann, supra note 102, at 78.

Terrorist Airline Bombings & the Article
20(1) Defense Under the Warsaw Convention:
The Lockerbie Air Disaster Reconsidered
LARRY MOORE*
I. INTRODUCTION

The terrorist bombing of an airliner, such as the much litigated
Lockerbie disaster1 several years prior, is not simply a horrible disaster but a vicious international crime of epic dimensions against hundreds of innocent people including many children. Instinctively, any
person, including judges and jurors, cannot but feel some sympathy for
the victims and their grieving families. These feelings can sometimes
become an influential part of any litigation on the matter against the
targeted airline.
The 1929 International Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air 2 along with its modifications and additions governs monetary damages for injuries or deaths
arising out of such an international aircrash' The Warsaw Convention sharply limits the amounts that may be awarded, and as a result,
United States courts, even in minor cases, have always had a strong
hostility toward the Warsaw Convention.'

* Associate Professor of Business Law, Fogleman School of Business and Economics, University of Memphis; J.D., Washington University; M.A., University of
Memphis; B.A., Vanderbilt University.
1. See Pagnucco v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. (In re Air Disaster at
Lockerbie Scot. on Dec. 21, 1988), 37 F.3d 804 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 934 (1995) (Lockerbie).
2. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 49
U.S.C. § 40,105 (1994) [hereinafter Warsaw Convention].
3. See infra note 22.
4. See generally Larry Moore, Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd.: The United
States Supreme Court Eliminates the American Rule to the Warsaw Convention, 13
HASTINGS INTL & COMP. L. REV. 229 (1990) (discussing the Supreme Court's elimination, in its interpretation of the Warsaw Convention, of the American Rule, which
previously set aside the limits of the treaty if the required warning on the ticket
was set in a print size that was smaller than 10 point type) [Hereinafter Moore,
Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd.]; Larry Moore, Mental Injury and Lesion Corporelle
in InternationalAviation Under the Warsaw Convention: Eastern Airlines v. Floyd, 22
ACAD. LEGAL STUD. IN Bus. NAT'L PROC. 504 (1993) (analyzing the Supreme Court's
rejection of mental or psychic injury as an independent ground for recovering damages under the Warsaw Convention); Larry Moore, The Lockerbie Air Disaster: Punitive Damages in InternationalAviation, 15 HouS. J. INT'L L. 67 (1992) (commenting
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It is, therefore, manifestly important that the airline, which is
also a victim in a terrorist tragedy, receives a full and complete hearing before judgment. Otherwise, the defendant airline incurs the full
force of the anger and hostility that should be directed at the real
murderers. Upon reading the dissenting justice's opinion in Lockerbie,
it appears that such hostilities may have been transferred to the defendant Pan Am at the hands of the trial judge.5
The Warsaw Convention is a multinational treaty governing all
liability in the airline industry with regards to losses or injuries to
persons, baggage, or goods resulting from a delay or an accident while
the aircraft is involved in an international flight, or while the aircraft
serves as a leg of any other international flight.6 From 1988 until the
Second Circuit's Lockerbie decision, the decisions in Warsaw Convention cases were so consistent that it appeared there would be little
excitement or interest in future cases litigated under this international
treaty.7 However, with the decision in Lockerbie and the Supreme
Court's refusal to grant certiorari, 8 this view seems premature. New
questions now arise as to what latitude may be given to the United
States district courts in setting aside the damage limitations of the
Warsaw Convention and in awarding compensation beyond those of
the treaty.9 Such questions were previously considered answered. °
This article addresses the utilization and treatment of international law in this area by the courts and the attorneys in Lockerbie.
First, this article looks at the unusual nature of this case and at its
possible effects on the settled law. If indeed this case signals a return
to the days when the United States courts tended to frequently set
aside the Warsaw Convention at will, then we are back, in terms of
law, to where we were in 1988. Second, this article examines the strategy utilized in this case to determine if the defense made the best use
of international law in presenting its case.

on a Second Circuit ruling that brought the Court of Appeals into uniformity when
it held that punitive damages could not be allowed under the treaty and that the
Warsaw Convention was the sole cause of action for international air accidents)
[herinafter Moore, The Lockerbie Air Disaster]; Larry Moore, Air Disasters: Cause of
Actions in International Aviation Under the Warsaw Convention; Burying the Ghost
of Komlos, 2 SE. J. LEGAL STUD. Bus. 57 (1993) (discussing an eleventh Circuit
decision reaffirming the rule that the treaty provides the only cause of action in
international air accidents) [hereinafter Moore, Air Disasters]. See also L.
GOLDHIRSCH, THE WARSAW CONVENTION ANNOTATED: A LEGAL HANDBOOK (1988).

5. See Lockerbie, 37 F.3d at 830 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
6. Andreas Lowenfeld & Allan Mendelsohn, The U.S. and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497, 498-501 (1967).
7. Moore, The Lockerbie Air Disaster, supra note 4.
8. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Pagnucco, 115 S. Ct. 934 (1995).
9. See generally Lockerbie, 37 F.3d 804.
10. Moore, The Lockerbie Air Disaster, supra note 4.
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As the global business and legal community becomes ever more a
part of our daily lives, even skilled attorneys may find that attempting
to try these cases entirely in terms of domestic practices, without the
inclusion of substantial international techniques, limits the options
and results available.
II. THE WARSAW CONVENTION
The Warsaw Convention is one of the world's oldest general international treaties and exclusively governs international commercial air
travel. It was enacted in 1929 to protect the new aviation industry
from the disastrously large judgments possible in air accidents at the
time." It also provided uniformity among countries as to the content
of tickets, baggage claim checks, and airbills. 2 The information, found
on the standard international traveler's airline ticket, is required by
this treaty."3
Since its enactment, the treaty has been changed by a number of
conferences and meetings." To the United States, most of these conferences amounted to little, 5 having accepted only one modification
from them. 6 Even that modification was not an official one, rather it
was an indirect change resulting from an agreement reached in Montreal by major commercial airlines agreeing to both strict liability and
to an increase in liability limits to $75,000.00 in international accidents." This agreement was at the time enforced by the Civil Aeronautic Board, now the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).' 8
The original Warsaw Convention was the result of two international conferences whose purposes were to draft a law aiding the development of the fledgling airline industry. 9 The idea came from a proposal by the French called the Avant-Project, which proposed to fix
liability and provide for uniformity in the regulation of international
aviation." This proposal was submitted to the 1925 Paris Conference
on Private International Air Law, the first of two conferences held for
11. Larry Moore & Stephen P. Ferris, Air Disasters And Their Financial Effects
On The InternationalAviation Industry: JustificationFor The Warsaw Convention? 4
J. LEGAL STUD. IN Bus. 107, 107 (1995).
12. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 6, at 498.
13. Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 3.
14. See GEORGETrE MILLER, LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT 37-38

(1977).
15. See Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 549-50 (1991).
16. MILLER, supra note 14, at 37.
17. Agreement Relating to the Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention
and the Hague Protocol, May 16, 1966, CAB 18,900, approved by Order E-23680, 31
Fed. Reg. 7302, reprinted in note following 49 U.S.C. § 40,105 (1994) at 1147-48
[hereinafter Montreal Agreement].
18. Id.
19. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 6, at 498.
20. MILLER, supra note 14, at 12-13.
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this purpose.2 1 The first draft of the Warsaw Treaty came out of this
1925 Conference.22 A commission was formed and a panel of experts
was appointed to study the problems of aviation and to present proposed solutions to an international convention, specifically called on to
ratify these proposals.23 The commission was called the Comite International Technique d'Experts Juridiques Aeriens.' It considered this
problem over a four year period and made its final report to the second
conference held in Warsaw, Poland, in 1929.26 There, the treaty was
ratified by the member nations in October, 1929,2 and went into effect on February 13, 1933.27
The League of Nations and an additional 44 countries were invited to attend the 1929 Conference. 28 Thirty-two nations officially attended this conference, along with the representatives of the League of
Nations and the International Commission of Air Navigation. 29 The
United States sent a representative, but did not make a formal appearance as a participant and was listed as an unofficial attendant." The
United States became a formal signatory to the treaty in 1934.1
The United States never accepted the treaty because of its low
liability limit in cases of personal injury or death. 2 Under Article
22(1) of the Warsaw Convention, the total damages allowed was
125,000 Poincare francs33 or approximately $8,300.' The United
States eliminated even the opportunity for inflation adjustments when
it froze the value of gold. The United States later abandoned the gold
standard altogether.35 As a result of this abandonment of the gold

21. Id. at 12.
22. SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE AERONAUTICAL LAw, MIN-

UTES, October 4-12, 1929, Warsaw, 11-12 (Robert Homer & Didier Legrez trans., 2d

ed. 1975) [hereinafter MINUTES].
23. G. Nathan Calkins, Jr., The Cause of Action Under The Warsaw Convention,
26 J. AIR L. & COM. 217, 220, 227 (1959). See also MINUTES, supra note 22, at 17-

18.
24. Calkins, supra note 23, at 218 n.7.

25. Id. at 227.
26. Id. at 236.
27. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 6, at 501.
28. MINUTES, supra note 22, at 3.
29. Barbara J. Buono, The Recoverability of Punitive Damages Under the Warsaw
Convention in Cases of Willful Misconduct: Is the Sky the Limit?, 13 FORDHAM INTL
L.J. 570, 575 (1990).
30. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 6, at 502.

31. Id.
32. Id. at 504-05.
33. Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 22.
34. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 6, at 49.
35. Rene Mankiewicz, The Judicial Diversification of Uniform Private Law Warsaw Conventions, 21 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 718, 719 (1972). Warsaw Convention article

22(4) states that the 125,000 francs "mentioned above shall be deemed to refer to
the French franc consisting of 65 1/2 milligrams of gold at the standard of fineness

of nine hundred thousandths. These sums may be converted into any national cur-
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standard, the damage limits have been frozen at the last official U.S.
gold to dollar exchange rate set by the Civil Aeronautics Board in
1958.8 Because of the low amount of recovery with no adjustments
for inflation, the United States courts have sought ways to avoid the
limits of this Warsaw Convention. 7
Due to the displeasure of the United States, the other member
nations sought a compromise and called a number of later conferences
and meetings to find an agreeable solution. 8 Few of these meetings
led to any major changes. 89 The most important modifications were
the Hague Protocol,' the Montreal Agreement,41 the Guatemala City
Protocol, 2 and the Guadalajara Warsaw Convention. 3
None of these treaties, however, satisfied the United States, and
none were ever ratified by Congress." Only the Montreal Agreement
has became a part of American law.' Criticism of the treaty and its
limit on damage awards was always severe in the United States"6 and
reached its climax in Ross v. Pan American Airways. 7 The protest

caused by this case led other nations, who were parties to the treaty,
to seek a compromise to the treaty amount without offending other nations."

rency in round figures." Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 22.
36. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 446 U.S. 243, 243 (1984).
37. Moore, Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., supra note 4.
38. MILLER, supra note 14, at 37-38.
39. Id. at 38, 258.
40. Protocol to Amend the Warsaw Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, opened for signature at Warsaw on
Oct. 12, 1929, done at the Hague, Sept. 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371 [hereinafter the
Hague Protocol]. This agreement, ratified by the other member nations in 1955, was
so unpopular in the United States that it was not submitted to the Senate for confirmation until 1961. Though the entire purpose of the Hague Warsaw Convention
was to appease the United States, its decision to raise the maximum damage award
to only $16,000 was still too low for the United States. The Hague Protocol was still
the subject of bitter debate until 1966 when the Montreal Agreement was placed
into effect. It was never formally ratified in this country. MILLER, supra note 14, at
498-501.
41. Montreal Agreement, supra note 17. See also MILLER, supra note 14, at 37.
42. MILLER, supra note 14, at 37-38. This 1971 Protocol raised the limits for
damages for nations signing it to $100,000. However, this was one of a number of
later modifications to the Warsaw Convention that the United States did not sign.
Moore & Ferris, supra note 11, at 110 n.27.
43. MILLER, supra note 14, at 38, 258. "This Protocol sought to solve the problems which arose when the contracting carrier used a third party carrier for some
part of the international flight." Moore & Ferris, supra note 11, at 110 n.28.
44. Moore & Ferris, supra note 11, at 110.
45. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 6, at 595-96.
46. Id. at 502-04.
47. Ross v. Pan Am. Airways, 85 N.E.2d 880 (N.Y. 1949). See also Moore & Ferris, supra note 11, at 110.
48. Moore & Ferris, supra note 11, at 110.
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The result was the 1955 Hague Protocol, which raised the treaty
limits to 250,000 Poincare francs or approximately $16,600." 9 The
United States rejected this compromise because it was still lower than
the $25,000 increase, recommended by the United States at the
time.50 Congress never ratified the Hague Protocol though it was debated within the Office of the President and within Congress for ten
years. 1 In 1965, those opposing the treaty prevailed and the United
States officially filed a Notice of Denunciation of the treaty which was
the first step in withdrawing from the Treaty.52 This led to further
negotiations among the member nations and among the airlines in an
attempt to keep the United States under the Warsaw Convention."
In a special meeting of the major air carriers of the member nations held in Montreal, Canada, in February of 1966, the private
agreement that is still in effect today was reached.5 This agreement
mollified, but did not eliminate criticism of the Warsaw Convention
within the United States as evidenced through its courts, which over
the years allowed numerous exceptions to the limitations of the Warsaw Convention. 5
However, beginning in 1989 with Chan v. Korean Air Lines,
Ltd., the United States Supreme Court and appellate courts have
issued a series of rulings sharply limiting the ability of lower courts to
look for rights and remedies outside the Warsaw Convention in adjudicating cases that arise under it.57
III. THE LOCKERBIE CASE
One means by which a court may still circumvent the limits established by the Warsaw Convention is to find that the injury was
caused by willful misconduct of the defendants as set forth in article
25(1) of the treaty." A number of cases have been tried upon this is-

49. Id.
50. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 6, at 506.
51. Moore & Ferris, supra note 11, at 111.
52. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 6, at 551. The United States was fully
prepared to denounce the treaty unless the limits of liability were raised to at least
$100,000. See Notice of Denunciation, 53 DEP'T ST. BULL. at 924-25 (1965).
53. Moore & Ferris, supra note 11, at 111.
54. Id.
55. Id. See also Moore, The Lockerbie Air Disaster, supra note 4.
56. Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 109 S. Ct. 1676 (1989).
57. Moore, Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., supra note 4.
58. Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 25. Article 25 (1) states:
[tihe carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of
this convention which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is
caused by his wilful misconduct or by such default on his part as, in
accordance with the law of the court to which the case is submitted, is
considered to be equivalent to wilful misconduct.
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sue 59 and it has been a major issue in several others.' Lockerbie is
such an Article 25(1) case. The manner in which it was conducted at
the trial level resulted in the defendants getting what can at best be
described as "minimal" due process and represents the attitude that
many U.S. judges have exhibited toward the Warsaw Convention since
its inception and represents the hazards to any defendant who does
not fully understand or utilize the treaty.6 '
The known facts, as based upon all of the evidence as summarized
in a straightforward analysis by the Court of Appeal's dissenting opinion, follow.62 On December 21, 1988, Pan Am Flight 103 from London
to New York exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland.' There was no hard
evidence to prove when, where, or how the bomb was placed on the
airplane.6 No one knows if the bomb was placed on an unmatched
piece of luggage, 5 that is a bag placed on board the plane but not accompanying any passenger," or if it was brought aboard by some unwitting pawn. 7 How the bomb got on board was a matter of controversy and its proof was a highly contested issue among experts.6
However, this was not the picture that the jury was allowed to see.6 9
A. Trial Issues
The Plaintiffs in this case proceeded under Article 25(1) of the
Warsaw Convention. ° This means that if the plaintiffs proved that
the defendants were guilty of willful misconduct, the defendants could
not then avail themselves of the liability limits of Article 22(1) of the
59. See Rowe v. Gatke, 126 F.2d 61 (7th Cir 1942); American Airlines, Inc. v.
Ulen, 186 F.2d 529 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Pekelis v. Transcontinental and W. Air, Inc.,
187 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1951); Grey v. American Airlines, Inc., 227 F.2d 282 (2d Cir.
1955); Koninklike Luchtvaart Maatschappij v. Tuller, 292 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1961);
Leroy v. Sabena Belg. World Airlines, 344 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1965); Berner v. British
Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965); Goepp v. American
Overseas Airlines, 117 N.Y.S.2d 276 (1952); Froman v. Pan Am. Airways, 135
N.Y.S.2d 619 (1954).
60. See Hill v. United Airlines, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 1048 (D. Kan. 1982); Republic
Nat'l Bank v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 815 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1987); Floyd v. Eastern
Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462 (11 Cir. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 499 U.S. 530
(1991); Harpalani v. Air India, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 797 (N.D. Ill. 1986); In re Air
Crash Disaster at Gander, 684 F. Supp. 927 (W.D. Kan. 1987).
61. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 6, at 499.
62. Pagnucco v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. (In re Air Disaster at
Lockerbie Scot. on Dec. 21, 1988), 37 F.3d 804, 830-37 (2nd Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 934(1995) (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 811.
64. Id. at 834 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 819.
67. Id. at 834 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 811.
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treaty" and thus become subject to unlimited liability under Article
25(1)." 2 Under the Warsaw Convention, willful misconduct means that
a carrier must have acted either 1) with knowledge that its actions
would probably result in injury or death7" or 2) in a conscious or reckless disregard of the fact that death or injury would be the probable
consequences of its actions. 7 Under this definition, the Warsaw
Convention's concept of willful misconduct involves an act or acts that
are a flagrant violation of a duty intended to protect passengers, luggage, and cargo.7" Thus, willful misconduct goes beyond the United
States' common law concept of ordinary negligence and raises it to a
level of fault that makes it more akin to our concept of gross negligence or reckless disregard of safety.7"
Further, if there is no willful misconduct in the law of a particular
nation in which a Warsaw Convention case is being tried, that case
must be tried under whatever principles exist in that nation's legal
system that is the equivalent of willful misconduct under the Warsaw
Convention.77 Note that this means that Article 25(1) is not to be read
in such a manner as to allow the individual nation to determine if the
act or actions in question would be considered willful misconduct by local standards. In other words, though Article 25(1) refers to local customs, because of its insistence on equivalence, it is obvious that there
is the intent to establish a uniform international standard."
If a plaintiff is successful in proving that the defendant was guilty
of willful misconduct, this removes the limitations on damages established in Article 17 regarding amounts that may be awarded for injury
or death.79 This is not a blanket waiver of damage limitations

71. Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 22. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
72. Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 25. For text of article 25(1), see supra

note 58.
73. Lockerbie, 37 F.3d at 812; See also Juan Acosta, Willful Misconduct under
the Warsaw Convention: Recent Trends and Developments, 19 U. MIAMI L. R. 575,
575 (1965).
74. Lockerbie, 37 F.3d at 812; see also Acosta, supra note 73, at 575.

75. Acosta, supra note 73, at 589.
76. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS Sec. 500 (1977).
An actor's conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another if he

does an act or intentionally fails to do an act that was his duty to the
other to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts that would lead
a reasonable man to realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, but also that such risk is
substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct
negligent.

Id.
77. Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 25. For the text of article 25(1), see
supra note 58.
78. Id.

79. Warsaw convention, supra note 2, art. 17. Article 17 states that:
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though." The defendant does not become liable for all manner of
damages resulting from the accident, that is, it does not expand the
types of damages beyond those allowed under Article 17.81 It merely
removes the dollar limit for Article 17 damages which only allow damages for personal injury."2 The damage limit is determined in gold
francs, because the United States was subject to the gold standard
until 1 9 5 8 .' Additionally, the damages are subject, in this country, to
the modification of the 1965 Montreal Agreement which raised the
award limitation to $75,000.00.84
B. Judicial Proceedings
At trial, the plaintiffs proceeded to show that the defendants'
security measures were so defective, specifically in its failure to comply
with FAA regulations concerning unaccompanied baggage, as to
amount to willful misconduct under Article 25(1)." The defense countered with a straightforward denial of misconduct and proceeded to
attempt to offer proof in support of this position." However, in relying
solely on Article 25(1), the defendants unintentionally damaged both
their case on appeal and their successful application to the Supreme
Court to grant certiorari. To help fully understand what happened in
this case, it may be best to summarize what was proven at the trial
based upon all the facts gleaned from both the majority and dissenting
opinion.
The plaintiffs' position was that the defendants' baggage handling
procedure violated accepted FAA procedure and that there was no oral
waiver from the agency of this procedure.87 Because of this defective
procedure, a terrorist was able to hide a bomb, disguised as a Toshiba
radio, in a suitcase8 that was then placed on an airplane in Malta,
Spain.89 This luggage was then transferred to the targeted Pan Am

[tihe carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the
death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by
a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took
place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of
embarking or disembarking.

Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 446 U.S. 243, 243 (1984).
84. Moore & Ferris, supra note 11, at 112.
85. Pagnucco v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. (In re Air Disaster at
Lockerbie Scot. on Dec. 21, 1988), 37 F.3d 804, 811 (2nd Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 934 (1995).
86. Id. at 812.
87. Id. at 813-17.
88. Id. at 811.
89. Id.
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flight in Frankfurt, Germany. ° The bag was x-rayed, but not
physically examined, at the Frankfurt airport in violation of FAA regulations." The plane stopped in London before taking off for the United States.2 Over Lockerbie, Scotland, the bomb exploded, killing all
aboard. Further, the defendants ignored repeated warnings, even to
the point of hiding warnings from the crew and passengers. 4
The plaintiffs' proof, as well as that offered by the defendants,
was to be derived primarily through the testimony of expert witnesses. 5 This was because causation, the most important issue in this
case, could not proven by any direct evidence and had to be developed
by the testimony of experts." At trial, as a result of the trial judge's
rulings on a series of plaintiffs' objections, almost all of the defendants'
experts, and therefore, their case was excluded from the jury. The
jury thus heard only the plaintiffs' side of the case and returned a
verdict against the defendants.9 8 An award of damages was granted
to the estate of three victims as a test case for appeal on certain questions concerning damages under the treaty." The damage award issue was whether the awards went beyond the provisions of the Warsaw Convention both as to the amount under Article 22 and as to the
type under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention."° The damage
award for the remaining plaintiffs was to await the appellate decision
on these issues.'
On appeal, the majority for the Court of Appeals, obviously, had a
great deal of trouble in both deciding and in explaining its position in
this case."° The initial decision was found unsatisfactory and a new
decision issued." Conceptually, the opinion decided two classes of

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 820.
Id. at 811.
Id. at 824-25.
Id. at 824-25. The dissenting judge, believed that:
[tihe district judge treated this case as if Pan Am were being prosecuted for criminally violating a federal statute and, relying on his erroneous interpretation of criminal law, precluded every attempt by Pan Am
to demonstrate that it did not know or believe that the probable result
of its conduct would be injury to the plaintiffs.
Id. at 841 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 811. "At the conclusion of the damages phase $9,225,000 was awarded
to the Pagnucco family, $9,000,000 to the Bainbridge family, and $1,735,000 to the
Porter family." Id.
99. Id. at 810.
100. Id. at 811.
101. Id. at 810.
102. Id. at 810 n.1.
103. Id.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
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issues. The main issue concerned the admissibility of evidence.01T The
other issue regarded the nature of the damages that may be permitted. O
It was the issue regarding the admissibility of evidence that
caused the difficulties for the Court of Appeals. In analyzing the question of evidence, the court looked at a series of issues and rulings on
testimony. First, it ruled that the lower court's rejection of the
defendants' evidence, which the defendants claimed showed its state of
mind, was not enough to warrant a new trial since the trial court decided that the defendant had received numerous warnings and ignored
them."8
Although the court found there was error in rejecting the evidence
of the defendants, showing that their security procedures were the
same as those required by British security regulations, the court determined this was harmless error, as the defendants were able to place
some evidence before the jury in other parts of the trial showing the
effectiveness of their x-ray system."°7 The court also held that the trial court's exclusion of the defendants' expert to counter the testimony
of the plaintiffs' expert, as to the security risk of unaccompanied luggage,8 was corrected by the trial court's curative instruction to the jury.

10

While the trial court's acceptance of the plaintiffs' presentation of
unrelated security issues was found to be prejudicial, this was considered proper because it showed causation."°8 The court further held
that there was no error in barring the defendants' expert witnesses as
to causation and in limiting the defendants' cross-examination of the
plaintiffs' witness.1 10 The court also found it was harmless error to
have allowed the plaintiffs' expert to conclude that the defendants
were in violation of the FAA regulation."' Finally, the court concluded that the defendants were not harmed by being denied the right to
demonstrate the effectiveness of their x-ray because the plaintiffs stipulated as to its operation. 2
Regarding the question of damages, the jury not only awarded
damages for wrongful death, it also allowed damages for loss of society
and companionship. 13 The court looked at the damages permitted

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 811.
at
at
at
at

819.
821.
822.
824.

110. Id. at 825.
111. Id. at 827:
112. Id. at 828.
113. Id. at 830 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
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under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention and held that losses had to
be limited to those allowed under the treaty."4 It ruled that the loss
of companionship and society would not be allowed to adult children of
victims and reversed the trial court on this issue.11 5
In the defendants' petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme
Court, the only issues left for consideration, though critical to the
defendants' case, were questions regarding the admissibility of evidence in areas where the law was well established.11 The Supreme
Court has maintained a practice in Warsaw Convention cases in recent
years of only taking those cases in which there is either some new
questions about the treaty, or where the court had to correct an improper use or interpretation of the treaty in the lower courts." 7 With
nothing to consider here but a relatively mundane question of admissibility of evidence, it is not surprising that certiorari was denied in this
case.
C. Article 20(1) As A Defense Tool In Warsaw Convention Cases
As one reads through the Circuit Court of Appeal's summary of
the defendants' actions in this case as laid out by the plaintiffs, one
can easily become embittered towards the defendants. It is only after
reading the dissenting opinion, which painstakingly laid out the elements of the defendants' case that was kept from the jury, does the
case come back into perspective and allows one to see that the defendants had a legitimate and reasonable defense to the charge of willful
misconduct. If hearing only one side of the case can enrage this author,
who is an expert in Warsaw Convention cases, the subsequent verdict
from a jury is not surprising. The Court of Appeals decision that the
evidentiary rulings were harmless error is not persuasive.
The defendants cannot be faulted for the strategy used in this
case. Because they had a fairly good defense, they decided to meet the
plaintiffs' allegations head on, challenging the plaintiffs' facts with
their facts, and the plaintiffs' experts with their own." 8 The defendants could not have reasonably anticipated that the trial judge would
allow all of the plaintiffs' proof and bar almost all of the defendants'
proof to the jury."' The trial judge treated this case as if it were a
criminal case where the defendants knowingly broke the law, instead
of as a civil suit where the issue was whether the defendants did all

114. Id. at 829-30.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 838-39.
117. Moore, Air Disasters, supra note 4.
118. Pagnucco v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. (In re Air Disaster at
Lockerbie Scot. on Dec. 21, 1988), 37 F.3d 804, 834 (2nd Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 934 (1995) (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 845-46.
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that they could do to carry out the goals of an administrative regulation.12 °
In retrospect, had the defendants utilized Article 20(1) of the
convention121 in framing their defense, it would have enhanced the
ability to get their case before the jury, or in getting the Supreme
Court to grant an appeal for the following reasons.
Article 20(1), among other things, absolves the defendant from
liability if the defendant proves that it and its agents had taken all
necessary measures to avoid the damage that has been caused." The
language of Article 20(1) places an affirmative duty on the defendant
to prove that it took reasonable and necessary steps to prevent the
accident."= Thus, if the defendant proceeds under this section, its
actions become a jury question where the evidence is evaluated to
determine if the defendant's actions satisfied the language of Article
20(1). Most importantly, the trial judge would not be in a position to
exclude the defendant's evidence, as was done so easily and completely
in this case, where evidence was offered only in opposition to the
plaintiffs' proof presented under Article 25(1). In other words, since the
burden of proof falls upon the defendant, under Article 20(1) it becomes more difficult for the court to exclude evidence on grounds that
it is immaterial, or reduce it to a cautionary warning to the jury, without placing such rulings in jeopardy of being reversed as prejudicial error. More importantly, however, it allows the defendant to raise an
issue under the Warsaw Convention for appeal purposes. In the past,
appeals on these grounds have received far greater attention by the
Supreme Court than other types of issues, such as questions of evidence as in this case.' 2'
Using Article 20(1), the defendants could have then called their
experts and through their testimony presented critical evidence. For
instance, no one knew who placed the bomb on the airplane." Next,
any theories of how the bomb got on board were just that, theories of
the testifying experts. 26 The questions of whether the bomb was in a
Toshiba radio in an unaccompanied bag or whether it was carried on

120. Id. at 841 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
121. Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 20. Article 20(1) states that "the carrier shall not be liable if he proves that he and his agents have taken all necessary
measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for him or them to take
such measures." Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Moore, Air Disasters, supra note 4.
125. Pagnucco v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. (In re Air Disaster at
Lockerbie Scot. on Dec. 21, 1988), 37 F.3d 804, 834 (2nd Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 934 (1995) (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
126. Id.
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board by an unsuspecting passenger was all a matter of complete speculation."
Another argument is that the company had asked for and believed
it had obtained an interpretation of the FAA airport security regulations which allowed x-ray inspection as an acceptable alternate to
physical examination, a request it was allowed to make.'28 The defendants could have also shown that they had numerous FAA inspections at the Frankfurt airport before and after the attack; that the
defendants were never cited for their use of x-rays; s that the Pentagon relied on x-ray scanning;.. that shortly after this disaster, the
FAA approved x-ray examination at all airports;"' that Great Britain, facing Irish Republican Army terrorism, used x-ray to guard
against terrorist bombs; 3 2 that the x-ray used by the defendant was
the most expensive and effective machine on the market and was one
that would have easily shown a Toshiba radio in a suitcase; 33 and
that the warning did not apply to the defendants because the defendants had been told a bomb would be placed on its plane by an unsuspecting Flemish female passenger and, as a precaution, had increased
security looking for a person of that description.'
The defendants could have shown that it would have been highly
unlikely for a terrorist to have taken a chance on a complicated bombing scheme in which a suitcase would criss-cross a continent subject to
uncertain airline schedules, delays, and multiple take-offs and landing." That would have made it impossible to guarantee that the
bomb would not go off on the ground or get misplaced altogether. 3 '
Finally, the defendants would have been allowed to show that no such
luggage as
described in the defendants' case had been placed on the
137
airplane.
The defendants would then be in a position to take evidence presented in their affirmative defense pursuant to Article 20(1) and utilize
it as a defense against the charge of willful misconduct under Article
25(1) on the grounds this proof showed a mens rea to avoid the terrorist attack for which they were warned. Therefore, the defendants could
not have been guilty of willfully allowing the attack.
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Id.
Id. at 845.
Id. at 841.
Id. at 836 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
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IV.

CONCLUSION

Even after hearing all of the defendants' proof, the jury might
possibly have returned the same verdict. However, in such a case, this
would be a verdict based upon all of the relevant facts and the defendants would have received the due process rights guaranteed to them
under the constitution. Conversely, the results of the trial and appeal
in this case gave the defendant minimum due process, if any at all.
It comes as no surprise, however, that the Supreme Court did not
grant certiorari. On the crucial question of evidence, the defense did
not question either the management of the Warsaw Convention by the
United States courts or the terms of the treaty. All that remained was
whether the trial court properly ruled on the admissibility of evidence.
Indeed, though not discussed at length in this paper, the defendants, at the Circuit Court level, won the only Warsaw Convention
question raised at trial.1" The Court agreed that the jury could not
award damages for certain parental losses because they were not of
the type allowed under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, as the
damages could not be applied to adult children not under their parents
supervision for purposes of the treaty."9 The Circuit Court treated
every other issue as merely a bad call by the trial judge, whose rulings
changed neither the interpretation nor the application of the treaty in
the United States. It has been these latter issues that have been the
main concern of the Supreme Court in Warsaw Convention cases."4
Because the issues on appeal did not raise any new questions of law in
evidence or under the treaty, this case would be little more than a
footnote to the history of the treaty in this country; therefore, it was of
little appellant value for the Supreme Court.
To attorneys and practitioners under this treaty or any other
international treaty, the lessons from this case are enormous. Attorneys must realize that when proceeding under a treaty they must
utilize all elements of the treaty and not necessarily the most obvious
sections in question. Attorneys must also be able to recognize when a
trial court is lapsing into local considerations so that the attorney can
remind the court of the cases international aspects. If this is not successful, then the attorney must be able to draft the appeal in terms
that will bring forth the international questions, possibly hidden in the
case, so as to force a true consideration of the treaty and their case on
the merits. Otherwise, the results could be the same as in Lockerbie,
where a magnificent international legal issue was reduced to a ruling
on the admissibility of evidence.

138. Id. at 828-30.
139. Id.
140. Moore, Air Disasters, supra note 4.

The United Nations and Democratic
Intervention: Is "Swords into
Ballot Boxes" Enough?
KARL J. IRVING*

I. INTRODUCTION

After each war there is a little less democracy to save.
-

Brooks Atkinson, Once around the Sun

Commentary on "second-generation" U.N. peacekeeping operations
has focused mainly on trends in civil conffict management and on the
difficulties they pose for the United Nations.' Like the Organization
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1. Important reviews of contemporary peacekeeping include: Jarat Chopra, Back
to the Drawing Board: International Peacekeeping Efforts, 51 Bulletin Atomic Scientists 29 (1995) [hereinafter Chopra, Back to the Drawing Board]; BEYOND TRADITIONAL PEACEKEEPING (Donald Daniel & Bradd Hayes eds., 1995); Alvaro De Soto &
Graciana Del Castillo, Implementation of Comprehensive Peace Agreements: Staying
the Course in El Salvador, 1 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 189 (1995); MICHAEL DOYLE, UN
PEACEKEEPING IN CAMBODIA: UNTAC'S Cw.T, MANDATE (1995); STEVEN RATNER, THE
NEW UN PEACEKEEPING: BUILDING PEACE IN LANDS OF CONFLICT AFTER THE COLD
WAR (1995); THE UNITED NATIONS AND CIVIL WARS (Thomas Weiss ed., 1995); Alvaro
De Soto & Graciana Del Castillo, Obstacles to Peacebuilding, 94 FOR. POL 69 (1994);
Philippe Guillot, The United Nations and Internal Conflict Resolution: Promoting
Western Standardsof Democracy through Multidimensional Peace Support Operations,
ELSA L. Rev. 93 (1994); Ramesh Thakur, From Peacekeeping to Enforcement: The
UN Operation in Somalia, 32 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 387 (1994); Ramses Amer, The
United Nations' Peacekeeping Operation in Cambodia: Overview and Assessment, 15
CONTEMP. SE. ASIA 211 (1993); ENFORCING RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN
INTERNAL CONFLICTS (Lori Damrosch ed., 1993) [hereinafter ENFORCING RESTRAINT];
PAUL DIEHL, INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING (1993); THE EVOLUTION OF U.N. PEACEKEEPING: CASE STUDIES AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (William Durch ed., 1993) [here-
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itself, however, such treatises fail to focus beyond the short-term and
evaluate the consequences and responsibilities of the international
community by using closure of civil war as a means to expand democratic liberalism. Foreign aid and diplomatic pressure long have been
customary in international relations, but the rally of intergovernmental organizations around a fairly broad consensus regarding internal
intervention in pursuit of desired ends is quite new. The novelty lies in
the combination of two concepts-the willingness of the international
community to interfere in the internal affairs of a sovereign state
when its government conducts or allows human rights violations, and
the will to extend such enforcement to agreements on civil and political
rights that epitomize democratic ideals. The hesitancy involved in such
an extension, however, has made it difficult to plan the progressive
stages necessary for transition from civil war or authoritarian government to irreversible democracy.
A wave of collective democratic institution-building began with
U.N. supervision of elections in Namibia upon its independence in
1989. Over the next half decade, through operations in Angola, Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, Somalia, and Western Sahara, the
United Nations has promoted varying degrees of democratization. More
recently, its goal has been to actually restore democracy in Haiti.2
What has not been fully explored is how administrative intervention
can be justified and what, exactly, the international community is
trying to achieve. The principle of sovereignty, as it has evolved, arguably allows for some degree of protection of civil and political rights
and assistance of government administration. Actual movement in this
direction by the international community, however, has aimed at promoting development of democratic institutions and practices in ways
that fail to take into account the needs of a democratic consolidation
process, particularly in states that have emerged from ruinous civil
war. Quick to declare "success" and move on, the international community has, in the process, virtually ignored problems of public administration. The member states that determine U.N. activities have paid

inafter THE EVOLUTION OF U.N. PEACEKEEPING]; Marrack Goulding, The Evolution of
United Nations Peacekeeping, 69 INT'L AFF. 451 (1993); David Holiday & William
Stanley, Building the Peace: Preliminary Lessons from El Salvador, 46 J. INT'L AFF.
415 (1993); and John MacKinlay & Jarat Chopra, Second Generation Multinational
Operations, 15 WASH. Q. 113 (1992).
2. Following is a list of operations whose acronyms are referenced in this article: la Mission des Nations Unies pour le Referundum du Sahara Occidental
(MINURSO); l'Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC); los Observadores
de las Naciones Unidas en El Salvador (ONUSAL); l'Oplration des Nations Unies au
Mozambique (ONUMOZ); the U.N. Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM); the U.N.
Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF); the U.N. Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP); the
U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL); the U.N. Operations in Somalia
(UNOSOM); the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR); and the U.N. Transitional
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).
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little regard to corruption and other abuses of discretion by the various
branches of government and their undemocratic connections with
elites, problems that could lead to legislative deadlock or, worse, to a
resumption of armed hostilities.3 With regard to Bosnia-Hercegovina,
while the Dayton accords provided for the adjudication of human
rights abuses, they paid scant attention to implementation of complex
power-sharing arrangements. Indeed, they gave little thought to events
beyond the first six-to-nine months of operations.'
The United Nations should look beyond its custom of formally
ending centralized arrangements after the first elections of a new democratic system of government. Instead, it should regard peace operations as a continuum of third party dispute settlement extending from
the mediation of the conflict and the early stages of peace accord implementation all the way through to consolidation of democratic institutions. Experience in the early stages of the implementation of peace
accords shows that parties often remain highly distrustful, exploiting
ambiguity in the accords and lack of diligence in oversight on the part
of the international community. Such practices are likely to carry over
into the daily operation of government, even after "free and fair" elections have been held. If what the United Nations is trying to achieve is
lasting peace through accords based on democratic governance, it

3. Works addressing the shifting mores of sovereignty include: Geoffrey Howe,
Sovereignty, Democracy and Human Rights, 66 POL. Q. 126 (1995); BEYOND
WESTPHALIA?: STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION (Gene Lyons &
Michael Mastanduno eds., 1995) [hereinafter BEYOND WESTPHALIA?]; Jarat Chopra &
Thomas G. Weiss, Sovereignty is No Longer Sacrosanct: Codifying Humanitarian
Intervention, 6 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 95 (1994); Tom Farer, Collectively Defending
Democracy in a World of Sovereign States: The Western Hemisphere's Prospect, 15
HUM. RTs. Q. 716 (1993); Lori Damrosch, Politics across Borders: Nonintervention
and Nonforcible Influence over Domestic Affairs, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1989); Thomas
Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992);
and David Scheffer, Toward a Modern Doctrine of HumanitarianIntervention, 23 U.
TOL. L. REV. 253 (1992). Some problems related to democratization can be found in
the following: DEVELOPING DEMOCRACY: COMPARATIVE RESEARCH IN HONOR OF J.F.P.
BLONDEL 244-45 (Ian Budge & David McKay eds., 1994) [hereinafter DEVELOPING
DEMOCRACY]; GERAINT PARRY & MICHAEL MORAN, DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION
(1994); BUILDING DEMOCRACY?: THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF DEMOCRATISATION
IN EASTERN EUROPE (Geoffrey Pridham et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter BUILDING DEMOCRACY?]; Doh Chull Shin, On the Third Wave of Democratization: A Synthesis and
Evaluation of Recent Theory and Research, 47 WORLD POL. 135, 144 (1994); and
BOUND TO CHANGE: CONSOLIDATING DEMOCRACY IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE (Peter
Volten ed., 1992) [hereinafter BOUND TO CHANGE].
4. There are, however, provisions for a Human Rights Chamber and an ombudsman with significant powers of inquiry. See R. Jeffrey Smith & Dana Priest,
Troops Given Wide Range of Authority, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 1995, at A36. There is
also a reconciliation program being developed that is aimed at long-term grass roots
developments, but which still does not address the problems of government administration. See Christine Spolar, Serbs Reassured on Safety after Sarajevo is Unified:
Presidency Seeks Ways to 'Break Wall of Distrust,' WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 1995, at
A10.

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 25:1

needs to maintain a formal, centralized oversight role in the
peacebuilding period to assure all parties involved that security and
civil and political rights will be observed by and for all parties, as
dictated by the joint agreement under which they have agreed to operate. With an invitation by the parties to hold power of consiliariusor
consent jurisdiction - offering ongoing advice and even exercising
quasi-adjudicatory powers in the case of an impasse - the United
Nations would be working in respect of sovereignty, not in spite of it.
II. SOVEREIGNTY LOST?

Intervene. 0 descend as a dove or
A furious papa or a mild engineer, but descend.
-

W. H. Auden, "Spain 1937"

Much of the debate over the legitimacy of U.N. intervention centers on the customary principle of sovereignty emphasized in article
2(7) of the Charter, which prohibits interference in "matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." A 1949 review accurately predicted the salience of this paragraph: "Being
couched in general terms, its interpretation will become a decisive
factor in determining whether the United Nations will be an organization of large and expanding responsibilities or be kept within relatively
narrow limits .

. . ."'

The juridical principle of sovereignty has its for-

mal origins in the treaties of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty
Years' War in Europe in 1648. The treaties bestowed autonomous power upon the various ruling figures of Western Europe to end the chaotic climate caused by prolific inter-territorial interference, with an expectation that individual sovereigns could be entrusted to maintain
order
within their borders so as to conduct stable relations with oth6
ers.

5. LELAND M. GOODRICH

& EDVARD HAMBRO,

CHARTER OF THE UNITED NA-

TIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 113 (2d ed. 1949), quoted in ABIODUN WILLIAMS, Introduction to ARTICLE 2(7) REVISITED 2 ACUNS Reports and Papers no.5,
1994 (Academic Council on the United Nations system).
6. LOUIS W. GOODMAN, Democracy, Sovereignty, and Intervention, 9 AM. U. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 27, 27 (1993); and Gene Lyons & Michael Mastanduno, Introduction: International Intervention, State Sovereignty, and the Future of International
Society, in BEYOND WESTPHALIA?, supra note 3, at 5. While the treaties were mostly
designed to cover religious matters, each sovereign was given the basis for territorial
sovereignty (landeshoheit), even over the conduct of foreign policy.
Since majority interests were safeguarded in the new Imperial Assembly
[of the Holy Roman Empire], to the extent of allowing a minority veto
in all matters where the assembly could not be considered a united
body-not just in religion, but also in all political and fiscal matters
somehow attributable to it-the Imperial Assembly came to resemble a
permanent ambassadorial conference rather than a parliament.
THOMAS MUNCK, SEVENTEENTH CENTURY EUROPE: STATE, CONFLICT AND THE SOCIAL

ORDER IN EUROPE, 1598-1700, at 23 (1990).
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The Westphalian system was never fully sacrosanct, as its Treaty
of OsnabrUck made provisions ensuring the religious tolerance of minorities. Similarly, "minorities treaties" at the end of the first World
War required protection of minority rights, as well as mechanisms to
oversee their implementation.! Norms of international relations that
have become customary international law, such as diplomatic immunity, or certain jus cogens principles of human rights, such as the prohibition on genocide, further delimit state sovereignty. Moreover, as a
very exercise of their sovereign rights, states may relinquish partial
sovereignty by adhering to formal international agreements. 8 International law arguably is not much more than a registry of such relinquishments' The International Court of Justice has stated that it
cannot find "any obstacle" to the authority of a state to bind itself by
consent in a way that would affect domestic policy,10 and many multilateral conventions have maintained ongoing regulatory decisionmaking powers binding on all signatories.11 With ever-multiplying
rules of interstate interaction, in fact, the negative connotation of "intervention" generally no longer applies to non-forcible outside assistance that 12strengthens the state in question, even without government
invitation.
Whether a given intervention "strengthens" a state is no less
obscure than whether a matter is "essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction"; thus the exercise of discretion by the international com-

7. E.g., Friedrich Kratochwil, Sovereignty as Dominium: Is There A Right of
Humanitarian Intervention?, in BEYOND WESTPHALIA?, supra note 3, at 30; HURST
HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE ACCOMMODATION
OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS 52-54 (1990).
8. See, e.g., The S.S. Wimbledon (Gr. Brit., Fr., Italy, Japan, Pol. v. Ger.), 1923
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 1, at 25 (Aug. 17) (stating "[tihe court declines to see, in the
conclusion of any treaty by which a State undertakes to perform or refrain from
performing a particular act, an abandonment of its sovereignty . . . the right of
entering into international engagements is an attribute of State sovereignty"), cited
in IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 288 (4th ed. 1990).
9. Jack Donnelly, State Sovereignty and International Intervention: The Case of
Human Rights, in BEYOND WESTPHALIA?, supra note 3, at 118.
10. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. REP. 131 (June 17) 259, quoted in Domingo Acevedo, The Haitian
Crisis and the OAS Response: A Test of Effectiveness in Protecting Democracy, in
ENFORCING RESTRAINT, supra note 1, at 129. Note, however, that this may not extend to the use of military force, even pursuant to treaty provisions, as it may violate jus cogens principles of sovereignty and territorial sovereignty that would make
treaties void ab initio under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. See
generally, David Wippman, Treaty-Based Intervention: Who Can Say No?, 62 U. CHI.
L. REV. 607 (1995).
11. HANNUM, supra note 7, at 21-22. Nevertheless, Hannum supports the notion
of the Wimbledon case (supra note 8) that such voluntary delegation of
decisionmaking is not a limitation of sovereignty, but "one of the ultimate sovereign
acts." HANNUM, supra note 7, at 22.
12. Nicholas Onuf, Intervention for the Common Good, in BEYOND WESTPHALIA?,
supra note 3, at 49-50.
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munity brings a political element to international policy-making. Inis
Claude states that while ratification of the U.N. Charter puts "practically every conceivable subject" in the international domain, art. 2(7)
could be interpreted as weakening the whole Charter." Thus, interpretation of this clause operates in the context of inter-state relationships, which are political by their very nature.14 The Permanent
Court of International Justice ruled that whether a certain matter is
within the sole jurisdiction of a state "depends on the development of
international relations." 5 Similarly, the International Court of Justice
stated that the General Assembly retains "a measure of discretion with
respect to the forms and procedures by which [a] right is to be realized." 6 As a consequence, international law remains too ephemeral to
rely upon in times of crisis, and "the Security Council makes decisions
to intervene not according to objective criteria but, rather, according to
what the international political traffic will bear.""
The General Assembly attempted to define inadmissible state
intervention, starting with the adoption of a declaratory statement in
1965 and ending with a more detailed declaration in 1981 that failed
to gain consensus."s More recently, as one scholar noted, "the pace of
U.N. implementation since 1990 has outstripped the international
agenda of fifty years"9 in terms of providing for foreign intervention
in support of human rights.20 The protection of fundamental human
rights has its origins as far back as the Concert of Europe's drive to
abolish the slave trade, but in the last half century the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
and the Helsinki Final Act-among many other treaties, declarations,
and so on-set new, integral standards. 2' Since the late 1980s, the

13. INIS L. CLAUDE, SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES: THE PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS

OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 166-67 (4th ed. 1971).
14. Id. at 183-84.
15. Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco (Gr. Brit. v. Fr.), 1923
P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 4, at 143 (Feb. 7) (advisory opinion), cited in Weiss & Chopra,
Sovereignty under Siege: From Intervention to Humanitarian Space, in BEYOND
WESTPHALIA?, supra note 3, at 96.
16. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 36 (Oct. 16) (advisory opinion), cited in
HANNUM, supra note 7, at 38.
17. Weiss, The United Nations and Civil Wars at the Dawn of the Twenty-First
Century, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND CIVIL WARS, supra note 1, at 201. The decision by European governments in the case of the former Yugoslavia to extend the
Helsinki principle of territorial integrity to internal as well as international frontiers
demonstrates the influence of politics in interpretations of law. See Marc Weller, The
InternationalResponse to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 569.
18. U.N. G.A. Res. 20/2131 (1965), and U.N. G.A. Res. 36/103 (1981), respectively, cited in Onuf, supra note 12, at 50.
19. Jarat Chopra, U.N. Civil Governance in Trust, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND
CIVIL WARS, supra note 1, at 69.
20. Id.
21. E.g., Robert Jackson, International Community beyond the Cold War, in BE-
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documents were used to justify humanitarian intervention without consent, instigated in part by the General Assembly itself. A G.A. resolution in 1988 recognized the right of civilians to international aid and
the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as providers of
such aid, and a resolution two years later reinforced this by designating access corridors of "tranquility" for aid workers.22 Then, in 1991,
the Security Council authorized humanitarian intervention for the first
time, providing for protection of Kurdish populations in northern Iraq
despite Iraqi charges of a violation of sovereignty. The U.N. action
consequently marked a significant turning point in international custom regarding multilateral intervention that would be influential in
Somalia and several other states in the ensuing years."

III. COLLECTIVE DEMOCRATIZATION
Man's capacity for justice makes democracy possible, but man's inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary.
-Reinhold

Niebuhr, The Children of Light
and the Children of Darkness

Political acceptance of state intervention has grown exponentially
to include protection of a broad band of human rights. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights affirms the right of individuals to participate in government either directly or through representatives and "[t]o vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections
which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by
secret ballot."24 Some scholars have held that pressuring governments
that do not come to power by popular suffrage does not violate the
principle of non-intervention, as sovereignty lies with the people, not
the government.2 5 Thomas Franck argues that "democratic entitle-

YOND WESTPHALIA?, supra note 3, at 68. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
U.N. G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), and International Covenant on

Civil and Political Rights, U.N. G.A. Annex to Res 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. No.
16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) adopted 15 Dec. 1966, entered into force 23 Mar.
1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
22. U.N. G.A. Res. 43/131 (1988); U.N. G.A. Res. 45/100 (1990); noted in Weiss
& Chopra, supra note 15, at 95.
23. Paul Lewis, UN Votes to Condemn Handling of Iraq Rebels, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
6, 1991, at 6. See also, Marc Boutin, Somalia: The Legality of U.N. Forcible Humanitarian Intervention, 17 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 138, 147-48 (1994) (citing U.N.

Doc. S/Res.688, 1991). Then Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar would write
in his final annual report that year: "The principle of non-interference with the
essential domestic jurisdiction of states cannot be regarded as a protective barrier
behind which human rights could be massively or systematically violated with impunity." Cited in Chopra, Back to the Drawing Board, supra note 1, at 32.
24. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 21, art. 25.
25. E.g., Farer, supra note 3, at 721. See also Damrosch, supra note 3, at 36;
FERNANDO TESON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY (1988), cited in MAHMOOD MONSHIPOURI, DEMOCRATIZATION, LIBERALIZATION AND
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ment" is fast becoming a norm of the international system, with consensus building around the "right to democratic governance," beginning with this right to "free and fair" elections.28 As early as 1984, a
study by the U.N. Secretary-General commissioned by the General
Assembly on the issue concluded:
[T]he right to popular participation, in its most general terms, does
not appear to be expressly established as such by universal instruments having binding legal value. On the other hand, a number of
international texts of varying legal natures contain elements of
popular participation, and some of these texts go so far as to enunciate a global right to participation.27

As legal doctrine shifted, U.N. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali
carried the idea much further. Stating that "[riespect for democratic
principles at all levels of social existence is crucial: in communities,
within States and within the community of States,"2 he argued that
only in this manner can sovereignty and self-determination coexist
without working at cross-purposes.2"
A similar growth took place in global recognition of democratic
principles serving as a source of stability and peace. In 1968, the Security Council placed mandatory economic sanctions on the white minority government of Rhodesia under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter,
marking the first implicit connection of the protection of civil and political rights with the maintenance of international peace and security.30
More recently, Boutros-Ghali has maintained that "[tihere is an obvious connection between democratic practices-such as the rule of law
and transparency in decision-making-and the achievement of true
peace and security in any new and stable political order,"3" which was
a main purpose of the Westphalian system. The Organization of American States (OAS) has declared representative democracy an "indispensable condition for the stability, peace, and development of the region," 2 while the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE THIRD WORLD 63 (1995).

26. Franck, supra note 3, at 89, 91.
27. UNITED NATIONS, Study by the Secretary-General on Popular Participationin

its Various Forms as an Important Factor in Development and in the Full Realization of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/10, at 36 (1984); quoted in HANNUM,
supra note 7, at 114.

28. An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping:
Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., at 10, U.N. Doc. A/47/277
[hereinafter An Agenda for Peace].
Id.
Farer, supra note 3, at 726. See U.N. Doc. S/INF/23/Rev. 1 (1968).
An Agenda for Peace, supra note 28, at 34.
Farer, supra note 3, at 735; Richard Bloomfield, Advancing Democracy and
Human Rights in the Americas, in ADVANCING DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE AMERICAS: WHAT ROLE FOR THE OAS? 5 (1994), cited in Richard Millett, Beyond
(1992)
29.
30.
31.
32.

Sovereignty: International Efforts to Support Latin American Democracy, 36 J.

1996

DEMOCRATIC INTERVENTION

(CSCE) has declared that "pluralistic democracy and the rule of law
are prerequisites for progress in setting up the lasting order of peace,
security, justice and cooperation."" Accordingly, the OAS established
a Unit for Promotion of Democracy, the CSCE, an Office for Democracy
and Human Rights. 3
Parallel to these events, intergovernmental organizations have
come to link foreign aid and membership in regional and international
organizations to government compliance with "the principles of democracy," including the establishment of multi-party systems and free and
fair elections. 5 With an aim to promote democratic goals of transparency and accountability, envisioned as linked to the success of sustainable development. 8 the World Bank has rewritten fiscal and trade
policies, procurement rules, civil service requirements and administrative law, and regulations regarding policy areas such as labor, health
care, and the environment, imposing their adoption as conditions for
acquiring loans for projects.37 Some developing countries have already
expressed the sentiment that similar conditionalities dictating domestic financial policies that states must undertake to receive loans from

INTERAM. STUD. & WORLD AFF. 1, 5 (1995).
33. Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, 29 I.L.M. 1305, 1307 (1990), cited in Scheffer, supra note 3, at
276-77. The argument over the Kantian principle concerning whether democracy
leads to global or regional peace is well beyond the scope of this article and is addressed extensively elsewhere. For the original concept, see C. FRIEDRICH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT: IMMANUEL KANT'S MORAL AND POLITICAL WRITINGS 430-76 (1949).
34. See, respectively: Millett, supra note 32, at 3; and James Steinberg, International Involvement in the Yugoslavia Conflict, in ENFORCING RESTRAINT, supra note
1, at 57.
35. E.g., COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXIVTH GENERAL REPORT
ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 1990, at 267 (1991); cited in
Andrew Moravcsik, Lessons from the European Human Rights Regime, in ADVANCING
DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 30, at 42. See also, Pinder, The European Community and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, in BUILDING DEMOCRACY?, supra note 3, at 124 (citing from the "Europe Agreements"). See generally
Graham T. Allison Jr. & Robert P. Beschel Jr., Can the United States Promote Democracy?, 107 POL. SCI. Q. 81 (1992).
36. See THE WORLD BANK, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: FROM CRISIS TO SUSTAINABLE
GROWTH 60 (1989) (stating "fh]istory suggests that political legitimacy and consensus
are a precondition for sustainable development"). See also, James Butty, The Democracy Carrot: President Bush's Vision of a New World Order, W. AFR. 603 (Apr. 22,
1991) (stating "there is growing evidence that open societies that value individual
rights, respect the rule of the law, and have open and accountable governments
provide better opportunities for sustained economic development than do closed systems which stifle individual initiative").
37. According to a World Bank vice-president and general counsel, "conditionality
has thus evolved from macroeconomic measures to detailed reforms affecting the
public administration itself." Ibrahim Shihata, The World Bank and "Governance"
Issues in Its Borrowing Members, in THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD: SELECTED ESSAYS 59 (Franziska Tschofen & Antonio Parra eds., 1991), quoted in Jonathan Cahn, Challenging the New Imperial Authority: The World Bank and the Democratization of Development, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 159, 160, n.1 (1993).
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the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are akin to reviving colonial
rule, but it is hard to say they actually violate sovereignty as they are
part and parcel of a voluntary agreement,38 and the practice of conditionalities operated even within Europe long before their use in the
recognition of republics of the former Yugoslavia as newly independent--e.g., "sovereign"-states."9
The United Nations also has engaged in conditionalities within
the confines of mediation venues, using peacekeeping and technical assistance as bargaining tools. Beginning with the agreement to assist in
the elections of a newly independent Namibia in 1989, the United
Nations soon found itself with a growing franchise and ever-expanding
authority even prior to the perceived success of multilateralism of the
Gulf War. Although the Special Representative did not have control of
the Namibian election, the U.N. operation was "instrumental" in drafting an electoral law and ensuring compliance with it."0 Also in late
1989, an agreement concerning Western Sahara was reached that
would give the United Nations control over all laws and administration
that it felt might impact on planned elections." An agreement in
1990 in El Salvador called on the United Nations to verify the observance of fundamental rights and freedoms in the country, giving it the
authority to visit "any place or establishment freely or without prior
notice.""2 Later that year the implementation plan of the Cambodian

38. See Onuf, supra note 12, at 56. One should be careful with this argument,
however, as the moral use of forms of suasion other than pure oratorical debate is
suspect. See DOUGLAS LACKEY, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 156
(1984).
When I was a schoolboy there was a schoolyard bully who used to
punch kids in the arm. If you protested, he punched you ten times. If
you said you like it, he punched you five times. Many said they like it.
It does not follow that the bully did not violate their rights.
Id.
39. A cover letter to the Polish Minorities Treaty, written by Clemenceau, states
as follows:
It has for long been the established procedure of the public law of Europe that when a State is created, or even when large accessions of
territory are made to an established State, the joint and formal recognition of the Great Powers should be accompanied by the requirement
that such States should, in the form of a binding international Convention, undertake to comply with certain principles of Government.
CARLILE MACARTNEY, NATIONAL STATES AND NATIONAL MINORITIES 238 (1934), cited
by Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty and Intervention, in BEYOND WESTPHALIA?, supra
note 3, at 239. In regards to the criteria for acceptance of recognition of the former
republics of Yugoslavia, see Steinberg, supra note 34, at 37, as well as Weller, supra
note 17.
40. Chopra, supra note 19, at 79.
41. The Sitation Concerning Western Sahara: Report of the Secretary-General,
U.N. SCOR, 43rd Sess., 2826th mtg., Sept. 20, at 17, U.N. S/Res/621, (1988); The
Situation Concerning Western Sahara: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR,
45th Sess., at 17 U.N. Doc. S/21360 (1990).
42. William Durch, Epilogue: Peacekeeping in Uncharted Territory, in THE EvO-
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peace accords stated that "administrative agencies, bodies and offices"
would be placed "under the direct control" of the United Nations operation there.' To James Rosenau, growth in collective administrative
intervention was not unexpected, as it formed part of an amalgam of
interventionary expansion that was building momentum in the electoral and peacekeeping areas, just as domestic economies had become
increasingly subject to international management."
With the responsibility of elections oversight has come the understanding that such operations should include "reforming or
strengthening governmental institutions." 5 Even traditional U.N. operations have performed tasks of public administration - mail exchange by UNDOF (Golan Heights); 6 the running of utilities, schools,
and a hospital by UNIFIL (Lebanon); 7 firefighting and animal control
by UNFICYP (Cyprus)" - but almost all of the U.N. peace support
missions established since 1989 have dealt with "second generation" or
"multidimensional" tasks. Such missions are those that "include a
large civilian component and are mandated explicitly to deal with
socio-political and/or humanitarian aspects of the conflict." 9 The most
comprehensive operation has been UNTAC (Cambodia), which went so
far as to help draft conditions for establishing an interim judiciary
system and provide training for lawyers, judges, and magistrates. 0

LUTION OF U.N. PEACEKEEPING, supra note 1, at 464.
43. Ben Kiernan, The Inclusion of the Khmer Rouge in the Cambodian Peace
Process: Causes and Consequences, in GENOCIDE AND DEMOCRACY IN CAMBODIA: THE
KHMER ROUGE, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 191, 223
(Ben Kiernan ed., 1993) [hereinafter GENOCIDE AND DEMOCRACY]. It provided the

Secretary-General with the ability "to put in place U.N. personnel with unfettered
access to all operations and documents and to require the reassignment or removal
of any Cambodian personnel." Stephen Ratner, The Cambodia Settlement Agreements,
87 AM. J. INTL L. 1, 14 (1993). The departments involved grew to include those in
charge of fisheries, tourism, and historical monuments. Second Progress Report of the
Secretary General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
(UNTAC), 47th Sess., Sept. 21, at 9, U.N. Doc. S/24578 (1992).
44. James Rosenau, Sovereignty in a Turbulent World, in BEYOND WESTPHALIA?,
supra note 3, at 218.
45. An Agenda for Peace, supra note 28, at 32.
46. Mona Ghali, United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, in THE EVOLUTION OF U.N. PEACEKEEPING, supra note 1, at 160.

47. Mona Ghali, United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon: 1978-Present, in THE
EVOLUTION OF U.N. PEACEKEEPING, supra note 1, at 199-200.

48. Karl Birgisson, United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, in THE EVOLUTION OF U.N. PEACEKEEPING, supra note 1, at 233.

49. Guillot, supra note 1, at 93. Guillot adds that such missions "combine peacekeeping with peacemaking and peacebuilding at the micro-level." Id.
50. Terrence Duffy, Cambodia Since the Election: Peace, Democracy and Human
Rights?, 15 CONTEMP. SE. ASIA 407, 417 (1994). Indeed, ONUSAL in El Salvador
was criticized for not doing enough to reform the judicial system. The Truth Commission of El Salvador, in its report, found constitutional and legal issues not settled
in negotiations, including habeas corpus remedies, due process, and criminal procedure. Mark Ensalaco, Truth Commissions for Chile and El Salvador: A Report and
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Perceptions of relative success in this expansion of governance activity
may have encouraged UNOSOM (Somalia) disastrously to begin establishing a transitional government in 1993 without a comprehensive
agreement detailing elections, power distribution, or authority of the
United Nations. in implementation.5
IV. THE NEED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE INTERVENTION

'Tis not enough to help the feeble up,
But to support him after.
_ Shakespeare, Timon of Athens
Recent administrative intervention by U.N. peace operations is a
far cry from the U.N.-supervised transfer of West Irian to Indonesia in
1963, where little pressure was made on the latter when it failed to
carry out even an agreed plebiscite. 2 The shift demonstrates partial
recognition by the international community that democracy means
more than just holding elections - a democracy needs a professional
civil service and an independent judiciary to enforce political rights on
a daily basis." Without guaranteed protection of such rights, "exercise of the franchise is meaningless."" It is perhaps for this reason
that the OAS Office of Free Elections was renamed the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.55 Some scholars delineate further cautionary notes regarding superficial, short-term multilateral
support of fledgling democracies: that "[flitting an evolutionary histori-

Assessment, 16 HuM. RTS. Q. 656, 667 (1994).
51. Chopra, supra note 19, at 82. Compare Donatella Larch, Somalia's Leaders
Reach Agreement, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1993, at A5, and Paul Lewis, Report Faults
Commanders of U.N. Forces in Somalia, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1994, at A10. See Further Report of the Secretary-GeneralSubmitted in Pursuance of Paragraphs18 & 19
of Resolution 794 (1992), U.N. SCOR. 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/25354 (1993), and especially Further Report of the Secretary-General Submitted in Pursuance of Paragraph 18 of Resolution 814 (1993), U.N. SCOR, 48th, U.N. Doc. S/26317 (1993), regarding the new UNOSOM mandate stemming from the set of agreements made by
the various Somali factions at Addis Ababa.
52. See generally CHRISTOPHER J. MCMULLEN, MEDIATION OF THE WEST NEW
GuINEA DISPUTE, 1962: A CASE STUDY (1981).
53. Thomas Friedman, A New U.S. Problem: Freely Elected Tyrants, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 12, 1992, at E3 (quoting Michael Sandel), cited by Acevedo, supra note 10, at
154, n.89. This obviously means more even than the "full-scale transition program"
in Cambodia, which included, in addition to free and fair elections, professionalized
army and police force, a return of refugees, the establishment of an independent
judiciary and human rights guarantees. Cf Sonia Han, Building a Peace that Lasts:
The United Nations and Post-Civil War Peace-Building, 26 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
837, 840, 846-47. This also means more than a long-term focus solely on development. Cf id. at 879. Han herself notes that it at least requires "cultivation of a civil
society and a political culture that will sustain democratic processes." Id. at 881
(emphasis added).
54. Bloomfield, supra note 32, at 16.
55. See Moravcsik, supra note 35, at 49.
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cal process into a series of deadlines" can create undue anticipatory
pressures on the populace;56 that with decades of past repression it is

nearly impossible to educate large publics as to the full meaning and
benefits of a democratic system; 7 and that the people can conceivably

vote for intolerant or anti-democratic policies.58

Furthermore, national assemblies must generate secondary rules
above and beyond constitutional provisions. It is not always the case
that such laws and regulations are completely congruent with a state's
constitution nor even that they are fully implemented.59 Those
charged with managing transitions to democracy must ensure not only

that non-self-executing agreements be implemented, but that antidemocratic forces from the former regime be held accountable if they
remain within the new one.' This is especially important in developing countries, where historically much of the national assets fall

under the direct control of bureaucrats, so civil servants have incentives to manipulate policy to their benefit, and private workers have
incentives to obtain influence through the administration rather than
the legislature.61 Thus, in order for democracy to gain and maintain

56. MOHAMMED AYOOB, THE THIRD WORLD SECURITY PREDICAMENT: STATE MAKING, REGIONAL CONFLICT, AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 32 (1995). See also Thomas Friedman, Harm's Way: U.S. Pays Dearly for an Education in Somalia, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 10, 1993, at D1 (stating "you don't do nation-building with a stopwatch"), quoted in Han, supra note 53, at 880.
57. An Examination of the U.N. Peace Plan and Referendum on the Western
Sahara: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights and International
Organizations and Africa and markup on H. Con. Res. 214, H. Con. Res. 201, and
H.R. 346 before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., Oct. 8 and 30, 1991, at 33
(testimony of Hurst Hannum, Professor, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tuffs
University); cf. James Gibson & Raymond Duch, Emerging Values in Soviet Political
Culture, in PUBLIC OPINION AND REGIME CHANGE: THE NEW POLITICS OF POST-SOVIET SOCIETIES 82 (Arthur Miller et al. eds., 1993) (stating "the Soviet people
have . . . not come to appreciate fully the need for institutional guarantees for the
rights of their political opponents"). The Haitians, as well, have had tremendous
problems understanding the voting process. E.g., Larry Rohter, Electoral Confusion:
So Far, at Least, Inept is the Kindest Word for HaitianDemocracy, N.Y. TIMES, July
2, 1995, §4, at 3.
58. Eric Herring, International Security and Democratization in Eastern Europe,
in BUILDING DEMOCRACY?, supra note 3, at 110. The rise of the Nazi party, the
referendum in favor of the new Peruvian constitution, and the recent election in
Algeria come to mind.
59. Christian Anglade, Democracy and the Rule of Law in Latin America, in
DEVELOPING DEMOCRACY, supra note 3, at 244-45. There were, in fact, many delays
and problems in secondary legislation regarding both judicial and land reform required under the accords. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Observer Mission in El Salvador, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/24833 (1992).
60. Germaine Hoston, The Activist State and the Challenge of Democratization:A
Comparative Historical Perspective, in BOUND TO CHANGE, supra note 3, at 114. "lIlt
is not enough to have the institutional structures of democratic politics. What matters is how the institutions work in practice." Id. at 111-12.
61. See John Mukum Mbaku, Bureaucratic Corruption and Policy Reform in
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public legitimacy, new administrations must protect the bureaucracy
from such nondemocratic interference, untangling the "web of influence" that often pre-existed between administrative and political
elites.6 2 New measures of transparency and accountability could reduce such influence, as well as the temptation of personal corruption.
Abuse of administrative discretion is not solely found in the executive branch, as demonstrated in El Salvador. There, the supreme court
president tried to maintain that the peace accords do not apply to the
judiciary as their negotiation and signature were an executive act. The
new legislature, meanwhile, extended the terms of incumbent judges
thereby blocking the appointment of new judges as required under the
accords." Even administrative reforms supposedly enacted in the interest of professionalism can constitute screens for attempts by the

reigning party to weaken its opponents' political opportunities."
When foreign aid was cut after Peruvian President Fujimori suspended
the constitution in 1994, he agreed to OAS-monitored congressional
elections, but manipulated the process, producing a constitution that
gave him even more administrative power than before.65 Discretionary abuse also can occur just prior to planned elections: in El Salvador,
for instance, the assembly passed a blanket amnesty a week after the
release of the Truth Commission report citing individuals for human
rights violations.6 In Cambodia, civil servants sold millions of dollars
Africa, 19 J. SOC. POL. & ECON. STUD. 149, 151-52 (1994); see also James Scott,
Corruption, Machine Politics and Political Change, 63 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1142
(1969); MYRON WEINER, THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY: PUBLIC PRESSURE AND POLITICAL
RESPONSE IN INDIA 217 (1962); FRED RIGGS, ADMINISTRATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE THEORY OF PRISMATIC SOCIETY 271 (1964), quoted in MERILEE GRINDLE,
POLITICS AND POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN THE THIRD WORLD 15, n.19 (1980). The
failure of the wave of comparative administration activity of the 1960s and 1970s
was largely due to the fact that researchers and consultants ignored the political
role of the bureaucracy, strengthening administrations at the cost of democratic
development. E.g., GERALD E. CAIDEN, ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM COMES OF AGE 53
(1991).

62. Naomi Chazan, Between Liberalism and Statism: African Political Cultures
and Democracy, in POLITICAL CULTURE AND DEMOCRACY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
81 (Larry Diamond ed., 1993) [hereinafter POLITICAL CULTURE].
63. Holiday & Stanley, supra note 1, at 424. The administration may not actually have the discretion to initiate certain reforms because of constitutional restrictions, as in El Salvador, making it all the more important that the other branches
of government comply with the accords. See Further Report of the Secretary-General

of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador, 47th Sess., Oct. 14, U.N.
Doc. S/26581, at 4 (1993).

64. See Mohammed Mohabbat Khan, Politics of Administrative Reform and
ganization in Bangladesh, 7 PUB. ADMIN. & DEV. 351, 358 (1987). See also
Doig, Good Government and Sustainable Anti-Corruption Strategies: A Role for
pendent Anti-Corruption Agencies?, 15 PUB. ADMIN. & DEV. 151, 156-57 (1995)

ReorAlan

Inde-

(stating "[a]nti-corruption rhetoric sentiments have been a routine feature of politics,
invariably less as a means to longer-term reform than as a means to diffuse opposition to the incoming regime, placate external agencies and secure tenure on office").
65. Bloomfield, supra note 32, at 14.
66. See MICHAEL R. LITTLE, A WAR OF INFORMATION: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN

1996

DEMOCRATIC INTERVENTION

of public assets for their personal benefit, including villas, timber from
state forests, and the notorious T-3 prison of the Khmer Rouge."7
The task of professionalizing and de-politicizing the bulk of government personnel is not a new concept, but it took even the Western
democracies many decades to begin." Among developing countries
especially, it poses a persistent problem. Patronage and nepotism was
so extensive in the Turkish democracy of the 1970s, for instance, that
each ministry fell under the jurisdiction of a particular political party,
prompting the military intervention of 1980.69 Such evidence, together
with the more recent military coup in Haiti, should dispel any lingering notions that "free and fair" elections - or even formal institutional
arrangements for a new judiciary and police force - are all that a
state needs to sustain a democracy. Conspicuous military coups do
not provide the only means for officials to rout democracy, as even
formal legal and institutional arrangements can be undermined
through "arbitrariness or corruption in implementation."7' In Nigeria,
for instance, military elites have been able to run the country even
after the democratic transition that began in 1992, simply through
"political engineering" and general corruption. 72 Again, what new democracies need for their sustainability is a thorough system of accountability, whereby public officials are held responsible for their
actions through transparency, internal and external controls, and ongoing procedures of political compromise as well as an establishment of

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY ON EL SALVADOR, 1979-1992, at 175-76
(1994).
67. MARIE MARTIN, CAMBODIA: A SHATIERED SOCIETY 291-93 (1994).
68. The U.S. Pendleton Civil Service Act of 1883, intended to eliminate nepotism, covered only 10 percent of federal workers. N. Joseph Cayer, Public Personnel
and Labor Law, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 283 (Jack Rabin et al.
eds., 1989). Great Britain followed a similar path. R.A.W. Rhodes, State-Building
without a Bureaucracy: The Case of the United Kingdom, in DEVELOPING DEMOCRACY, supra note 3, at 170. "The 'permanent civil service' prior to that time (17801850) differed from its modern counterpart in three significant ways. It was not
permanent, it was not civil, and it was not a service." Id. at 173, quoting Harold
Perkins, THE ORIGINS OF MODERN ENGLISH SOCIETY, 1780-1880 22 (1969).
69. Ergun Ozbudun, State Elites and Democratic Political Culture in Turkey, in
POLITICAL CULTURE, supra note 62, at 114. Military coups often follow charges of
bureaucratic corruption. See SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING
SOCIETIES 203 (1968).
70. See Acevedo, supra note 10, at 119. Elections and a new constitution in
themselves "do not guarantee stability and survival" of a democratic system. Shin,
supra note 3, at 144. See also Anglade, supra note 59, at 236 (stating '[Llike electoral accountability, constitutional accountability is a substantive issue, and the
mechanisms that establish accountability cannot be assumed to work simply because
they have a formal constitutional existence"); Farer, supra note 3, at 716 (stating
"[flair elections are a necessary but not sufficient condition for authentic representative government").
71. Doig, supra note 64, at 153, citing WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 54 (1992),
72. Mbaku, supra note 61, at 164-65.
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justice.73 Moreover, civil servants need to receive continual training
that stresses an attitude of service, rather than one of control.74 Even
in the United States, as recently as 1962, the Supreme Court cautioned that if the U.S. political system passed a certain point of corruption, it might be unable to redress itself.7"
Public sector problems do not necessarily all stem from blatant
political influence. In most developing countries, there are chronic
problems of administrative capacity, including "inadequate bureaucratic structure, limited trained manpower, absence of record-keeping and
statistical procedures, low enforcement priority, or insufficient financial resources."7" States undergoing transitions to democracy also
commonly experience an administrative "void" or "vacuum" developing
where most of the experienced and educated elites either belonged to
the old regime or were enticed by the comparatively lavish salaries of
the new private sector.77 Moreover, these weakened bureaucracies are
often faced with an overwhelming rash of new and pressing problems,
such as burgeoning levels of unemployment, inflation, and organized
crime.7" New legislatures, especially the more common parliamentary
systems, are themselves often poorly staffed and lack expertise in the
various new issues and relationships they must confront in a democratic system.7 9 These transitional States generally suffer from a complete lack of experience with the open and conciliatory bargaining
necessary for democratic politics.'

73. Cahn, supra note 37, at 189.
74. Randall Baker, Democracy Versus Bureaucracy: Transforming the Nature of
the Civil Service in Bulgaria, in COMPARATIVE PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: PUTrING U.S.
PUBLIC POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION IN CONTEXT 55 (Randall Baker ed., 1994).
75. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 228-31 (1962), cited in Thomas M. Franck, Intervention against Illegitimate Regimes, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 165 (Lori Fisler Damrosch & David J. Scheffer eds., 1991).
76. Antonia Handler Chayes & Abram Chayes, Regime Architecture: Elements
and Principles, in GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: COOPERATION AND SECURITY IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 95 (Janne Nolan ed., 1994). See also Mohan Kaul & Paul Collins, Governments in Transition: Towards a New Public Administration, 15 PUB. ADMIN. & DEV.
199, 202 (1995) (stating "[m]any of the difficulties faced by developing countries are
not solely due to defective or inappropriate policy instruments. They can also result
from complex institutional- mechanisms that make it difficult to implement policy
effectively and from weak policy implementation capabilities"). This becomes even
more important when one realizes that, as in El Salvador, public administration
means much more than setting up institutions such as mayors and judges, but includes a whole line of basic services such as education and health care. U.N. Doc.
S/1994/1212, at 6 (Oct. 31, 1994).
77. See Peter Frank, Problems of Implementation at the Local Level, in DEVELOPING DEMOCRACY, supra note 3, at 295; MARTIN, supra note 67, at 262.
78. Baker, supra note 74, at 53. See also, generally, Eric M. Rice, Public Administration in Post-Socialist Eastern Europe, 52 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 116-124 (MarJApr.
1992).
79. Knut Walker & Philip Williams, The Military and Democratization in El
Salvador, 35 J. INTERAM. STUD. & WORLD AFF. 39, 70 (1993).
80. E.g., THEO A.J. TOONEN, Analyzing Institutional Change and Administrative
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For "consolidation" of democratic liberalism to occur, political
relationships and arrangements developed in the transition phase need
to become "regularly practiced and habitually accepted.""' Groups
with varying political interests must have an ability to participate
satisfactorily in the political process, where they may willfully channel
their competing desires into peaceful methods of settlement. 2 What
has emerged as a successful scenario in democratizing countries is that
of elite groups negotiating consecutive "pacts" that get them through
the transition in stages," with a process in place that ensures the
"removal of the breakdown potentials from the competitive issue.""
Full political, judicial, and bureaucratic accountability must also exist
for implementation to proceed smoothly. 8 These pacts form necessary
characteristics of a successful transition above and beyond negotiated
settlements that may have been reached to end a civil war, as such
settlements often give rise to more disputes and, indeed, potentially
carry seeds of future conflagration if proper procedures for implementation have not been established.

Transformation: A Comparative View, 71 PUB. ADMIN. 151 (1993).
From the outside, it sometimes seems as though the main problem is
not so much the highly plural political game which is being played, but
the lack of appropriate rules for the game of pluralistic politics. The
game has to be played with inadequate constitutional, political and
cultural rules for the game of consociational politics and joint decision
making which is based upon accommodation and mutual adjustment.
Id. at 160-61.
81. Philippe Schmitter, The Consolidation of Political Democracies: Processes,
Rhythms, Sequences and Types (unpublished, 1991); quoted in Rudolf Tokes, Democracy in Hungary: The First Hundred Days and a Mid-Term Assessment, in BOUND
TO CHANGE, supra note 3, at 184.
82. See Farer, supra note 3, at 717 (stating "[tihe condition precedent for an
enduring democracy is a powerful civil society wherein the inevitable conflicts of
group interest are softened by a collective commitment to compromise"). See also
Tatu Vanhanen, Introduction to STRATEGIES OF DEMOCRATIZATION 7 (Tatu Vanhanen
ed., 1992) (stating "[tihe task of political architecture-as opposed to social-is to
formulate and construct political institutions that will provide channels of meaningful
and political participation in particular social circumstances").
83. GUILLERMO O'DONNELL & PHILIPPE SCHMITTER, TRANSITIONS FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE: TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT UNCERTAIN DEMOCRACIES 39 (1986);
see also, Shin, supra note 3, at 161.
84. Giuseppe Dipalma, Parliaments, Consolidation, Institutionalization: A Minimalist View, in PARLIAMENT AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN SOUTHERN EUROPE:
GREECE, ITALY, PORTUGAL, SPAIN, AND TURKEY 38-39 (Ulrike Liebert & Maurizio
Cotta eds., 1991), cited by Jeffrey Huffman & Mary Gautier, Continuity in Transitions Theory, in 1 RESEARCH ON DEMOCRACY AND SOCIETY: DEMOCRATIZATION IN
EASTERN AND WESTERN EUROPE 10 (Frederick Weil et al. eds., 1993).
85. Doig, supra note 64, at 153.
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V. IMPLEMENTATION: AN EXTENSION OF POLITICS BY SIMILAR MEANS

'Well, I shan't go, at any rate,' said Alice. 'Besides, that's not a
regular rule; you invented it just now.'
'It's the oldest rule in the book,' said the King.
-

Lewis Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland

When elite pacts begin with a peace accord that aims at comprehensive settlement, those expecting to implement the agreement
should assume that much "will not be honored or achievable in the
field."86 As a result of ongoing reassessment by the parties, implementation ultimately becomes a political engagement of goal modification.87 While U.N. officials focus on the extent to which overall peace
objectives are met, each party to the accord becomes more concerned
with how specific pieces make a real difference in their position." Because stability constitutes one criterion for measuring the success of a
mediated outcome, full inclusion of parties that can affect the outcome
in both the negotiation and implementation processes is thus necessary.89 Furthermore, any guarantor should avoid insecure contracts in
which one party's incentives to comply diminish once the other party
begins to fulfill its obligations - in this context, implementing agreements must take into account each party's alternative to continued
agreement. m
Invariably, challenges to transition arise early on in the implementation phase of comprehensive accords. Moroccan forces have obstructed MINURSO patrols and supply networks in Western Sahara,

86. Brian Urquhart, Who Can Police the World?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (May 12,
1994).

87. Clarence Stone, The Implementation of Social Programs: Two Perspectives, 36
J. SOC. ISSUES 13, 34 (1980), quoted in Patricia Wilson, Power, Politics, and Other

Reasons Why Senior Executives Leave the Federal Government, 54 PUB. ADMIN. REV.
12 (JanJFeb. 1994). See also, generally, Giandomenico Majone & Aaron Wildavsky,
Implementation as Evolution, in POLICY STUDIES REVIEW ANNUAL (Howard Freeman
ed., 1978); ERNST B. HAAS, BEYOND THE NATION-STATE: FUNCTIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 103 (1964) (stating "[aidministration, instead of appearing in
the guise of a heroic ordering of chaos, assumes the form of continuous negotiation
attentive to the possibility of maximizing common values").
88. In the implementation phase, individual groups are "more concerned with
what they in particular may lose than what all in general may win." EUGENE
BARDACH, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME (1977), quoted in Soren Winter, Integrating
Implementation Research, in IMPLEMENTATION AND THE POLICY PROCESS: OPENING UP
THE BLACK Box 27 (Dennis J. Palumbo & Donald J. Calista eds., 1990); but cf
DANIEL MAZMANIAN & PAUL SABATIER, IMPLEMENTATION AND PUBLIC POLICY: WITH A
NEW POSTSCRIPT 12 (1989).
89. LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE: CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES (1987).
90. David Lax & James Sebenius, The Power of Alternatives or the Limits to
Negotiation, in NEGOTIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE 109-10 (J. William Breslin &
Jeffrey Z. Rubin eds., 1991).
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for instance."s Invariably, when one party fails to act responsibly, the
other feels obligated to partially renege as well, and thus MINURSO
found the rebel group Polisario increasingly unwilling to cooperate. 2
Similarly, when the Khmer Rouge refused to assemble its troops into
cantonment areas in Cambodia, troops of the other factions left cantonment areas on "agricultural leave." 3 In the following year in Angola,
the rebel group UNITA, which at one point had nearly 90 percent of its
troops in cantonment areas, refused to demobilize when the government created an "antiriot police" consisting of 25,000 elite troops.9 '
UNITA was thus well-positioned to launch attacks after losing the first
round of elections. Despite efforts to avoid such events in Mozambique,
the same pattern initially surfaced.95 Recalcitrance is seldom limited
to mere foot-dragging; Khmer Rouge elements killed over 100 civilians
in a string of massacres in three months in 1993.96 The State of Cambodia (SOC) government also presented grave challenges for UNTAC,97
killing students who were protesting against government corruption
and shifting the chain of policymaking to bypass U.N. officials working
within and mandated to control government agencies.98 While the
Dayton accords provide for a human rights ombudsman with the right
to review any government documents and demand cooperation of any
official of Bosnia,99 the UNTAC experience shows that this role will be
difficult, if not impossible, without constant backstopping with NATO
and U.N. officials.
Actors can wield more power to affect events in the implementation phase than during negotiations. Operations failing to take this
fact into account are bound to fail."° As negotiations inadequately
considered the motivations of local factions in Somalia, for example,
without full disarmament it was "naive to imagine" that democratic

91. Durch, United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, in
THE EVOLUTION OF PEACEKEEPING, supra note 1, at 428.
92. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 102D CONG., 2D SESS.,
THE WESTERN SAHARA: THE REFERENDUM PROCESS IN DANGER 6 (Comm. Print

1992). See also Durch, supra note 91, at 412.

93. Michael Doyle & Ayaka Suzuki, TransitionalAuthority in Cambodia, in THE
UNITED NATIONS AND CIvIL WARS, supra note 1, at 133.

94. Angola: The Aftermath of Elections, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Africa
of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives 102d Cong. 10 (testimony
by Duncan Sellars, Chairman, International Freedom Foundation).

95. Andrew Meldru, Mozambique: Avoiding Another Angola, 38 AFR. REP. 46, 4748 (1992) (stating delays by RENAMO to assemble in cantonment areas led to delays by government forces, and skirmishes took place as a result).
96. Kiernan, Introduction to GENOCIDE AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 43, at 25.
97. Kiernan, supra note 43, at 236.
98. Doyle & Suzuki, supra note 93, at 138 (regarding budgetary issues); MARTIN,
supra note 65, at 295 (regarding security issues).
99. Smith & Priest, supra note 4.
100. BRIAN HOGWOOD & LEWIS GUNN, POLICY ANALYSIS FOR THE REAL WORLD

215 (1984), quoted in Crawford Morgan, Asbestos Policy and Practice in a Local
Authority, in IMPLEMENTATION IN PUBLIC POLICY 50 (Talib Younis ed., 1990).
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elections could take place." 1 Others have warned that the Western
Sahara plan, with a "winner-take-all" referendum, is a recipe for disaster because it does not detail terms for dismantlement or withdrawal
of the loser's troops.0 2 The Dayton accords similarly failed to adequately address the role of the armed forces after elections or in the
process of establishing a central administration."w At root in the return of hostilities to Angola was that the United Nations was only to
"verify that the monitoring groups were assuming their responsibilities,""0 4 and thus had no mandate to actually implement-let alone
enforce-the demobilization required under the accords. In contrast,
while the Mozambique agreement discounted U.N. oversight,
UNOMOZ obtained assurance of full disarmament and U.N. control before the elections. 05 Especially difficult in dealing with recalcitrant
parties is the reconciliation of enforcement with impartiality. When the
Security Council finally took moderate action in Cambodia after initially avoiding confrontation, UNTAC seemed unprepared for the response. In retaliation for the imposition of economic sanctions, the
Khmer Rouge took U.N. personnel hostage and shelled U.N. positions'" - actions mirrored in May 1995 by Bosnian Serbs against
UNPROFOR when the Security Council attempted to impose its authority with "pinprick" bombing raids."
Failure to take a holistic viewpoint of implementation also has led

101. John Mackinlay, Military Responses to Complex Emergencies, in THE UNITED
NATIONS AND CIVIL WARS, supra note 1, at 53.
102. See Durch, Getting Involved: The Political-Military Context, in THE EVOLUTION OF U.N. PEACEKEEPING, supra note 1, at 33.
103. There were no arrangements to integrate the rival armies, and the Bosnian
Serbs were only vaguely required to reduce their military potential to a level where
it was "no longer a threat" to the accords prior to elections. Michael Dobbs, Balkan
Leaders Approve Bosnian Pact, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 1995, at A21. "Mafia" groups
that emerge well-armed and well-financed from the conflict have also come to run
major parts of the government involved infrastructure development, and have "little
interest in peace agreements or the return of the rule of law." Chris Hedges, A WarBred Underworld Threatens Bosnia Peace, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1996, at A8.
104. Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Angola Verification
Mission, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., May 20, at 3, U.N. Doc. S/22627 (1991). BoutrosGhali made this even clearer in a later report: "According to the Peace Accords and
the mandate of the Security Council, UNAVEM II is in Angola not to organize or
implement the cease-fire and electoral arrangements, but to observe and verify the
monitoring of their implementation by the Angolan parties themselves." U.N. SCOR,
Further Report of the Secretary General of United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II), 47th Sess., Sept. 9, at 3, U.N. Doc. S/24556 (1992).
105. Andrew Meldru, Mozambique: Lessons from Angola, 38 AFR. REP. 22, 24
(1993).
106. Amer, supra note 1, at 218.
107. It is also frustrating to see that the Security Council has yet to deal with
Boutros-Ghali's call in early 1992 to "gravely consider what action should be taken
towards those who put United Nations personnel in danger," despite a recent convention to address the problem on a legal basis. An Agenda for Peace, supra note
28, at 40.
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to grave errors. A significant underlying cause of the UNITA troop
exodus from cantonment areas in Angola was the loss of troop morale
and organization due to severe shortages of food, medicine, and clothing." The United Nations also has made proposals that would violate newly drafted -constitutions,"° or has apparently failed to take
1
note of local norms in bargaining styles or informal infrastructure."
These shortcomings in planning have helped to stymie Boutros-Ghali's
vision "to ensure that the original causes of war are eradicated,""' by
failing to remove "breakdown potentials" necessary, as noted above, for
democratic consolidation to occur. Given such concerns, the observation
that U.N. officials, facing failure to achieve goals, have had a tendency
to "hang tight" and settle for partial successes in peace operations is
alarming."' While it is generally understood that comprehensive
peace entails comprehensive institutional reform, no movement has
emerged to actualize the concept of peace operations as a continuous
process stretching from initial negotiation through long-term implementation. Moreover, implementation oversight needs to focus on the
parties' perceptions and mind sets, just as third parties are required to
do during the original negotiations."' Harboring and maintaining a
108. See Virginia Page Fortna, United Nations Angola Verification Mission II, in
THE EVOLUTION OF U.N. PEACEKEEPING, supra note 1, at 399-400.
109. The United Nations stood behind the report of the Truth Commission, which
recommended new appointments to the judiciary and a 10-year ban on certain individuals from running for public office, although the constitution forbids the president from removing justices not convicted of a crime, and guarantees every citizen a
right to participate in government. The Peace Process in El Salvador, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Western Hemisphere Affairs, House Comm. on Foreign Affairs,
March 16 and 23, at 41 (comment by Rep. Cass Ballenger). "Lustration" laws seeking to ban from civil service officials associated with the former regime and later
found unconstitutional have been commonplace in Central and Eastern Europe. E.g.,
COMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS IN BULGARIA (1992).
110. The Somali approach to dispute settlement favors lengthy and open-ended
discussion, rather than the fixed-schedule-and-agenda format arranged by U.N. officials. Debarati Sapir & Hedwig Deconnick, The Paradox of Humanitarian Assistance
and Military Intervention in Somalia, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND CIvIL WARS,
supra note 1, at 168. Also, "[n]either the United Nations nor the more responsible
and reflective donor agencies gave enough thought to identifying local institutions or
groups in order to strengthen them for the future." Id. at 163.
111. Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General
on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, U.N. Doc.
S/1995/1, 122 [hereinafter Supplement to An Agenda for Peace]. Peacebuilding operations are meant to serve as a counterweight to preventive diplomacy, preventing
crisis from recurring. An Agenda for Peace, supra note 28, at 33.
112. See Durch, supra note 100, at 30. See also An Examination of the U.N.
Peace Plan and Referendum on the Western Sahara,Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Africa, House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, October 8 and 9, 1991, at 21-22 (testimony
by Lawrence Farley, Professor, Lock Haven University). "For all its fairness and
objectivity, MINURSO will have spent upward to $200 million by the time an election is held in Western Sahara. There will be a strong inclination for MINURSO to
dismiss known irregularities as unimportant." Id. Cf Urquhart, supra note 84.
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holistic viewpoint is essential for public service reform, and could not
be made any less important by prevalent civil strife in a state's recent
past."1
U.N. policymakers, therefore, should certify that each stage of the
implementation process is devised so that each party is assured the
other is complying, as at each step the parties are likely to use whatever resources available to garner power."' Continuation of gameplaying would surely stretch win-lose competition to the consolidation
phase of implementation. Ambiguities need to be highlighted early so
that those supervising implementation can draw contingencies "to
enable disputes to be carried on within reasonable bounds.""' Illdefined objectives may give rise to one party's disillusionment as perceptions of unsatisfied goals emerge, jeopardizing the party's willingness to continue compliance." 7 Clear and detailed mandates for U.N.
peacekeeping operations would help set expectations and minimize
disagreement over interpretation."'
Even with a clear mandate in relation to implementation, however, some underlying perceived conflicts of interest would remain. Negotiation does not end with a given accord, "but is a continuous aspect of
living under the agreement,"' necessitating development of procedures the parties can and will use on their own to resolve their disputes satisfactorily and in a peaceful manner - procedures that would

113. "It is not enough for negotiations to achieve a brokered compromise
agreement, a political agreement hammered together under the pressure
of outside powers ....

The negotiations must produce a resolution of

the conflict, that is, an outcome that satisfies the basic needs for identity, security, and dignity-and that both consider to be at least minimally consistent with the requirements of justice and fairness."
Herbert C. Kelman, A Behavioral Science Perspective on the Study of War and Peace,
in PERSPECTIVES ON BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE: THE COLORADO LECTURES 268 (Richard
Jessor ed., 1991). Note that the preamble to the Constitution of UNESCO reads:
"Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defenses
of the people must be constructed."
114. Kaul & Collins, supra note 76, at 201.
115. LIONEL CLIFFE, THE TRANSITION TO INDEPENDENCE IN NAMIBIA 81 (1994).
116. HUGH HECLO & AARON WILDAVSKY, THE PRIVATE GOVERNMENT OF PRIVATE
MONEY (1974), quoted in David Lewis, Conclusion: Improving Implementation, in
POLICIES INTO PRACTICE: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CASE STUDIES IN IMPLEMENTATION 221 (David Lewis & Helen Wallace eds., 1984).

117. David Pyle, From Pilot Project to Operational Program in India: The Problems of Transition, in POLITICS AND POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN THE THIRD WORLD,
supra note 61, at 123, 141.
118. DIEHL, supra note 1, at 72-73. See, e.g., Chayes & Chayes, From Law Enforcement to Dispute Settlement: A New Approach to Arms Control Verification and
Compliance, 14 INT'L SEC. 147 (1990). "Questions of interpretation and disputes
about the meaning and application of the governing rules are an inevitable feature
of life under any complex legal regulatory regime." Id. at 163.
119. Chayes & Chayes, Compliance without Enforcement: State Behavior under
Regulatory Treaties, 7 NEGOTIATION J. 311, 313 (1991).
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demonstrate the values of democratic interaction for later periods in a
state's development.
VI. ENSURING COMPLIANCE MAINTENANCE

You know what the trouble with peace is? No organization.
-

Bertold Brecht, Mutter Courage

Multidimensional operations generally have lacked comprehensive
systems to deal with disputes, first demonstrated in Namibia, where
different interpretations of a demobilization clause and lack of communication sparked the deadliest fighting of the entire war. 2 '
Peacekeeping troops have traditionally dealt with alleged violations
and disputes over interpretation of accords as part of their duties, 1 '
but not until El Salvador did a compliance verification commission
formally emerge. An Administrative Consultative Body was proposed
in Cambodia when the parties' implementing authority began to have
problems, but this plan was rejected." In Angola, when a body created by the parties to verify compliance with the accords became ineffective, U.N. observers not only helped resolve disputes but carried out
verification responsibilities of the parties themselves, yet lacked authority to do more.' The compliance oversight body in El Salvador
itself deepened rather than overcame stalemate, partly because, as in
Angola, it was comprised of an equal number from both parties.
ONUSAL thus assisted the negotiation of new agreements," aided
by its mandate to monitor "all agreements" concluded between the parties." One observer concluded that a process should be "organized
and monitored by international organizations and interested governments in order to engage the dynamic process of constant negotiations,
heighten the cost of failure, and secure additional support for the negotiations and implementation of the peace agreement."'26 The peace
accords in Mozambique are unique in creating a supervisory commis-

120. See CLIFFE, supra note 113, at 84; DIEHL, supra note 1, at 160; DONALD
SPARKS &

DECEMBER GREEN, NAMIBIA:

THE NATION AFTER INDEPENDENCE

49-50

(1992).
121. DIEHL, supra note 1, at 9.
122. Amer, supra note 1, at 216.
123. Fortna, supra note 108, at 392.
124. Cristina Eguizabal, Regional Leadership and Universal Implementation in El
Salvador's Quest for Peace, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND CIvIL WARS, supra note 1,
at 186. On the problem of the body's composition, see Holiday & Stanley, supra note
1, at 428, as well as U.N. SCOR, Report of the Secretary General on the United
Nations Angola Verification Mission, supra note 104.

125. Holiday & Stanley, supra note 1, at 416 n.3.
126. Joseph Sullivan, How Peace Came to El Salvador, 38 ORBIs 83, 84 (1994).

Jarat Chopra also recommends the creation of joint monitoring commissions at the
local level so that "unique peace agreements, the conventional source of objectives to
be implemented on the ground could be interpreted jointly, regularly, and accountably." CHOPRA, Back to the Drawing Board, supra note 1, at 34.
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sion that included outside parties, although, without a U.N. chair,
differences still arose.'2
Abram and Antonia Handler Chayes argue that a system to maintain compliance requires a strong normative bases that is perceived as
fair and nondiscriminatory; transparency measures and ongoing review
of possible noncompliance; with capacity building assistance for the
parties and procedures for dispute settlement; and flexibility.
In the process, the circumstances advanced in mitigation or excuse
of nonperformance are systematically addressed. Those that seem
to have substance are dealt with; those that do not are exposed.
Often the upshot is agreement on a narrower and more concrete
definition of the required performance, adapted to the circumstances of the case.. . [Blut if a party persistently fails to respond, the
possiblilty
of diffuse manifestations is present in the back28
ground.

A notable example of such a managerial process is the International Labour Organization, which requires regular reporting, has
thorough procedures to identify noncompliance, makes suggestions for
members to meet requirements, and blacklists those that fail to carry
out such measures." Numerous other treaty regimes effectively use
such "shaming" procedures of enforcement, and some scholars have
called for their use in supporting democratic transitions. 3 ° While
most such activity by U.N. peace missions has been informal and ad
hoc, ONUSAL nonetheless issued a formal report on compliance in
1992 that led to increased external pressure on the Salvadoran government.' U.N. advisors Alvaro de Soto and Graciana del Castillo, with
El Salvador in mind, argue that the Security Council should "maintain
127. The Supervisory and Monitoring Commission was comprised of members of
the parties, plus France, Italy, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. It was to "guarantee the implementation of the agreement, assume responsibility for authentic interpretation of it, settle any disputes that may arise
between the parties and guide and coordinate the activities of the other commissions." Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., Dec. 3, at 3, U.N. Doc. S/24892 (1992).
The first disputes to resolve were between the two parties and ONUMOZ itself.
Report of Secretary General on United Nations Operations in Mozambique, U.N.
SCOR 48th Sess., June 30, at 2, U.N. Doc. S/26034 (1993). Nevertheless, progress
seemed better than in other operations. See Report of the Secretary General on United Nations Operations in Mozambique, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Aug. 30, U.N. Doc.
S/26385 (1993).
128. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 26 (1995).
129. Id. See generally HAAS, supra note 87.

130. E.g., Moravcsik, supra note 35, at 56-57.
131. Holiday & Stanley, supra note 1, at 421-22. In Namibia, when regulations
for the running of elections were first promulgated, foreign governments called them
"completely unacceptable," prompting negotiations between the government and the
U.N. special representative to make changes. CLIFFE, supra note 115, at 130.
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its grip" on compliance monitoring:132
The issue that arises now is how to move away from a peacekeeping operation strictu sensu-i.e., one involving military and police
personnel-to an operation in which the UN can continue discharging its verification and good offices responsibilities, without losing
the momentum provided by pressure from the international community through the council, and in doing so how to harness the
programs and agencies of the UN system so that they work toward
the same goal of peace consolidation. 3 '

Desired ends of the parties go beyond pro forma requirements of
peace accords, however, and thus intergovernmental arrangements to
monitor and guarantee peace agreements should be long-lasting. As
many countries lack the capacity to metamorphose a one-party bureaucracy into an apolitical public service, outside pressure and assistance
may be necessary."3 In recognition of this, some within the OAS
have called for the establishment of a mediation and reconciliation
service to "preempt" threats to democratic order among its members.3 The Cypriot town of Pyla, where Greek and Turkish Cypriots
coexist with a dual-mayoral system, could serve as an informal example for such a service, as UNFICYP officers have successfully mediated
disputes between the mayors.'36 Inevitable wrangling among parties
over quotidian affairs in public administration make it imperative for
the United Nations to seriously consider the concept of "reserve units
of blue hats, training as weekend administrators"1 7 for all compre-

132. De Soto & Del Castillo, Implementation of Comprehensive Peace Agreements,
supra note 1, at 202.
133. Id. at 191.
134. GERALD CAIDEN, Administrative Reform, in COMPARATIVE PUBLIC MANAGE-

MENT 115 (1991). Alan Doig argues that "[ainti-corruption agencies will require both
donor operation and coordination over a number of years

....

.

Doig, supra note 64,

at 163.
135. Millett, supra note 32, at 18. The OAS also expressed its commitment to
"defense of democracy" in the hemisphere. Organization of American States, General
Assembly, The Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the InterAmerican System. OEA/SER. P/XXI.O.2 (1991), cited in Bloomfield, supra note 32, at
13. The guarantee of a state's form of government by a collective of external states
dates at least as far back as the 1863 Treaty of London, under which Great Britain,
France, and Russia guaranteed the status of Greece as "a monarchical, independent,
and constitutional state." IAN BROWNLIE,

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF

FORCE BY STATES 318 (1963), cited by Wippman, supra note 10, at 613, n.32. Mediated settlement of civil strife also has been guaranteed by external governments
before, as with the Cyprus Treaty of Guarantee (Aug. 16) 382 U.N.T.S. 3 (1960),
cited by Wippman, supra note 10, at 633.
136. Marlise Simons, Pyla Journal: In a Small Town on Torn Cyprus, the Tween
Meet, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1991, at A4.
137. Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution in Africa: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Africa of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives 103d Cong., 1st
Sess., at 21 (1994) (statement of I. William Zartman, Professor, Paul H. Nitze School
of Advanced International Studies). William Durch and Barry Blechman also support
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hensive settlements, to provide good offices, smooth out ambiguities
and misunderstandings, and promote international disapprobation
when a party blatantly deviates from agreed measures. Such activity
could lie under the mandate, for instance, of a new U.N. Social Council, the Trusteeship Council as transformed into a Council on Diversity,
Representation and Governance, or a new Peace-Building Unit, which
have been proposed recently as sorely needed U.N. structural chang38
es.

1

The U.N. Secretariat should play a role in such post-conflict compliance maintenance arrangements. Its assistance in dispute settlement has come to be seen as "a necessity rather than an intrusion,"" 9 as the generally accepted powers of the Secretary-General
under article 99 of the Charter have moved well beyond even "good
offices" and the conduct of enquiries," with acceptance of mediation
by the Secretary-General itself construed as acknowledgement that a
dispute is a matter of legitimate international concern."' SecretariesGeneral long have helped draft framework agreements containing constitutional elements, including U Thant in the Congo, Javier Perez de
Cu~llar in Cyprus, and Boutros-Ghali in Bosnia."' Under art. 33(1)
of the Charter, a state may opt to bring in any outside party to aid in
peaceful settlement through a variety of measures, including binding
authority. The Secretary-General assumed such a role in the North
Borneo dispute in 1963, the Bahrain dispute in 1970, and the Rainbow
Warrior dispute of 1986."' As part of a voluntary settlement, such

the idea of "continued monitoring by a small, free-roving observer group, technical
advice, integrated development assistance, or some combination of all three." WILLIAM DURCH & BARRY BLECHMAN, KEEPING THE PEACE: THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE
EMERGING WORLD ORDER 48 (1992).
138. Respectively: THE UNITED NATIONS IN ITS SECOND HALF-CENTURY 40 (The

Independent Working Group on the Future of the United Nations ed., 1995);
ERSINE CHILDERS & BRIAN URQUHART, RENEWING THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM,

201-02 (Development Dialogue, 1994); and Han, supra note 53, at 878-79.
139. Chopra, supra note 19, at 87.
140. Under art. 99, the Secretary-General may report matters which he deems
threaten international peace and security to the Security Council or the General
Assembly. It has been successfully argued that the ability to conduct enquiries and
the provision of "good offices" is crucial for such determinations. E.g., K. VENKATA
RAMAN, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS (1977).

141. JOHN MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 23 (1991).
142. See, respectively: Durch, The UN Operation in the Congo, in EVOLUTION OF
UN PEACEKEEPING, supra note 1, at 343; Report by the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Operation in Cyprus, Addendum, U.N. SCOR, 41st Sess., U.N. Doc.
S/18102/Add.1; and Report of the Secretary General on the International Conference
on the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., Nov. 11, U.N. Doc. S/24795
(1992).
143. Respectively: MAX HARRELSON, FIRES ALL AROUND THE HORIZON 154 (1989);
U THANT, VIEW FROM THE U.N. 50 (1978); Jodi Wexler, The Rainbow WarriorAffair:
State and Agent Responsibility for Authorized Violations of International Law, 5 B.U.
INT'L L.J. 389, 401 (1987).
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authority can be likened to acceptance of inspections of nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency.'" The arrangements
made, including the designation of a third party, would be elements of
voluntary implementing agreements,'" aiming at the consolidation of
democratic forces to allow for maximum political input by all sides and
avoid a relapse into civil conflict. 1" It also can be argued that once a
settlement has been signed by parties, the world community recognizes
as jointly representing the will of the state, the agreement cannot be
amended or abrogated by a new state government unless all the original parties agree." As Jarat Chopra writes, "joint monitoring commissions might ... offer a means of reconciling the sovereignty-intervention stalemate."'"
VII. CONCLUSION
It is getting to be harder to run a constitution than to frame one.
- Woodrow Wilson, "The Study of Administration"
In addition to electoral, judicial, military and police reforms covered to some extent in recent "comprehensive" peace accords, peace-

144. Ratner, supra note 41, at 24. There should be no problem with such an arrangement if enforcement is under the hands of the Security Council and monitoring
and negotiation and traditional peacekeeping and civilian affairs in the hands of the
Secretary-General. For those who feel recalcitrant parties will not differentiate between them, note the Serb proposal to release U.N. peacekeepers held hostage in
return for a lifting of U.N. sanctions against Serbia-under the condition that verification of compliance be conducted by the Secretary-General, and not the Security
Council. Stephen Kinzer, In Belgrade, Milosevic Stiffens in Talks, N.Y. TIMES, June
3, 1995, at 4.
145. "In order for the disputants to be genuinely motivated to reach agreement, a
third party must acknowledge, and must help the principals to understand, the importance of their autonomy; it is their set of decisions to make and their dispute to
resolve." JEFFREY RUBIN, in PSYCHOLOGY AND THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR
507 (Ralph White ed., 1986). Cf MERRILLS, supra note 142, at 86. In fact, if an
arbitrator does not stick to his mandate, his decision can be challenged as a nullity
under international law. Id. at 88-89.
146. Note that the new Constitution of South Africa, for instance, includes measures to deal with disputes "arising from the implementation of the provisions of the
Constitution dealing with transitional arrangements and the rationalization of public
administration." Zola Skweyiya & Sibusisio Vil-Nkomo, Government in Transition: A
South African Perspective, 15 PUB. ADMIN. & DEV. 217, 220 (1995).
147. Wippman, supra note 10, at 627, 631. Indeed, the Permanent Court of International Justice ruled that limitations on sovereignty a state accepts under treaty
cannot be renounced later as an impermissible infringement on that state's sovereignty. Id. at 616 (citing The S.S. Wimbledon, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 1, at 25).
There is still the problem of measuring government performance vis-A-vis the general
public, yet intervention in this regard is more difficult to justify in terms of violating the principle of sovereignty. See Hage Geingob, From Colonialism to Freedom
and Democracy: Role of an Effective Public Service in the Political Transition-the
Namibian Experience, 15 PUB. ADMIN. & DEV. 211 (1995).

148. Chopra, Back to the Drawing Board, supra note 1, at 34.
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building mandates need to address long-term challenges.149 Such an
effort should move beyond the present haphazard and uncoordinated
work of the U.N. Development Programme, the U.N. High Commission
for Refugees, the U.N. Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization,
the U.N. Children's Fund, the World Food Program, the Food and
Agricultural Organization, the World Health Organization, the U.N.
Population Fund, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, the International Labor Organization, the World Bank, and the International
Monetary Fund.15 ° While Ernst Haas and Peter Haas may be correct
in stating that "collective security, human rights protection, democratization, and the fostering of ethnic self-determination do not warrant
being made into a single comprehensive problematique," 5 ' linkages
must be made in both planning and programming to take account of
problems confronting these areas during long-term implementation of
comprehensive accords, at least in terms of a monitoring and feedback
process aimed at ongoing conciliation that has a centralized point of
oversight.152
There is symmetry in the need of the Secretary-General to conduct inquiries and rely on his position at the center of informal international communication networks, not just as conflict begins, but after
it has ended.153 Some states have shown disdain for post-conflict
"quasi-diplomatic" missions of the Secretary-General,'" but a centralized body is necessary to guarantee full implementation of comprehensive accords. As Boutros-Ghali stated, a withdrawal of operations
needs to take into account "residual verification for which the United

149. Larry Rohter, U.N. Force Takes up Duties in Haiti, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1995,

at 14 (citing the director of the U.N. mission, Lakhdar Brahimi).
150. The creation of a Department of Humanitarian Affairs in 1992 has thus far
lacked effectiveness, even during formal peacekeeping periods. Durch, Structural
Issues and the Future of UN Peace Operations, in BEYOND TRADITIONAL PEACEKEEPING, supra note 1, at 158.
151. Peter Haas & Ernst Haas, Learning to Learn: Improving International Governance, 1 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 255, 277 (1995).
152. Id.
153. For an extensive description of the role of the Secretary-General on obtaining
information see, e.g., THE CHALLENGING ROLE OF THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL: MAKING 'THE MOST IMPOSSIBLE JOB IN THE WORLD' POSSIBLE (Benjamin Rivlin & Leon
Gordenker eds., 1993); HAROLD JACOBSON, NETWORKS OF INTERDEPENDENCE: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE GLOBAL POLITICAL SYSTEM, ch. 6 (1984).
154. The first of which was created at the termination of UNGOMAP. Remonstrations are not aimed at intervention per se, but at the expanding powers of the Secretary-General. Birgisson, United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, in EVOLUTION OF U.N. PEACEKEEPING, supra note 1, at 309. A similar
office was proposed by Boutros-Ghali in 1993 for Cambodia and 1995 for El Salvador. Respectively: U.N. Security Council, Further Report of the Secretary-General
Pursuant to Paragraph 7 of Resolution 840 (1993), U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc.
S/26649 (1993) (on activities planned for the period after the UNTAC mandate expired); and De Soto & Del Castillo, Implementation of Comprehensive Peace Agreements, supra note 1, at 202.
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Nations remains responsible,"" and he has begun to voice added
concerns over the corrupt bureaucracies and lingering distrust that
plague new governments.' The Secretariat has the ability to assemble and coordinate teams of administration experts to address such
concerns, and, indeed, Dag Hammarskjold felt that the United Nations
alone could provide such assistance.'57
There have been instances outside the U.N. Trusteeship system
where central administrative authority was transferred to, or overseen
by, an international body. In 1897, the European powers established
an administrative commission in Crete, and again in 1900 in
Beijing.' In the 1920s and 1930s, the Free City of Danzig and the
Memel Territory operated under arrangements giving the League of
Nations power of final arbiter, the Saar territory had an administrative body that included representatives of "interested" states,'59 and a
Commission of the League governed Leticia for a year in its transition
from Peruvian to Columbian rule.'o Pursuant to a treaty signed at
the end of the second World War, the Security Council was to appoint
a governor for the Free Territory of Trieste, with powers to veto legislation counter to human rights provisions of the treaty, although the
advent of the Cold War made it impossible for the Council to agree on
a nominee.' There were also the U.N. administration in Libya from
1949 to 1952, the U.N. Temporary Executive Authority of West New
Guinea from 1962 to 1963 and, albeit briefly, administrative control by
ONUC in the Congo in 1961."62

155. Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, supra note 111, 52.
156. BouTROs-GHALI, Democracy: A Newly Recognized Imperative, 1 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 3, 6 (1995).
157. DAG HAMMARSKJOLD, THE SERVANT OF PEACE: A SELECTION OF THE SPEECHES AND STATEMENTS OF DAG HAMMARSKJOLD, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED
NATIONS 1953-1961 240 (Wilder Foote ed., 1962) (stating the Organization could
.come into the picture in such a way as to help considerably in the framing of their
political life after independence and in the building up of the national state").
158. Chopra, supra note 19, at 71.
159. Treaty of Versailles, signed 28 June 1919, 11 Martens Nouveau Receuil 3d,
323; and Treaty of Paris, Poland-Danzig, signed 9 Nov. 1920, 6 L.N.T.S. 190; cited
in HANNUM, supra note 7, at 377-392; and RATNER, supra note 1, at 94-97, citing
MEIR YDIT, INTERNATIONALIZED TERRITORIES: FROM THE "FREE CITY OF CRACOW" TO
THE "FREE CITY OF BERLIN" 59-62 (1961).
160. Agreement between Columbia and Peru Relating to the Procedure for Putting
into Effect the Recommendations Proposed by the Council of the League of Nations in
the Report it Adopted on March 18th, 1933 (23 May) 138 L.N.T.S. 251, cited in
RATNER, supra note 1, at 98. Ratner also notes that under a 1937 League-authorized
peace plan accepted by France and Turkey, an envoy of the Council would ensure
governance of the territory of Alexandretta, mediate with Syria, and organize elections, but the Council failed to implement the plan as the France and Turkey made
other arrangements. Id. at 97.
161. Peace Treaty with Italy, signed 10 Feb. 1947, 49 U.N.T.S. 3, cited in
HANNUM, supra note 7, at 401-06.
162. E.g., respectively: JOHAN KAUFMANN, THE EVOLVING UNITED NATIONS: PRINCIPLES AND REALITIES 10 (ACUNS Reports and Papers no. 4, 1994); Chopra, supra
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Concerns about a renewal of neo-colonialist attitudes and relationships should not be taken lightly. It is partly to assuage such apprehensions, in fact, that Boutros-Ghali has suggested that
decisionmaking over peacebuilding activities be shifted from the Security Council to another intergovernmental body." Such a body
should be created by the General Assembly to show democratic respect
on the global level, but with substantial attachment to an authoritative group within the Office of the Secretary-General so that ongoing
planning, negotiation, and coordination with a long-term outlook go
into each new operation from the beginning, rather than the United
Nations operating "by the collective seat of the international community's pants."' Without such metaphorical suspenders, some new democracies would surely slip through the community's fingers. The General Assembly also has the power to allow such a body to seek advisory
judgments from the International Court of Justice ex aequo et bono,
with a view to conciliation as well as justice, under art. 38 of the
Court's statute and article 96 of the Charter. Such less-than-strictlyadjudicatory rulings could promote the true beauty of democratic practices. Surely this is what the international community has been trying
to accomplish, although it has failed to express this in either its actions or focus. The United Nations should be prepared to lead combatants in states such as Bosnia-Hercegovina to devise - and maintain
a system of peaceful means of resolving political disputes that occur
in the implementation of comprehensive peace accords, helping to
stabilize the new political arrangements and curtail the reemergence of
political violence.

note 19, at 76; and DIEHL, supra note 1, at 51. RATNER, supra note 1, at 106-07
(stating 'UN officials themselves undertook technical tasks that the Congolese could
UN personnel often took the initiative to make or implement polinot perform ....
cy themselves"). UNTEA officials also occupied "senior posts" of the administration.
Id. at 110-11.
163. Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, supra note 109, at 54.
164. Weiss, The United Nations and Civil Wars at the Dawn of the Twenty-First
Century, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND CIVIL WARS, supra note 1, at 198.

Multilateral Treaties and the Formation
of Customary International Law*
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International law is based upon two apparently contradictory
assumptions: first, that the states, being sovereign, are basically
not subject to any legal restraint; second, that international law
does pose such restraints.
Joseph Frankel'

There is an understandable temptation to assume that international law must match the model of a legal system associated with
domestic law. There is also, however, a crucial distinction between the
two that indicates it might be wise to avoid the temptation. International law, it is commonly supposed, imposes obligations upon states
and by so doing constrains the range of proper state behavior. But
states also make international law; they author the obligations to
which they are bound. They are both sovereign and subject at the
same time, a condition quite foreign to domestic legal systems.2
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ed. 1988).

2. This point may seem controversial since, after all, people make laws even in
domestic legal systems. But legislators are not ordinarily considered to be both sovereign and subject at the same time. Strictly speaking, it seems impossible for a
sovereign to be subject to the law. A sovereign who wanted to disobey some law he
had made could simply declare a new law for the moment or make a legal exception
in this instance. Legislators, as citizens, are subject to the laws of democratic societies like everyone else; thus they lack sovereign authority in themselves.
It might also be suggested that states are bound to obey the requirement of
their own legal systems. In the United States, for example. the Constitution is the
supreme law of the land and it places constraints upon state action. In this sense,
we may speak of sovereign authority as limited. But there are some notorious problems with this way of speaking. Public officials tend to have their own views about
the nature of constitutional limits that apply to them and even about when they
apply to them. If we think of these limits as self-imposed, the attempt to square the
judicial circle by holding that constitutional governments are both sovereign and
subject at the same time begins to decay.
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This curious feature of international law raises a host of problems

in need of clarification and discussion. For example, how do states
create international law in the first place? If a state opts to disobey
international law, is it acting illegally or is it creating new law? And
how can a state come to stand under an obligation to obey international law anyway? We do not intend to attempt a frontal assault on these
questions here. Instead, we will concern ourselves with an examination
of one particular context in which they arise.
According to one rather popular view, treaties are a source of
international customary law.' This view has become particularly popular in recent years because of pressing global problems requiring globally cooperative solutions. Cooperative solutions are most easily and
quickly effected by the treaty process, but treaties, as such, obligate
only those states that are parties to them and participation in these
treaties is often not widespread enough to be effective. The solution,
then, is to envision these treaties as creating customary international
law, which, it is believed, obligates all states. Popular though this view
may be, it is hardly accepted by all, and so there is reason to examine
what there is to be said for it. We shall argue that those parts of multilateral treaties which are generalizable beyond the particulars of the
treaty can serve as a source of customary international law provided
three basic conditions are met:
1) The treaty is accepted by a sufficient number of states in the international system.
2) Among the parties to the treaty there are a significant number of
those states whose interests are most affected by the treaty.
3) The treaty provisions are not subject to reservations by the accepting parties.
I. CUSTOM, OBLIGATION, AND CONSENT

Law obligates, at least in the traditional view. It is generally
agreed that international law obligates as well. This is the source of
some confusion. If states are sovereign, and hence answerable to no
higher authority, how do such obligations come into being? The question has a more exact nature with regard to multilateral treaties: How
could a treaty between states B, C, D ....

N, obligate state A to abide

by the substance of the treaty? If international law does obligate, it
must be possible to make sense of this. Therefore, we will consider this
problem, as a matter in need of preliminary clarification, before exploring how multilateral treaties might create customary international

3. See e.g., R. Baxter, Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International Law, 41 BRIT. Y.B. INTVL L. 275 (1965-66); ANTHONY D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT
OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (1971).
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law.

One classic way to formulate the problem of the imperative nature
of customary international law calls attention to the apparent hypostasis at work here. States are not persons, so what sense does it make to
treat them as such and ascribe actions and obligations to them? This
characterization is a rather commonplace feature of legal systems in
general, of course, and not just of international law.4 But noting this
does little to solve the problem, since one can wonder about the propriety of all such characterizations. Obligations, like actions, are properly predictable of persons and not of things like states or corporations.
This difficulty dissolves, however, if we speak of state obligations as a
shorthand for the obligations that adhere to their official representatives. Such obligations are not owed by these representatives as individuals, of course, but rather as a consequence of the position they
have assumed. They are, in effect, a type of positional duty - an obligation that rides with the position of authority one occupies.' Talk of
the obligation of states thus becomes a metaphorical way of speaking
about the obligations owed by the officers and official spokespersons of
the state.
However, this is not the problem of state obligation that we wish
to address. Instead, we want to question how states come to stand
under an obligation to obey customary international law in the first
place. There is a parallel with the classic problem of political obligation
familiar to students of political philosophy. As subjects of a given legal
jurisdiction, persons are presumed-particularly by legal authorities-to have an obligation to obey the law. The obligation, moreover,
holds because the law is law and not because of any moral merit that
a particular law might have. But people cannot be naturally subject to
civil law since the state is an artificial construct rather than a natural
set of human relationships.6 Then, how do people, qua citizens, come
to have such obligations?
Certain conceptual points make this question, and the cognate
question of how legal obligations adhere to states, more troublesome.
Moral philosophers frequently note that obligations, unlike duties,
must be voluntarily assumed.7 A person who stands under an obliga4. For example, the law has for some time treated corporations as fictional
persons, and there is no reason why states cannot be similarly treated.
5. A. JOHN SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS 16-24
(1979).
6. This is, at any rate, the classic liberal view. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEvIATHAN: OR THE MATTER, FORME AND POWER OF A COMMONWEALTH ECCLESIATICAL AND
CIVIL (Michael Oakeshott ed., Collier-MacMillan Ltd 1962); HuGo GROTiUS, DE JURE
PRAEDAE COMMENTARIUS: COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF PRIzE AND BOOTY (James
Brown Scott ed. & Gwladys I. Williams trans., The Clarendon Press 1950) (1604);
JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 87 (Thomas P. Perdon ed., The
Liberal Arts Press 1952 (1764).
7. See Richard Brandt, The Concepts of Obligation and Duty, 73 MIND (1965);
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tion must first have done something to incur it. If so, then obligations
cannot be imposed from without; they come into being only with the
voluntary consent of the obligee. Viewed historically, this reliance upon
consent emerges with the rise of modem liberalism and the concurrent
secularization of western political thought.
Pufendorf, who helped develop the early impetus of these trends
in western political discourse,8 supposed that an obligation throws a
"moral bridle" over the will. This aptly characterizes the sense in
which an obligation is a type of moral constraint that precludes choice
and determines conduct. But he also held that obligations can have
two separate sources.9 First, they can be assumed, through consent, by
individuals who place the bridle upon themselves. Second, obligations
can be imposed on one by a superior authority. Thus God imposes His
law on human beings, and that law obligates, according to Pufendorf,
simply because of His moral authority. The substance of this distinction remains current in moral and political theory, although reference
to God is frequently replaced, in the post-Kantian world, by a reliance
upon Reason as the authoritative voice. Additionally, the distinction
now takes a significantly different form, and one that emphasizes the
voluntary dimension of obligations. It is now customary to understand
the "moral bridle" imposed upon the will by Reason or God as a natural or moral duty, while a self-imposed bridle, i.e., one to which a person consents, is understood to be an obligation.'0
We are not concerned with whether states stand under a duty to
obey international law, or whether international law is built upon or
reflects certain fundamental elements of natural law. It does not appear, however, that multilateral treaties can give rise to natural duties
in this sense. Suppose there is a natural duty binding upon states to
do X (perhaps a principle of jus cogens), and suppose further that a
preponderant majority of the states of the world ratify a multilateral
treaty stipulating the need to do X. The treaty provides an additional
normative reason why the states that ratify it ought to do X; they have
both a natural duty and an obligation to do so. States that have chosen
not to participate in the treaty, on the other hand, are still duty
bound, from the standpoint of natural law, to do X. But it is less clear
that the presence of the treaty means that they also have an obligation
to do X brought into force by the treaty. The treaty cannot create the
natural duty; nor for that matter is there any reason for it to do so.

John Ladd, Legal and Moral Obligation, NOMOS XII: POLITICAL AND LEGAL OBLIGATION 3 (1970).

8. Samuel Pufendorf, Elements of Universal Jurisprudence,in THE POLITICAL
WRITINGS OF SAMUEL PUFENDORF, 50 (Craig L. Carr ed. & Michael J. Seidler trans.
1994).

9. Id. at 167. In this, as in other things, Pufendorf followed Grotius. See
GROTIUS, supra note 6, at 15.
10. SIMMONS, supra note 5, at 11-16.
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The duty exists and holds against all states independently of the treaty. So, appeals to natural duty fail to shed any light on whether multilateral treaties can create obligatory customary international law.
Since treaties are voluntary agreements, it is not hard to understand why they obligate their signatories.1 By signing a treaty, a
state consents to obey its provisions. 2 Moreover the fact that a state
has consented solely determines the state's obligation. Suppose the
substance of a treaty requires the signatories to do X, and suppose further that doing X is generally regarded in the international community
as a good idea. The fact that X is a good idea provides a reason why
states ought to do X, but it does not also establish that states which
have not signed the treaty are obligated to do X. The existence of an
obligation to do X supplies a strong reason of its own why a state
ought to do X independently of the fact that it is a good idea."3 In the
absence of a showing of consent, however, even good ideas do not
obligate.
The consent requirement raises an obvious barrier to the idea that
multilateral treaties create customary international law and thereby
obligate non-signatories to abide by their terms. Consider, for example,
a hypothetical situation, of the sort imagined by Baxter, where all
states in the state-system, minus one, sign a multilateral treaty requiring that they do X." Baxter supposes that X would also constitute
a rule of customary international law, presumably by virtue of its
general acceptance, that would obligate the one state that failed to
sign the treaty. This reveals something of the logic of customary international law, to be sure, but it also complicates the problem of obligation. Absent a foundational principle of majority rule, as a type of
"secondary rule," it is simply not clear why the remaining single state
should be said to stand under an obligation to adhere to V
X. ' Such
general acceptance might show that most states in the system think
adherence to X is a good idea and correspondingly that all states ought
to adhere to it. But something more must be added if we want to insist
that states have an obligation to adhere to X, and this something more

11. Corbett notes, "Treaties considered as agreements are acts of consent; considered as documents they are records of evidence of consent." P. Corbett, The Consent
of States and the Sources of the Law of Nations, 6 BRIT. Y.B. INTL L 22, 25 (1925).
Peace treaties are arguably an exception to this.
12. I.M. Lobo Souza, The Role of Consent in the Customary Process, 44 INTL &
COMP. L.Q. 521 (1995). Rex J. Zedalis, Protection of Nationals Abroad: Is Consent the
Basis of Legal Obligations?, 25 TEX. INT'L L.J. 209 (1990).
13. The fact that X is an obligation also qualifies as a reason for action, and
perhaps the controlling reason at that. See J. RAZ, THE AuTHORITY OF LAw 234
(1979).
14. R. BAXTER, TREATIES AND CUSTOM 38 (1970). But see, C. Tomuschat, Obligations Arising for States Without or Against Their Will, 241 RECUEIL DES COURS 195,
at 268-73 (1993 V).
15. H.L.A. Hart, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 77-96 (2d ed. 1994).
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must satisfy the consent requirement necessary to establish an obligation.
We want to suggest, but to suggest only, how the consent condition can be met, and thus to point toward a theory of obligation capable of accounting for the obligatory character of customary international law. Consent is something that is given; in this sense, all consent is
expressed.16 But consent can be expressed in a variety of ways, perhaps the most familiar of which is the type of formal expression of
consent associated with the law of contracts. The law has long recognized, however, that consent can be expressed tacitly as well." Both
Grotius and Pufendorf relied heavily on the notion of tacit consent to
explain how certain conventional relationships came into being and
why they continue to obligate those who participate in them. 8
Pufendorf, for example, supposed that tacit consent is "clearly inferred
from the nature of the affair and other circumstances." 9 He used as
an example the attractive instance of a person ordering a meal at a
restaurant. By ordering the meal the person tacitly consents to pay for
it. This is an act of participation or involvement in a social practice
that carries with it a tacit expression of consent to the rules and procedures of the practice itself.20 To participate in the practice simply is to
consent to obey the rules of the practice. Therefore, one who makes
obvious moves of participation in some practice thereby incurs an obligation to obey its rules.
Thus understood, tacit consent can be used to explain how indi::duals who come together and participate in rule-governed associative
practices incur obligations to adhere to the rules. Imagine several
youths join forces and invent a game. The rules of play will be understood as obligatory for all participants, although the youths can alter
the rules during the course of play as they see fit. Here, participation
signals consent to follow the rules even if some of the youths dislike
some of the rules adopted by the group as a whole. There is an obvious
analogy here with relations between states. As participants in the
inter-state system, states can be understood to tacitly signal their
consent to obey those rules considered by the elements of the system to
be of great importance. If the status of international law is invoked to
indicate the importance many states attach to certain rules, identified
as rules of the inter-state system, then participation in the inter-state
system provides adequate grounds for concluding that states incur an

16. J. PLAMENATZ, CONSENT, FREEDOM, AND POLITICAL OBLIGATION 4 (1968).
17. Cf. FRIEDRICH KESSLER

& GRANT

GILMORE, K. KESSLER AND

G.

GILMORE,

CONTRACTS 116-17 (2d. ed. 1970); P. AT1YAH, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF CON-

TRACTS 34 (1981).
18. GROTIUS, supra note 6, at 19; PUFENDORF, supra note 8, at 171.
19. Pufendorf, supra note 8, at 171.
20. The sense of tacit consent introduced here has been developed more fully by
Craig Carr. See Craig Carr, Tacit Consent, 4 PUB. AFF. Q. (1990).
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obligation to adhere to these rules.
Some may object that the element of voluntarism which many
philosophers think is associated with displays of consent is lacking in
the case of states.2 If one of the youngsters involved in developing a
particular game does not care for some of the rules, she can decide not
to participate, and if she opts not to participate, she has no obligation
to obey the rules of play. Since it looks as if states cannot decide not to
participate in the inter-state system, it might seem wrong to conclude
that their participation entails consent to obey the rules of customary
international law. But this objection does not seem to get very far. A
state can always declare its intention not to participate in the ordinary
relations of states. It can even welcome a general identification as a
rogue or lawless state, thereby demonstrating its unwillingness to
participate in the ordinary relations of states. But states rarely do this.
Instead, they often invoke international law on their own behalf, make
law-like arguments in defense of their actions, and proceed to conduct.
their international affairs according to the standard practices of the
international system. When a state behaves this way and eschews behavior patterns that would indicate it wants to be recognized as a
rogue state, it is fair to say that it is participating in the inter-state
system and thus incurs an obligation to abide by those rules considered important enough to be regarded as binding law by the states of
the system.2
There is a second, and rather familiar objection to this argument.
It suffers the standard problem of imprecision that troubles the subject
of international law in general. How many states must regard a rule
as important before it can properly be recognized as a general rule of
international law? How important must a norm be before it qualifies
as a rule of international law? However, these are not questions about
whether international law obligates, but about what counts as international law. We have offered some reasons to think that if X qualifies as
a rule of customary international law, states have an obligation to obey
it. This returns us to the more traditional problem of how X might
come to qualify as a rule of customary international law. More specifically, it returns us to the question, posed at the outset, whether multilateral treaties give rise to customary international law. If it turns out
that such treaties do generate customary international law, we now
have reason to conclude that even states that are not parties to the
treaty stand under an obligation to adhere to the terms of the treaty.

21. SIMMONS, supra note 5, at 93-100.
22. One possible exception to this might be found in notions about persistent
objectors. For an excellent discussion of the various viewpoints regarding the persistent objector rule, see Jonathan I. Charney, The Persistent Objector Rule and the
Development of Customary InternationalLaw, 56 BRrT. Y.B. INTL L. 1 (1985).
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II. TREATIES AND THE FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Two issues orbit the question of whether treaties make customary
international law. The first issue is whether treaties "create" customary international law or are merely to be taken as a piece of evidence,
perhaps of state practice and/or opinio juris, that is no more compelling than any other piece of evidence regarding the establishment of
customary international law.23 If we suppose that treaties do sometimes make customary international law, the second issue is whether
such treaties create "instant custom" or whether their conditions must
"harden" or "ripen into" customary international law.24
We will argue that treaties do present evidence of customary international law and that this evidence can be, in some instances, more
important than other pieces of evidence. Depending upon the issue, a
treaty may be the most important, indeed may be the only, evidence of
customary international law, or it may present only minor evidence
compared with other state practices and opinio juris. We will argue
also that one cannot decide in the abstract if or when treaty provisions
become part of customary international law. Rather, there must be
some test or index by which each treaty and its provisions can be
judged in making this determination. Applying this test to some treaties may indeed show that they become instant custom upon entry into
force, applying it to others may show that they need to "ripen" beyond
their force date before they can be said to create customary international law.
Since his very influential work on customary international law,
Anthony D'Amato has become the champion of the school of thought
that argues that treaties should be thought of as creating customary
international law.25 As D'Amato himself states regarding his 1971
book, "I leaped to the radical position that treaties directly generate
customary rules." 6 D'Amato has many critics, however, who claim
that the role of treaties in the formulation of international law has
been greatly overstated by D'Amato and his followers.17 This contentious issue crystallized in a debate between Arthur M. Weisburd and
D'Amato first published in 1988 and D'Amato has reaffirmed his position in his more recent work.28 But, the debate over this question is
not new; it has received attention since the beginnings of challenges to

23. See generally A.M. Weisburd, Customary International Law: The Problem of

Treaties, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 1 (1988).
24. D'AMATO, supra note 3, at 139.

25. See generally id.
26. Anthony D'Amato, Custom and Treaty: A Response to Professor Weisburd, 21
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 459, 461 (1988).
27. See Weisburd, supra note 23. Michael Akehurst, Custom As a Source of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INTL L. 1 (1974-75).
28. INTERNATIONAL LAW ANTHOLOGY 95-101 (Anthony D'Amato ed., 1994).
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legal positivism.29
The debate concerns both bilateral and multilateral treaties, but
we will concern ourselves here only with a subset of multilateral treaties, or as they have been referred to in the past, the so-called "lawmaking treaties."0 While we agree with D'Amato that bilateral treaties also can create customary international law, this point seems more
straightforward and seems mostly to be based on magnitudes or quantities. That is, if there are few bilateral treaties covering a particular
subject, these treaties do not provide strong evidence of the formation
of customary law. Conversely, if there are large numbers of treaties on
a subject and these treaties treat the subject in the same way,3 1they do
provide strong evidence of both state practice and opiniojuris.
It is held by certain authors that global treaties (i.e., those that
are open for participation by all states) with general provisions create
law that is binding on all states in the international system, irrespective of whether they are parties to the treaty. Just how these treaties
create obligations for third parties has been a matter of considerable
discussion among international law scholars. 2
One of the ways suggested is that these treaties create "instant
customary international law" and since all states are obligated to obey
customary international law, states are, ipso facto, obligated by the
customary law created by the law-making treaty. Or as D'Amato has
put it,
The claim made here is not that treaties bind nonparties, but that
general provisions in treaties give rise to rules of customary law
binding upon all states. The custom is binding, not the treaty.3
(emphasis added)
This is one way, of course, to avoid confrontation with the well
known principle of customary international law, pacta tertiis nec
nocent nec prosunt. This principle, formally restated in articles 34
through 37 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, has long
been understood by states, international courts, and scholars alike as a

29. See generally D'AMATO, supra note 3.
30. D'AMATO, supra note 3, at 161. In one sense this term is a redundancy because all treaties create law for their parties. D'Amato has noted that this term has
fallen into disuse in recent years, however, we think it useful to convey the meaning
that we are referring only to those treaties that seem to have as their purpose the
creation or codification of international law. Id.
31. D'Amato points out that by sheer numbers alone bilateral treaties must be
taken as evidence of customary international law. He states, "yet, as I argued in my
book on custom in 1971, if we look at the matter mathematically, a multilateral
convention among ten states is the equivalent of forty-five similarly worded bilateral
treaties among the same ten states." D'Amato supra, note 28, at 99.
32. D'Amato, supra note 28.
33. D'AMATO, supra note 3, at 107.
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customary principle of treaty law. 4 The Convention, however, may
have added to the confusion surrounding the application of treaty
provisions to third parties. Article 38 of the Convention concerning
"Rules in a Treaty Becoming Binding on Third States Through International Custom" states, "Nothing in articles 34 to 37 precludes a rule
set forth in a treaty from becoming binding upon a third State as a
3
(emphasis
customary rule of international law, recognized as such.""
added)
Whether article 38 states that customary international law, already established, is what binds states, remains unclear. The Convention itself does so by restating such customary international law principles as pacta tertiis (Articles 34-37) and pacta sunt servanda (Article
26), or whether the treaties in question can create customary international law by the means of "instant custom.""6 The words, "recognized
as such" seem to give weight to the notion that the treaties themselves
cannot create law binding on third states, but can only articulate already recognized principles of customary international law. But the
first part of the sentence, "Nothing in articles 34 to 37 precludes a rule
set forth in a treaty from becoming binding upon a third State as a
customary rule of international law... " (emphasis added) suggests
another possibility. Treaties can "suggest" new customary international law or articulate nascent customary international law, but in
either case recognition by a substantial number of states in the international system is required before it can be converted into customary
international law obligating all states.37
Since World War II there have been increasing numbers of global
multilateral treaties in the international system. Most of them have
come into force; the remainder remain "unperfected." 5 One of the
main issues surrounding these treaties involves clarifying the point at
which they create customary international law. That is, do they create
customary international law - and thus obligations - for third states
when the treaty comes into force, or do they require some broader
acceptance among states, and particularly "pertinent" states, before
the customary law obligation emerges?
To argue, following D'Amato, that these treaties create customary

34. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. DOC. A/CONF.39/27,May
23, 1969 as reprinted in 63 AJIL 875 (1969).
35. Id. at 887.
36. "The Convention is not simply declaratory of general international law, since
in part it involves the progressive development of the law. However, particular articles reflect the existing rules or practice." BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
389 (Ian Brownlie ed., 4th ed. 1995).
37. But see Anthony D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in International
Law, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1110, 1139-40 (1982).
38. See generally CHRISTIAN L. WIKTOR, UNPERFECTED TREATIES OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, 1776-1976, vol. I-IX (1976).
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international law when they come into force

9

is also to argue that a

small percentage of the world's states should be able to create law for
the entire system. In other words this argument is not even an argument in favor of majority rule in the international system, a concept
itself not thoroughly or perhaps even widely accepted, ° because often
a minority of states can bring a treaty into force. Moreover, in many
instances this minority of states, as we shall demonstrate below, may
not even include those states that are most concerned with the particular obligations being created, e.g. major maritime powers and law
of the sea provisions.
In spite of the fact that D'Amato at times argues that multilateral
treaties create customary international law upon ratification, he also
says,
To the extent that a widely adopted multilateral convention repre-

sents the consensus of states on the precepts contained therein
those precepts are part of international law by that fact alone. In
this sense, multilateral treaties are and historically have been more
important than bilateral ones. But this effect is not due to anything
connected with the concept of custom; it involves a separate phenomenon - 'consensus' - which deserves separate study as to its

nature, identification, and provability."
We think, however, that the determination of consensus among the
states of the world has much to do with the formation of customary
law from treaty provisions and we will deal with that issue here.
Some authors argue that the most important thing in determining
whether a treaty can become part of customary international law is
the intent of the parties to the treaty. They argue that the intent of
the treaty can be ascertained from the language of the treaty itself or
from an examination of the travaux preparatoires.2 D'Amato correctly
argues against the use of either the intent as manifested in the text of
the treaty or in the travaux preparatoires,5 partly because in both of
these the true intent of the parties may not be shown accurately. More
importantly, he argues that it is not the intent of the parties to the
treaty that matters, but rather what the rest of the community of
states makes of the contents of the treaty. Accordingly he argues, "International law proceeds on the basis of community expectations, not

39. D'AMATO, supra note 3, at 164. "If treaties do at any point in time pass into
customary law, they pass at the moment they are ratified. The passage of a period
of time simply makes the treaty as a secondary rule more persuasive." Id.
40. STEVEN SCHWEBEL, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW PROCEEDINGS,
CONTEMPORARY VIEWS ON THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE EFFECT OF UN
RESOLUTIONS ON EMERGING LEGAL NORMS 301 (1979).
41. D'AMATO, supra note 3, at 165.

42. Id. at 156-60.
43. Id. at 154-57.
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the 'will' of particular members of the community."4' On this basis,
can we not say that multilateral treaties themselves cannot generally
create "instant" customary international law for all of the states in the
international system, but rather must await their subsequent reactions.
D'Amato objects to theories suggesting that treaty provisions must
"harden into" customary law before they can obligate all states.' But,
while he would likely not appreciate our drawing such an inference
from his statement quoted above, the only way that we can be sure
that the will of the community of states manifests, concerning provisions in treaties that are meant to be suggestive or creative of customary international law, is indeed to await the necessary state acceptance for them to "harden into" customary international law.'
Perhaps one exception to this would be a treaty declaring law on a
subject that had not yet been dealt with in international law. Examples of this phenomenon might be found in some of the provisions
contained in treaties dealing with outer space."7 Perhaps when existing customary international law is silent on a matter the treaty
would constitute the only existing evidence of state practice and opinio
juris on that particular subject. Absent any negative response on the
part of states, the treaty might be said to be creative of customary
international law in the sense that it represents the only existing evidence of law dealing with the issue. At the very least, we might expect
that should a dispute arise over the subject matter relevant to the
"new law" and if that dispute is to be decided by third party arbitration or adjudication, then, the dispute settler would probably use the
relevant treaty provisions as evidence of customary international law
on the subject. Moreover, this might hold even if neither of the disputant states were party to the treaty. Certainly the World Court has
availed itself of this method in past cases where customary practice
and opiniojuris were in doubt. 8
As we have noted above, D'Amato objects to the idea that treaties
need to "harden into" customary international law. His main problem
with this concept lies in its imprecision. That is, if we subscribe to this

44. Id. at 151.
45. Id. at 139 & n.109.
46. Id. at 139-40.
47. See, e.g., Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,
Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410; 610 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, March 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389; 961 U.N.T.S. 187
[hereinafter Space Object Convention].
48. For a summary of cases, see D'AMATO, supra note 3, at 116-21. He notes,
among others, the following cases as evidence of the court's reliance on treaties as
customary international law: The Lotus Case, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, Asylum
Case, 1950 I.C.J. 266, Fisheries Case, 1951 I.C.J. 116.
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notion, then we do not have a definitive way of knowing just when and
how the conventional law becomes customary international law.49 Insofar as the passage of an indefinite period of time is concerned, we see
no particular reason to disagree with D'Amato. Time passage alone, no
matter how long, will not make conventional law metamorphose into
customary international law. Beyond that, however, two responses may
be made to D'Amato's objections to the imprecision created by the
notion that treaties need something more than ratification and entry
into force to evolve or "harden" into customary international law.
The first response is that customary international law is not a
precise entity in the first place.5" Ample evidence of this is to be found
in the numerous writings of scholars on the subject and in the lengths
to which courts go in trying to discover what customary international
law is on any particular subject at any particular time. So trying to
make precise that which has never been precise may be chasing an
illusion. Even D'Amato, who says that treaties create customary international law upon their ratification,51 notes that the law developed by
treaties does not remain static, but is affected by state practice that
can modify or even eliminate the law originally stated in the treaty. 2
If this is so, then the entry-into-force of a treaty, at best, has given us
only momentary precision about the law.
The second possible response to the problem of imprecision is to
try to add precision by specifying a more reasonable index for gauging
if and when conventional law has become part of customary international law. In other words, when.a treaty has come into force with only
the ratifications of a small percentage of the world's states, is there
another benchmark, beyond the point of ratification suggested by
D'Amato, with which we might be more comfortable in asserting that
the treaty provisions have become accepted as customary international
law? While another index may not have the same definitive time line
enjoyed by entry-into-force, it might be more realistic in claiming with
some certainty that the law stated in the treaty has been accepted by
the community of states. If international law does indeed proceed "on
the basis of community expectations," and not on the will of a minority
of states, there then needs to be a way to determine more accurately
and realistically whether the community of states has accepted the
nascent law put forward in the treaty as having become part of the
corpus of customary international law. If such a method can be created
and achieves some acceptance, then availing oneself of that method

49. D'AMATO, supra note 3, at 140.
50. As Michael Akehurst notes, "The attitude of international lawyers towards
customary international law is somewhat similar; they invoke rules of customary
international law every day, but they have great difficulty in agreeing on a definition of customary international law." Akehurst, supra note 27, at 1.
51. D'AMATO, supra note 3, at 164.
52. Id. at 142.

DENy. J. INT'L

L. & POL'Y

VOL. 25:1

should lend strong evidence, pro or con, to the issue of whether one can
consider certain treaties, or provisions thereof, to be customary international law.
Such an index has already been suggested by the ICJ in the North
Sea Continental Shelf Cases.5" We believe this index can be stated
more specifically and can be applied in a systematic way in order to
get us closer to the determination of when customary law is generated
by treaty provisions. The Court's ruling in this case suggests three
criteria to be used in the determination of whether treaty provisions
could become part of customary international law. These three criteria
are: 1) the number of states in the international system that have
formally accepted the treaty by whatever means specified in the treaty
for formal acceptance, e.g., ratification;5 4 2) the presence or absence of
"pertinent" states among the parties to the treaty;55 and 3) the existence of reservations to any provisions by the parties. 6 We will deal
with each of these in turn and provide examples of their application
below.
A. Parties to the Treaty-Sufficient Numbers
It is generally believed that widespread acceptance of a legal principle is necessary for it to be understood as part of customary international law. Though D'Amato believes that the Court's mention of insufficient adoption in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases57 "also suffers from imprecision,"58 there is no particular reason that this somewhat-less-than-precise magnitudinal statement cannot be made more
precise by setting specific quantifiable standards.
The relevance of magnitude has long been established in international law and, as Peter Rohn has pointed out, "Quantitative notions
permeate all law."" The ICJ itself has found numerous instances
where reference to magnitude or to quantity was found to be of relevance to the judicial decision.6" There have been several cases in
which the Court found particular need to cite quantities in order to

53. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. 3
Feb. 20).
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 43.
Id.
Id. at 44.
Id.

58. D'AMATO, supra note 3, at 112 n.12.
59. 1 PETER H. ROHN, WORLD TREATY INDEX 16 (2d ed. 1984).

60. Id. at 18. The cases listed by Rohn in which magnitude or quantity played a
role in the Court's decision were: Corfu Channel Case, (U.K. v. Alb.) 1949 I.C.J. 4;
Asylum (Colom. v. Peru) 1950 I.C.J. 266; Rights of U.S. Nationals in Morocco (Fr. v.
U.S.A.) 1952 I.C.J. 176; Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thail.) 1962 I.C.J. 6;
South West Africa (Eth v. S.Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr) 1966 I.C.J. 6; North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. 3.
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determine if a rule in a treaty had achived widespead enough acceptance to become a part of customary international law. In the Asylum
Case, Columbia " . . . invoked conventions which have not been ratified
by Peru."6 ' The Court was called upon to determine if the conventional law contained in certain treaties had attained the status of regional
customary international law for the Americas and would thus be valid
against Peru. Referring to the Montevideo Conventions of 1933 and
193962 the Court noted, "The Convention of 1933 has, in fact, been
ratified by not more than 11 States and the Convention of 1939 by two
States only."' The Court concluded that because of the limited number of states ratifying these agreements they were not applicable to
Peru as customary international law."
In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases," the Court was concerned with the question of whether Article 6 of the Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea," had passed into customary international
law. On the general question of whether a treaty provision could pass
into customary international law and thus become binding upon third
states, the Court stated:
There is no doubt that this process is a perfectly possible one and
does from time to time occur: it constitutes indeed one of the recognized methods by which new rules of customary international law
may be formed. At the same time this result is not lightly to be
regardedas having been attained.(emphasis added)"7
In speaking of whether the treaty itself had received sufficiently
widespread and representative participation the Court noted that " ...
the number of ratifications and accessions so far secured is, though
respectable, hardly sufficient."68 The Court went on to say that although there are reasons beyond disapproval that may cause non-ratification of treaties, these reasons " . . . can hardly constitute a basis
on which positive acceptance of its principles can be implied."6 9 Thus
it should be clear that a sufficiently large number of states is required
to cause the Court to imply opinio juris concerning any treaty provision sufficient to turn it into customary international law.

61. Asylum (Colom. v. Peru) 1950 I.C.J. 266, 277 (Nov. 20).
62. Convention on Political Asylum, Dec. 26, 1933 reprinted in 6 MANLEY 0.
HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 607 (1932-34). Treaty on Political Asylum and
Refuge, Aug. 4, 1939 reprinted in 8 MANLEY 0. HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 404 (1938-41).
63. Asylum, supra note 61, at 277.
64. Id.
65. North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 53.
66. Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, reprinted in 52 AM. J. INTL L.
842 (1958).
67. North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 53, at 41.
68. Id. at 42.

69. Id.
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That a treaty accepted by a minority of states should be given the
ability to create customary international law seems non-sensical. Interestingly, third world objections to customary international law in general have noted the creation of law by a small minority of states as one
basis of their objections to the current body of customary international
law." One good example of the minority rule phenomenon, that follows from the acceptance of the notion that the coming-into-force of a
global treaty creates customary international law, is the above mentioned Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.71 The Convention
was completed and open for signature and ratification in 1969. It required only thirty-five ratifications to come into force.72 In 1969 this
represented only 25% of the existing states of the world. The Convention did not enter into force until January 27, 1980, eleven years after
its completion. By then, the states that brought the treaty into force
represented only 21% of the world's states. Even more startling is the,
fact that these states accounted for slightly over 25% of the total of the
world's treaties.7" Moreover, only three of the top ten treaty-making
states of the world, the United Kingdom, Spain and Italy had ratified
the treaty.7 These three states alone accounted for 30% of all of the
treaties to which the thirty five ratifying states were parties.75
Assuming that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
contained provisions that were new to customary international law at
the time of its ratification and that the ratification of the treaty turned
these rules into customary international law, then 21% of the world's
states, including only three of the top ten treaty making states, can be
said to have created customary international law. This new law would
now be binding on the other 79% of the world's states, a group composed of all but three of the world's major treaty making states whose
members account for nearly 75% of the world's treaties.
At this writing, only seventy-six states are parties to the treaty,
less than half of the world's existing states. The world's leading treatymaking states - including the United States as a party to 7% of the
world's treaties - are not accounted for among these seventy-six
states.76 The U. S. total is nearly twice that of the next leading state.
It surely is a leap of faith to assert that this treaty, which concerns
itself with treaty law, could have established law for its non-parties

70. J. Patrick Kelly, The Changing Process of International Law and the Role of
the World Court, 11 MICH. J. INTL L. 129, 156 (1989).
71. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23,
1969, U.N.Doc. A/CONF.39/27, (1969) reprinted in 63 AM. J. INTL'L L. 875 (1969).
72. See Id., at art. 84.
73. ROHN, supra note 59, at 111-17.
74. Multilateral Treaties Deposited With the Secretary-General, Status as at 31
December 1994 at 757, U.N. Doc.ST/LEG/DRT.E/13 (1995).
75. ROHN, supra note 59, at 111-17.
76. ROHN, supra note 59, at 84.
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representing a significant number of the world's states and accounting
for a large portion of all of the world's treaties.
Many of the provisions of this treaty present no particular problem since, as noted above, they reflect rules and practices that already
existed at the time and were simply incorporated into the treaty. In
other words, they were already accepted as part of customary international law governing treaty relations. But, what of those rules that are
not reflective of state practice and which attempt to create new law?
Would any third party state be satisfied with the assertion that 21% of
the world's states are able to create customary international law and
thereby the obligation to obey, especially when these states do not
include most of the world's largest treaty making states?
In addition to a magnitudinal requirement, the Court has suggested what might be referred to as a qualitative requirement as well,
"... a very widespread and representative participation in the convention might suffice of itself, provided it included that of States whose
interests were specially affected."77 (emphasis added) This brings us to
our second condition, the participation of pertinent states.
B. Pertinent States
It has been argued by some authors that law making treaties
cannot successfully create obligations for third parties through the creation of customary law if the pertinent states are not parties to the
treaty.7" Other authors like D'Amato argue that regardless of the
number of parties and regardless of which parties they are, customary
international law can be generated by a treaty, thereby obligating
third states.79 Political and legal reality, however, would seem to support the argument in favor of the necessity of pertinent states being
part of the agreement. As suggested by our example of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, it makes little sense to think of
treaties creating customary law for states when those states most
concerned with the particular treaty are not parties to it. We might
call these states sine qua non states (SQN states) for without their
participation in the law, the law would have no realistic meaning. If,
for example, most of the major maritime powers are not party to a
treaty governing the uses of the sea, those treaty- based laws would
not obligate these states and thus would not regulate their behavior. If
treaty provisions are not followed in practice by the non-party SQN
states, then there seems little point in declaring them to be creative of
customary international law obligating all states.80 It remains simply

77. North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 53, at 42.
78. Schwebel, supra note 40. C. Wilfred Jenks, The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INTIL L. 401 (1953).
79. D'AMATO, supra note 3, at 165.
80. We are not necessarily arguing here, as does Weisburb, that mere violations
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an idealistic notion.
Many other issues can be found where the identification of SQN
states is rather easy. In the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
the SQN states would be the world's major treaty-making states. Without the participation of most of the world's largest treaty-makers it can
hardly be said that the treaty can create new provisions of customary
international law relevant to treaty law. Certainly, many of the new
law creating provisions of this treaty may have been accepted in practice by the major treaty making states, but the treaty itself cannot
provide evidence of this fact. One must rely instead on the traditional
means of determining whether something has become a part of customary international law, state practice, and opinio juris. Likewise, states
with deep sea bed mining capabilities would have to be regarded as
SQN states for that part of UNCLOS III which sets up the deep sea
bed mining regime.8 ' The fact that an extra protocol was later added
to UNCLOS III to accommodate these states and bring them into the
treaty in general gives support to the importance of SQN states in this
particular treaty.82
Sometimes the number of SQN states may even be rather small.
In the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by
Space Objects," for example, only states with space launch capabilities would be SQN states. This would be true not only in that section
of the treaty dealing with liability for collisions between space objects, 4 but also in the section dealing with absolute liability for objects falling to earth.' By viewing this treaty as having created cusof the law constitute evidence that the law does not exist, but rather that widespread acceptance must include the major relevant actors in the issue area. If there
actors ratify a treaty and then violate its provisions, they are, as D'Amato notes,
lawbreakers and not necessarily new law creators. For a cogent debate see Anthony
D'Amato, Custom and Treaty: A Response to Professor Weisburd, 21 VAND. J.
TRANSNATL L. 459 (1988). Anthony D'Amato, A Brief Rejoinder, 21 VAND. J.
TRANSNATL L. 489 (1988). A.M. Weisburd, A Reply to Professor D'Amato, 21 VAND.
J. TRANSNATL L. 473 (1988).

We should also note that the idea of SGN states is not a "yes or no" issue,
but rather one of degree. Some states, depending upon the issue, may be more important as participants than others. As one moves down the scale from most obviously important to least obviously important the judgments will become more difficult towards the middle of the scale. The importance of the participation of certain
states, however, is not something that one can decide abstractly, but depends on the
specific issue and on the judgment of judges, scholars, and statesmen.
81. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec.
10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982)
[hereinafter UNCLOS Treaty].
82. Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess.,
Annex Agenda Item 36, U.N. Doc. A/RES.48/263 (1994).
83. Space Objects Convention, supra note 47.
84. See Space Objects Convention, supra note 47.
85. Space Objects Convention, supra note 47, art. II.
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tomary international law, because of the participation of all launch
capable states, all states are eligible for liability claims for any damage
caused by space objects, regardless of whether they have participated
in the treaty.
The requirement that SQN states be a significant part of the
treaty for the treaty to take effect is not without precedent in international law.86 The International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships (hereinafter MARPOL)87 requires that the treaty
will " . . . enter into force twelve months after the date on which not
less than 15 states, the combined merchant fleets of which constitute
not less than fifty percent of the gross tonnage of the world's merchant
shipping, have become parties... "8 By 1990, "... the Convention
had attracted participation by States representing over 85% of gross
merchant tonnage." 89 MARPOL is global in scope, being open to all
states for ratification or accession. At the time of this writing ninetyone States had ratified or acceded to MARPOL. While this represents
fewer than half of the world's states, it represents 85% of the world's
significant shipping states ° and, as noted above, over 85% of the
world's gross merchant tonnage. In this particular instance the treaty
ratifications by SQN states can serve as convincing evidence that its
provisions may also become fixed as customary international law.
An objection might be raised to our position that SQN states need
to be parties to a treaty before it can be regarded as part of customary
law. If all pertinent states are parties to a certain treaty, then what
need is there to assert that its provisions have become part of customary law, since the treaty itself already obligates all of its parties? If all
states in the international community are parties to a treaty then this
objection might have merit. With the exception of wishing to obligate
states that might later withdraw from the treaty, there would be little
gained by saying that the treaty had become part of customary international law. The point in asserting that a treaty has become part of

86. The concept of SQN states was an important part of the United Nations
Charter. Article 110(3) requires that, "The present Charter shall come into force
upon the deposit of ratifications by the Republic of China, France, the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ire-

land, and the United States, and by a majority of the other signatory states." U.N.
CHARTER art. 110, para. 3. See also L. M. GOODRICH AND E. HAMBRO, CHARTER OF
THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS, 43 (2d ed. 1949).
87. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL) reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
at 762-76 (Harold Hohmann ed., 1992).
88. Id. art. 15, para. 1.
89. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: A SUR-

VEY OF EXISTING LEGAL INSTRUMENTS 161 (Peter H. Sand ed., 1992).
90. U.S. Dept. of Transportation, Maritime Administration, Merchant Fleets of
the World: Oceangoing Steam and Motor Ships of 1,000 Gross Tons and Over as of
January 1, 1987 (1988).
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customary international law lies in obligating all states. In a universally accepted treaty, that has already been done by the treaty itself.
But, this is hardly realistic. The United Nations Charter is probably
the closest thing to a universally accepted treaty." Thus, even if all of
the SQN states are parties to a certain treaty, the international community would probably wish to see the behavior of other states regulated by the treaty provisions. Alternatively, the treaty might be accepted by only some or most of the SQN states, but they might also
wish to see the treaty provisions become part of customary law in
order to obligate the non-parties.
Returning to the MARPOL treaty, we find that seventeen out of
twenty of the world's largest shipping states have become parties to
the convention. This probably constitutes a sufficient portion of this
treaty's SQN states to assert, on grounds of SQN state participation,
that the treaty provisions are part of customary international law.
Interestingly, the three states of the top twenty non-parties are three
of the world's largest oil producing states.92 Given their potential for
disastrous spills, the remainder of the community of states might wish
the imposition of customary international law, generated by MARPOL,
on these three states despite their non-party status. Even if all of the
top twenty shipping states were parties to MARPOL, sufficient
shipping and subsequent potential for marine pollution exists beyond
the major shipping states. This also gives rise to the desire that the
MARPOL provisions would obligate nonparties through the creation of
customary law.
The test of SQN states as parties to the treaty, then, does not
necessarily require that all SQN states be parties, but that a sufficient
number of them have accepted the treaty to have considered it as having formed part of customary international law. "Sufficient number" is
obviously not a precise concept, but as a generic term it cannot be.
When applied to a specific treaty however, it should be easier to decide
how many is sufficient. In some treaties, like UNCLOS III, sufficiency
may require only most (e.g. two-thirds) of the major maritime powers.
In other treaties, like the various outer space treaties, sufficiency may
require all of the launch-capable states. By applying the test of whether the SQN states are parties to the treaty we have a second piece of
evidence to test whether a treaty or any of its provisions have become
part of customary international law.

91. U.N. CHARTER.
92. U.S. Dept. of State, TREATIES IN FORCE 253-254 (1983). The major oil producing states that have not ratified the treaty are Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Kuwait.

1996

MULTILATERAL TREATIES

C. Reservations
Our third condition for whether treaty provisions directly can
become part of customary international law has been noted by Baxter
and subsequently restated more definitively by the ICJ in the North
Sea Continental Shelf cases.93 Referring to the Geneva Gas Protocol of
1925,94 Baxter noted: "The reservations are persuasive evidence that
a number of the parties did not initially regard the Protocol as declaratory of a rule of customary international law placing an unqualified
obligation upon all States to refrain from the use of such methods of
warfare."95 In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases," the Court
stated that any treaty provision subject to reservations by states cannot be said to be formative of customary international law.97 In this
case, the Court distinguished between Articles One through Three of
the 1958 Geneva Continental Shelf Convention,98 which did not allow
reservations and the remaining articles in the treaty which did. The
article in question in this case was Article Six. The Court noted:
Finally, the faculty of making reservations to Article 6, while it
might not of itself prevent the equidistance principle being eventually received as general law, does add considerably to the difficulty
of regarding this result as having been brought about (or being
potentially possible) on the basis of the Convention."
In other words, provisions in treaties that allow reservations may
become part of customary international law by other means, but the
treaty itself cannot be taken as creative of customary law. Moreover,
the Court has stated, " ...

it must be observed that no valid conclu-

sions can be drawn from the fact that the faculty of entering reservations ...

has been exercised only sparingly and within certain lim-

its.""° Thus, it is not whether states have made reservations that is

93. For a discussion of the Court's methodology for determining when treaty provisions can become a rule of customary law, see D'AMATO, supra note 3, at 109-12.
94. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 94 L.N.T.S.
65.
95. Baxter, supra note 3, at 284.
96. North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 53, at 42.
97. D'AMATO, supra note 3, at 111. "The Court is basically saying in the Continental Shelf case that any rule from which a state can unilaterally withdraw does
not rise to the level of being a legal rule of general validity." Id.
98. Law of the Sea: Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15
U.S.T. 471, 400 U.N.T.S. 311.
99. North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 53, at 42.
100. Id. at 43. One interesting side note to the issue of treaty provisions becoming part of customary international law relates to the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, and in particular, Article 38. We see that the treaty does allow
reservations and that at least one state (Costa Rica) has made a reservation concerning this article. According to the Court's wisdom then, Article 38, which allows
that a rule in a treaty can become binding on third states if it is part of customary
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important, but rather whether the provisions in the treaty are subject
to reservations. The logic behind this finding by the Court should be
clear. Any provision in a treaty that states are allowed to treat as not
applying to themselves should not become a part of customary international law where states do not have the option of treating the law as
res inter alios acta.
Of our three conditions, the reservations test is the most stringent
and will no doubt eliminate many global treaties from contention as
being creative of customary international law. For example, all of the
treaties discussed above, with the exception of UNCLOS III, are among
those which allow reservations but which are accepted by many authors as having created customary international law. Perhaps then
this test is too restrictive of the development of customary law through
the convention process. Although it is restrictive, the Court has indicated that the derivation of customary law from treaty law is a result
"not lightly to be regarded as having been attained.""' Perhaps restrictiveness is not a major problem then, and for reasons of conflict
avoidance 1" and practical application it might best be retained; little,
it seems, would be lost. Treaties are the major source of international
law in the contemporary world. They create legal obligations for their
parties and most often the parties to certain treaties are also the
states most concerned to obey them, the SQN states. To attempt to extend these treaty obligations to other states through the asserted generation of customary international law probably makes little difference
in most instances. In those few instances where it seems important for
the international community to see a customary law established that
has been put forth originally in a treaty, (perhaps because a pressing
problem needs international cooperation" s ) there is still reason to be
rigorous and realistic when asserting that such a norm does exist.10"
Moreover, treaties of this sort can be created without allowing reservations, as has been done with UNCLOS III."0' The original logic that
omits treaties allowing reservations from directly becoming part of
customary international law still remains.

international law, must itself not be able to pass into customary international law
solely on the basis of the treaty. Its presence within the corpus of customary international law must therefore depend upon the usual imprecise methods of determining if something has become part of customary international law, state practice and
opinio juris. Multilateral Treaties Deposited With the Secretary-General, Status as at
31 December 1994 at 758-59, U.N. DOc. ST/LRH/DRT.E/13 (1995).
101. Id. at 42.
102. Jenks, supra note 78.
103. United Nations: Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1541 (1987).
104. A.M. Weisburd, A Reply to Professor D'Amato, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L.
473, 476-81 (1981).
105. UNCLOS Treaty, supra note 81, U.N. Doc. AICONF.62/122 (1982), reprinted
in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982).

1996

MULTILATERAL TREATIES

III. CONCLUSION
We argued at the outset that it makes some sense to think that
customary international law imposes obligations on states. We suggested that a state's participation in the international system is a way of
giving tacit consent to obey the rules of customary international law.
We then turned to the problem of whether treaties, which normally
bind only their parties, can become part of customary international
law, thus binding all states. We have argued that while it is possible
for treaty provisions to form a part of customary international law,
such formation requires something more, in most cases, than simply
the entry into force of the treaty. We devised a three-part test, relying
upon decisions of the Court and writings of various authors. Our test
requires that a sufficient number of states be party to the treaty, that
they include among their numbers those states that are most concerned with the provisions of the specific treaty, and finally that the
provisions of the treaty do not allow reservations. This three-part test,
while likely eliminating most multilateral treaties from contention for
conversion to customary law, nonetheless, seems properly stringent
because conflicts are likely to arise by attempting to apply treaty law
too broadly as customary law."~
Though the notion of treaties becoming part of customary international law has gained considerable credibility in the past two decades,
it remains a controversial topic. Because of many pressing global problems it has often been seen as necessary to create laws rather quickly
that obligate all states in the international system. Treaties are the
quickest way to create law, but they often suffer from lack of universal
acceptance. Given the pacta tertiis principle, one way around this problem is to argue that the treaty provisions establish customary international law obligating all states. Additionally, states that cooperate to
solve global problems with treaties that obligate only themselves, probably do not wish to be disadvantaged relative to the non-participants.
The stratospheric ozone depletion issue, for example, was one where
cooperating states would have been economically disadvantaged if
states producing significant quantities of chlorofiuorocarbons remained
outside the confines of the treaty and also were not bound by customary international law to refrain from the production of these ozone
depleting agents. 7
While we are sympathetic to these problems and understand the
proposed solution, we cannot be sanguine about the likely success of
trying to apply this concept without the widespread acceptance of

106. Jenks, supra note 78.
107. Gary L. Scott, Geoffrey Reynolds, & Anthony Lott, Success and Failure Components of Global Enuirnomental Cooperation: The Making of International Environmental Law, 2 ILSA J. INTL & COMP. L. 23, 46-58 (1995); Weisburd, supra note 80,
at 476-81.
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states and particularly those states most affected by the new laws. We
think then that the three-part test we have suggested holds out the
most realistic way of judging whether treaty provisions have become
part of customary international law.

CAPITAL MARKETS

Securities Regulation in
the Russian Federation*
PAUL G. THOMPSON**
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I. INTRODUCTION
Immediately prior to and since the collapse of the Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics (USSR), the Russian Federation, the largest of the
former Soviet republics, has moved towards establishing a free-market
economy. As a central part of this shift, the Russian government privatized state-owned enterprises resulting in the circulation of privatization vouchers and stimulating the development of financial markets
in Russia. Since the beginning of privatization, securities trading has

expanded but understanding of securities trading is slow to develop.
In the past few years, the government has taken steps to introduce comprehensive regulation of securities transactions. The most important of these steps are the establishment of regulatory authorities
for the securities markets and the enactment of the basics of a codified
legal system, including the Civil Code,1 which contains fundamental

* Copyright ©1996 by Thomson Legal Publishing, (1-800-323-1336). All rights
reserved. Reprinted by permission of Thomson Legal Publishing from International
Capital Markets and Securities Regulation, edited by Harold S. Bloomenthal and
Samuel Wolff.
** Partner, Holme Roberts & Owen L.L.P., B.B.A. 1985, University of Iowa; J.D.
1989, University of Michigan; resident in London, England.
*** Senior Associate, Holme Roberts & Owen L.L.P., J.D. 1990, Moscow State
Institute of International Relations; LL.M 1992, California Western School of LawSan Diego; resident in Moscow, Russia.
1. Grazhdanskij Kodeks Rossiyskoi Federatsii [Civil Code of the Russian Federation], Part One (Nov. 30, 1994), SOBRANI
ZAKONODATEL'STVA ROSSIYSKOI
FEDERATSII (SOBR. ZAKONOD. R.F.] 1994, No. 32, Doc. 3301 and Part Two (Jan. 26,
1996), SOBR. ZAKONOD. R.F. 1996, No. 5, Doc. 410, translated in Economic Law of
Russia, "Civil Code of the Russian Federation (Parts One and Two)" (Garant-Service
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regulation of commercial activities, the Securities Law,2 and the Joint
Stock Company Law.' Recently, the Federal Commission on Securities
Markets (Federal Securities Commission)4 replaced the Russian Ministry of Finance as the central regulator of securities markets in Russia.
The current regulatory framework is a leap forward from the
period prior to the introduction of codified legislation, during which
shareholder and investor protection was limited and investments were
poorly regulated. The previous environment promoted schemes such as
the MMM pyramid investment fund. Though the fund collapsed in
1994, losses were caused to millions of investors.5 The new legislation
incorporates the main provisions governing securities in a set of codified laws; yet, gaps in the law remain. Directions issued by securities
regulators are expected to advance and to clarify the existing law.
II.

REGULATORY AUTHORITIES.

A. PoliticalOrganizationof the Russian Federation
Most people know that until the last months of the USSR, the
Communist Party centrally planned Russia's economy and controlled
its political system. When the USSR collapsed at the end of 1991, the
15 former Soviet republics gained their independence. The majority of
the republics joined the Commonwealth of Independent States. The

1996, Doc. 7500), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, RFLaw File [hereinafter Civil
Code]. Civil Code, Part One came into force on January 1, 1995 under "Federal Law
of the Russian Federation No. 52-FZ" (Nov. 30, 1994), SOBR. ZAKONOD. R.F. 1994,
No. 32, Doc. 3302, translated in Economic Law of Russia, "Federal Law No. 52 of
the Civil Code of the Russian Federation" (Garant-Service 1996, Doc. 7501), available
in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, RFLaw File. Civil Code, Part Two came into force on
March 1, 1996 under "Federal Law of the Russian Federation No. 15-FZ" (Jan. 26,
1996), SOBR. ZAKONOD. R.F. 1996, No. 5, Doc. 411, translated in Economic Law of
Russia, "Federal Law No. 15-FZ of January 26, 1996 on the Enforcement of the Second Part of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation" (Garant-Service 1996, Doc.
5940), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, RFLaw File.
2. Federal'nyi zakon "0 rynke tsennykh bumag" [Federal Law "On Securities
Market"] (Apr. 22, 1996), SOBR. ZAKONOD. R.F. 1996, No. 17, Doc. 1918, translated
in Economic Law of Russia, Federal Law No. 39-FZ of April 22, 1996 on the Securities Market" (Garant-Service 1996, Doc. 6464), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library,
RFLaw File [hereinafter Securities Law].
3. Federal'nyi zakon "Ob Aktsionernykh Obshestvakh" [Federal Law "On Joint
Stock Companies"] (Nov. 24, 1995) (amended June 13, 1996), SOBR. ZAKONOD. R.F.
1996, No. 1, Doc. 1, translated in Economic Law of Russia, "Federal Law No. 208-FZ
of December 26, 1995 on Joint-Stock Companies (with the Additions and Amendments of June 13, 1996) (Garant-Service 1996, Doc. 5712), available in LEXIS,
Intlaw Library, RFLaw File [hereinafter Joint Stock Company Law].
4. See infra note 21.
5. Carey Goldberg, MMM Leaves Bitter Taste of Capitalism in Russia; Finance:
Investors Panic After Fund's Collapse, as Shares Worth $50 Days Earlier Drop to
Value of 50 Cents, L.A. TIMES, Jul. 30, 1994, at A10, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Allnws File.
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Russian Federation, or Russia, is the largest of the former Soviet republics and has a population of about 150 million.' Russia assumed
the international status and many of the domestic functions of the
USSR.
The President of the Russian Federation is Boris Yeltsin. He was
democratically elected in June 1991 and re-elected in July 1996. Initially, President Yeltsin supported extensive democratic and free-market economic reforms, but faced opposition from the Soviet-period Congress of People's Deputies. This opposition culminated in the attempted coup of October 1993, during which President Yeltsin called for new
Parliament elections and seized the White House from the opposition
by military force. In the Parliament's elections in 1993, and again in
the elections of 1995, the Communist Party made considerable gains.
It currently has a plurality of 157 seats in the State Duma, the lower
house of Parliament.7
After the attempted coup, President Yeltsin consolidated government authority under his control. The Constitution of the Russian Federation,8 approved in national elections held at the end of 1993, provided the basis for a democratic system of government. This system is
dominated by the President. He issues decrees that are binding
throughout Russia 9 and nominates the highest government officials,
including the prime minister. Although the President's nominees require Parliament's approval, the President may dissolve Parliament if
it rejects his nominee for prime minister three times. ° President
Yeltsen has a cooperative relationship with the prime minister, Viktor
S. Chernomyrdin, who was appointed in December 1992.
The Parliament, or Federal Assembly, consists of the 178-member
Federal Council and the 450-member State Duma. The Federal Council
consists of two representatives from each of Russia's 89 administrative
regions.1' Members of the Duma are elected through direct electoral
voting. The Duma is weak in comparison to the President. Nonetheless, if it passes two votes of no confidence in the government within a
three-month period, the President must nominate a new government or
dissolve the Duma and call for elections. 2 The Federal Council may,

6. Sources of Power, Fact Sheet 1, IBC POLITICAL RISK SERVICES, Apr. 1, 1996,
LEXIS, Europe Library, Russia File.
7. Id.
8. Konstitutsija Rossiyskoi Federatsii [The Constitution of the Russian Federation], ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, Dec. 25, 1993, translated in Economic Law of Russia,
"The Constitution of the Russian Federation (Adopted at National Voting on December 12, 1993)" (Garant-Service 1996, Doc. 3000), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library,
RFLaw File [hereinafter Constitution].

9. Id. art. 90.
10. Id. art. 111.
11. Id. art. 95.
12. Id. art. 117.
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with the support of the Duma and the Supreme Court, impeach the
President on the basis of high treason or another serious crime. 3
Federal laws must be approved by the Duma, the Federal Council,
and the President. The President may veto a bill on its first passage
through Parliament. On the second reading, the President cannot veto
the same bill if it receives two-thirds majority approval in both the
Duma and the Federal Council. 4
The judiciary is independent, subject to constitutional and federal
law. The Constitutional Court monitors the activity of the legislative
and executive branches of government and settles disputes of competence between state bodies. The Supreme Court reviews civil, criminal,
and administrative matters while the Superior Arbitration Court oversees commercial disputes. Judges sitting on these higher courts are
nominated by the President, subject to the approval of the Federal
Council. 5 The judges of other federal courts are appointed by the
President.'
Russia enacted the foundations of a codified legal system modeled
on the European civil law structure. The Russian Civil Code 7 provides a general framework for civil matters, including civil rights and
duties, legal entities, business organizations, security interests, contractual rights, and property rights. The Russian Criminal Code 8 recognizes crimes against the individual, in contrast to the former Soviet
emphasis on crimes against the state.
In addition to the Federal Government, Russia is organized into
various political subdivisions-89 administrative regions, including 21
autonomous republics such as Tatarstan and Bashkortustan, which
have significant devolved powers. There are 66 national administrative
divisions of varying autonomy. These consist of 49 oblasts such as
Leningrad Oblast and Sverdlovsk Oblast, six krays and eleven autonomous national areas or okrugs. There are also two federal cities with
autonomous status, Moscow and St. Petersburg. 9 Each administrative region elects its own representative body.2"

13. Id. art. 93.
14. Id. art. 107.
15. Id. art. 102.
16. Id. art. 128.
17. See Civil Code, supra note 1.
18. Ugolovnyi Kodekse Rossiyskoi Federatsii [Criminal Code of the Russian Federation], SOBR. ZAKONOD. R.F. 1996, No. 25, Doc. 2954 [hereinafter Criminal Code].
19. Russia, Economy, EIU Country Profiles (Jan. 1, 1996) LEXIS, Europe Library, Russia File.
20. Russia, Political Scene, EIU Country Profiles (Mar. 7, 1994) LEXIS, Europe
Library, Russia File.
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B. State Committee of the Russian Federationon the Securities Market
The Federal Securities Commission, established by presidential
decree in 1994,21 regulates the Russian securities market and securities market participants.22 It is a federal executive agency for state
policy on securities market implementation' and has the status of a
state committee2 ' and has broad rulemaking authority.2 5 It supervises and controls the activities of securities market participants by regulating their activities, licensing market professionals, and supervising
the securities market. 2 The Federal Securities Commission has no
authority over federal government securities, including federal government bonds (GKOs and OFZs), 27 or securities issued by constituent

21. Ukaz Presidenta #2063 "0 merakh po gosudarstvennomu regulirovanu rynka
tsennykh bumag v Rossiyskoi Federatsii' [Presidential Decree #2063 "On Measure of
State Regulation of the Securities Market in the Russian Federation"] (Nov. 4, 1994)
(amended Mar. 22, 1996), SOBR. ZAKONOD. R.F. 1994, No. 28, Doc. 2972, translated
in Economic Law of Russia, "Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No.
2063 of November 4, 1994, On Measures of State Regulation of the Securities Market in the Russian Federation (with the Additions and Amendments of March 22,
1996)" (Garant-Service 1996, Doc. 3251, § 6), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library,
RFLaw File [hereinafter Decree # 2063]. Initially, the Federal Securities Commission
was known as the Commission for Securities and Stock Exchanges under the President of the Russian Federation. When the Securities Law was adopted, its name
was changed to the Federal Commission on Securities Markets.
22. The authority of the Federal Securities Commission is defined under Chapter
12 of the Securities Law. Securities Law, supra note 2; see also Ukaz Presidenta
#1009 "0 Federalnoi Komissii po rynku tsennykh bumag" [Presidential Decree #1009
"On Federal Securities Commission"] (July 1, 1996), ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, July 12,
1996 [hereinafter Decree #1009].
23. Securities Law, supra note 2, art. 40.
24. Initially, the Federal Securities Commission had the status of a federal ministry reporting directly to the President. Presidential Decree #1177; Ukaz Presidenta
#202 "0 statuse Federalnoi Komissii po tennsym bumagam i fondovomy rynku pri
Pravitelstve Rossiyskoi Federatsii" [Presidential Decree #202 "On Status of the Federal Commission for Securities and Securities Market"] (Feb. 27, 1995), SOBR.
ZAKONOD. R.F. 1995, No. 10, Doc. 856, translated in Economic Law of Russia, "Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 202 of February 27, 1995 on the
Status of the Federal Commission for Securities and for the Share Market under the
Government of the Russian Federation" (Garant-Service 1996, Doc. 3682), available
in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, RFLaw File [hereinafter Decree #202]. The Chairman of
the Federal Securities Commission has ex officio status of a federal minister. See
also Securities Law, supra note 2, art. 40. The recent downgrading of its status to a
state committee creates uncertainty with respect to the future role of the Federal
Securities Commission as the principal regulator of the Russian securities market.
Paul Funder Larsen, Securities Commission Stripped of Status, Moscow TIMEs, Aug.
27, 1996, at 1
25. See generally Decree #202, supra note 24; Securities Law, supra note 2; Decree #1009, supra note 22.
26. It is responsible for the provision and withdrawal of licenses to securities
market participants, the coordination of all government regulation of the securities
market, and the introduction of compulsory regulation of securities market activity.
Securities Law, supra note 2, art. 42.
27. See infra part V.C.
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republics and regions of the Russian Federation.28 However, the Federal Securities Commission has authority over securities issued by municipalities.2 9
The principal office of the Federal Securities Commission is in Moscow. o It may establish regional offices to assist it if needed."' It is administered by a 15-member board headed by the Chairman of the Federal Securities Commission.32 In addition to the Chairman, the first deputy chairman, the deputy chairmen, and the secretary of the Federal
Securities Commission, five representatives of the federal executive
agencies responsible for securities market matters serve on the Federal
Securities Commission Board. This includes a representative of the Ministry of Finance, a representative of the Central Bank, and two representatives of the Federal Assembly.3 The appointing authorities for, and
the terms of office for, the Board members vary. The Chairman of the
Federal Securities Commission is appointed by the prime minister.3
The office of the first deputy chairman, the deputy chairmen, and the
secretary of the Federal Securities Commission are filled by government
civil service appointees."
The Securities Law calls for the establishment of a 25-member Expert Council to advise the Board of the Federal Securities Commission
on certain matters.36 Such matters of advisement are the scope of authority of the Federal Securities Commission, securities market regulation, draft instructions, and legislation." The Expert Council can suspend for up to six months the effective date of a decision or an instruction of the Federal Securities Commission. 8 Yet, the Federal Securities
Commission Board exercises independent control over the Expert Council. 9 The Expert Council includes representatives of state agencies and
organizations involved in the regulation of financial and securities markets, securities market participants, self-regulatory organizations, relat-

28. Securities Law, supra note 2, art. 40.
29. Id. art. 2.
30. Id. art. 46. The official address of the Federal Securities Commission is
Leninsky Prospect # 9, Moscow, Russia.
31. Id. art. 47. Regional offices may be established by decree of the Federal Securities Commission with concurrence of the executive agencies of the constituent members
of the Russian Federation. Id. The chairman of each regional office is confirmed by the
Federal Securities Commission based on a joint proposal by the head of the executive
authorities of the affected constituent member of the Russian Federation and the
Chairman of the Federal Securities Commission. Id.
32. Id. art. 41.
33. Id.
34. Decree #1177, supra note 24.
35. Securities Law, supra note 2, art. 40.
36. Id. art. 41.
37. Id. art. 45.
38. Id.
39. Id. art. 41.
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ed union associations, and independent experts. 0 State agencies and
organizations nominate their representatives. The Federal Securities
Commission Board confirms or denies the nominations. 1 The Board
also confirms representatives nominated by securities market participants. 2 The Chairman of the Expert Council, who serves as an ex officio member of the Federal Securities Commission Board," is elected by
the Expert Council and confirmed by the Chairman of the Federal Securities Commission." Members of the Expert Council may be appointed
for an unlimited number of two-year terms. 5
At the tim the Federal Securities Commission was established,
both the Ministry of Finance and the Federal Securities Commission had
overlapping authority for securities market regulation as a result of
different presidential decrees and government legislation." Presidential
decree recently clarified the authority of the two parties. Now, the Federal Securities Commission is primarily responsible for the regulation of
the securities market. Without its approval, no other agency may act on
matters within the Federal Securities Commisssion's competence. 7
Nevertheless, the Federal Securities Commission's jurisdiction is not
exclusive because some of its actions require the concurrence of the Central Bank, 8 authorities of certain constituent republics, and regions of
the Russian Federation, or various other agencies. 9
C. The Central Bank of the Russian Federation
The Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Central Bank) was
established in 1990 as an independent central bank, replacing its predecessor, the USSR Gosbank.5" The Central Bank is responsible for con-

40. Id.

41. Id. art. 45.
42. Id.
43. Id. art. 41.
44. Id. art. 45.
45. Id. art. 41.
46. The Ministry of Finance is the most important government ministry in terms
of its influence over the economy. The board of the Federal Securities Commission
includes a representative of the Ministry of Finance. See supra text accompanying note
33.
47. Decree #1009, supra note 22, § 9. But see supra note 24.
48. See infra text accompanying note 72.
49. See supra note 31.
50. Federal'nyi zakon "0 Tsentralnom Banke Rossiyskoi Federatsii" [Federal Law
No. 394-1 "On the Central Bank of the RSFSR (Bank of Russia)"] (Dec. 2,
1990),VEDOMOSTI SEZDA NARODNYKH DEPUTATOV I VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA RossIYsKol
FEDERATSII 1990, No. 27, Doc. 356, translated in Economic Law of Russia, "Federal
Law No. 394-1 of December 2, 1990, on the Central Bank of the Russian Federation
(Bank of Russia)" (Garant-Service 1996, Doc. 5802) available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library,
RFLaw File [hereinafter Central Bank Law], reworded and amended by Federal'nyi
zakon #65-FZ "0 vnecenii ismenenii i dopolnenii v Zakon RSFSR 0 Tsentralnom Banke
RSFSR (Banke Rossi)" [Federal Law No. 65-FZ "On Amending the RSFSR Law on the
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ducting a single state monetary-credit policy in cooperation with the
Russian government. Its aim is to stabilize and protect the ruble 1 and
to regulate the banking system,52 the supervising banks, and other
credit organizations.53 It can issue prospective regulations consistent
with federal legislation."' It also may grant credits of up to one year
against securities; buy and sell securities of companies and government
securities; conduct settlement, cash, and deposit operations; and function
as a custodian and asset manager." The Central Bank has its own reserve funds, the use of which are determined by its Board of Directors.56

Central Bank of the RSFSR (the Bank of Russia)"] (Apr. 26, 1996) (amended July 31,
1995, and Jan. 4, 1996), SOBR. ZAKONOD. R.F. 1995, No. 18, Doc. 1593, translated in

Economic Law of Russia, "Federal Law No. 65-FZ of April 26, 1996 On Amending the
RSFSR Law on the Central Bank of the RSFSR (the Bank of Russia)(with the Additions and Amendments of July 31, 1995, January 4, 1996)" (Garant-Service 1996, Doc.
4640), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, RFLaw File; Federal'nyi zakon #214-FZ "0
vnesenii dopolnenia v statu 83 Federalnogo zakona "0 Tsentralnom Banke Rossiyskoi
Federatsii" [Federal Law No. 214-FZ "On Supplementing Article 83 of the Federal Law
on the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of Russia)"] (Dec. 27, 1995),
SOBR. ZAKONOD. R.F. 1996, No. 1, Doc. 7, translated in Economic Law of Russia, "Federal Law No. 214-FZ of December 27, 1995, On Supplementing Article 83 of the Federal Law on the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of Russia)" (Garant-Service 1996, Doc. 5701), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, RFLaw File . The Central
Bank Law came into force on December 2, 1995, under Postanovlenie VS RSFSR ot
2 dekabria 1990 g. "0 poriadke vvedenia v deistvie Zakona RSFSR 0 Tsentralnom
Banke RSFSR (Banke Rossii) i Zakona RSFSR" and "0 bankakh i bankovskoi
deitelnosty v RSFSR" [Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR of December 2,
1990, on Entry into Force of the Laws of the RSFSR "On the Central Bank of the
RSFSR (The Bank of Russia)" and "On Banks and Banking in the RSFSR"I,
VEDOMOSTI

S'ESDA NARODNYKH DEPUTATOV I VERKHOVNOGO

SOVETA

RoSsIYSKOI

FEDERATSII 1990, No. 27, Doc. 358, translated in Economic Law of Russia "Resolution
of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR of December 2, 1990 on Entry into Force of the
Laws of the RSFSR on the Central Bank of the RSFSR (the Bank of Russia) and on
Banks and Banking in the RSFSR" (Garant-Service 1996, Doc. 5804), available in
LEXIS, Intlaw Library, RFLaw File.
51. Central Bank Law, supra note 50, art. 35. The basic instruments of the single
monetary-credit policy of Russia regulated by the Central Bank are interest rates,
reserve requirements of the Central Bank, market operations, bank refinancing, currency regulation, guidelines for the growth of monetary stock, and direct qualitative
restrictions on the refinancing of banks and the banking operations carried out by
credit organizations. Id.
52. Id. art. 4. The main functions of the Central Bank in relation to banking operations include: (1) issuing currency and organizing cash circulation; (2) acting as a
creditor of the last resort for credit organizations and organizing a bank refinancing
system; (3) establishing rules for settlements and banking operations; (4) registering,
licencing, and supervising credit organizations; (5) registering securities issued by credit
organizations; (6) forecasting the balance of payments; and (7) carrying out all types
of banking operations for the fulfillment of its functions. Id.
53. Id. arts. 77-79.
54. Id. art. 6.
55. Id. art. 45.
56. Id. art. 10.
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The seat of the Central Bank is in Moscow. 7 It also has territorial
institutions or regional divisions, including the National Banks of the
constituent republics.5 8 The functions of its divisions are determined by.
Central Bank regulations." Although the heads of the territorial institutions may be invited to participate at the meetings of the Board of
Directors of the Central Bank,60 the territorial institutions do not generally have any rule-making authority.
The main decision-making body of the Central Bank is its twelvemember Board of Directors,6 1 headed by the Chairman of the Bank.62
The Minister of Finance and the Minister of Economics are, by custom,
members of the Board of Directors. The Central Bank consults the Min-

istry of Finance about government securities and the national debt.'
The Central Bank also has a consultative body, the National Banking

Council," to review policy and legislation.'
The Central Bank is responsible to the Duma. The Duma appoints
and removes the Central Bank's Chairman and its members of the Board
of Directors. 66 Additionally, it appoints auditors to the Central Bank.67

The Chairman reports to the Duma on the Central Bank's activities."
The Central Bank has one representative on the Board of the Federal Securities Commission. 9 In conjunction with the Federal Securities
Commission, the Central Bank determines certain rules, including those
governing securities issued by banks,7" and those regulating securities
denominated in foreign currency.71 The Central Bank must approve in-

57. Id. art. 1.
58. Id. art. 83.
59. Id. art. 84.
60. Id. arts. 14, 19.
61. Id. art. 16.
62. Id. art. 11. The Chairman is nominated by the President and appointed by the
Duma. Id. art. 12.
63. Id. art. 19. See also supra text accompanying note 49.
64. Central Bank Law, supra note 50, art. 20. The Chairman of the Central Bank
presides over the National Banking Council which includes two representatives from
each house of the Federal Assembly and one representative of each of the Executive
Office, the Government, and the Ministries of Finance and Economics. Representatives
of the Central Bank, credit organizations, and additional experts are appointed to the
Council by approval by the Duma of the Chairman's nomination. Id.
65. Id. art. 21. The National Banking Council considers the drafts of the basic
directions of the monetary-credit policy that are issued each year by the Central Bank
to the Duma for approval. The drafts reflect the policy of currency regulation and
control, give opinions thereon and analyze the results of their implementation; examine
the draft legislative and normative acts related to banking; considers the regulation
of credit organizations; and assist in the formulation of settlement regulations. Id.
66. The members of the Board are nominated by the Duma. Id. art. 13.
67. Id. art. 5.
68. Id.
69. Securities Law, supra note 2, art. 41.
70. See generally id. arts. 27-34.
71. Id. art. 43.
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structions issued by the Federal Securities Commission affecting banks
and the regulation of currency fund assets.72
D. Self-Regulatory Organizations
Self-regulatory organizations (SROs), such as the National Association of Securities Market Participants (NAUFOR),"3 regulate professional securities market participants, protect the clients and security
owners thereof, and determine rules and standards for transactions with
securities that enhance market efficiency. 4 SRO members are subject
to the overlapping jurisdiction of the SROs, the Federal Securities Commission, and other federal ministries and agencies, such as the Ministry
of Finance.
Each SRO must adopt rules and regulations governing its operations and its members. Such rules must provide for professional qualifications of certain persons associated with the SROs' members, minimum capital requirements, standards of conduct, price manipulation
limitations, sanctions of SRO members and persons associated with
members, and nondiscriminatory procedures for the application of sanctions.75 The rules and regulations must be submitted to the Federal Securities Commission forming one of the bases on which the Federal Securities Commission may grant a permit authorizing the formation of an
SRO.76 If an SRO was licensed prior to April 25, 1996, it has up to one
year, subject to an additional one-year extension, to conform its constituent documents and other rules to the Securities Law.77
SROs are primarily concerned with policing their members and
persons associated with their members, adopting rules governing trading
in securities, and settling disputes among their members. For the most
part, SROs are not concerned with disclosure requirements nor with
substantive regulation of the companies because the securities are traded by their members. Each SRO establishes the requirements for listing
on its exchange and, in the case of NAUFOR, for quotation outside the
stock exchanges.

72. Id.
73. Until recently, NAUFOR was known as the Professional Association of Securities Market Participants, or PAUFOR. See ADAM SMITH INSTITUTE, CAPITAL MARKET
REPORT 2, 2 p. 1 2 (July 4, 1996).
74. Securities Law, supra note 2, art. 48.
75. Id. art. 50.
76. Id.
77. Id. art. 52.
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III. SECURITIES LAWS

A. Civil Code of the Russian Federation
The Civil Code of the Russian Federation provides a general
framework for securities legislation" and for legal entities such as general and limited partnerships, limited liability companies, and joint stock
companies. 9 The Civil Code is supplemented by other federal legislation, such as the Securities Law"0 and the Joint Stock Company Law."
The types of securities recognized by the Civil Code are discussed below. 2
B. Federal Law "On Securities Market"
The Securities Law, effective as of April 25, 1996,' is the primary
legislation concerning the issuance of securities by companies and operations of securities markets in the Russian Federation. The Securities
Law is divided into several sections concerning, inter alia, securities
market participants, offerings of securities by companies, continuous
disclosure of information about issuers of securities, market regulation,
the organizational structure of the Federal Securities Commission, and
enforcement. The Securities Law also defines the responsibilities of various securities market participants that were formerly regulated by several government resolutions.'
C. Government Resolutions ConcerningSecurities
Until recently, the principal regulations concerning securities were
government resolutions and instructions of several government agencies,
one of them being the Ministry of Finance. Before the adoption of the
Securities Law, Government Resolution #78" regulated most aspects
of the securities markets and provided the legal framework for conducting securities operations. Although Government Resolution #78 has not

78. Civil Code, supra note 1, ch. VII.
79. Id. ch. IV.
80. See Securities Law, supra note 2.
81. See Joint Stock Company Law, supra note 3.
82. Civil Code, supra note 1, arts. 143, 149. See generally infra part V.
83. The Securities Law came into force on April 25, 1996, the date of its official
publication in ROSS1YSKAYA GAZETA. See Securities Law, supra note 2, art. 53.
84. Id. arts. 3-15.
85. Postanovlenie Pravitelstva RF #78 "Ob uterjdenii polojenia o vypuske i
obrahsenii tsennykh bumag i fondovykh birjakh v RSFSR" [Government Resolution #78,
"Regulations of Issuance and Circulation of Securities and Stock Exchanges"] (Dec. 28,
1991), FINANCIAL NEWSPAPER 1992, No. 5, translated in Economic Law of Russia, "Regulations for the Issue and Circulation of Securities and for Stock Exchanges in the
RSFSR of December 28, 1991 (Approved by Decision of the Government of the RSFSR
No. 78 of December 28, 1991)" (Garant-Service 1996, Doc. 5034), available in LEXIS,
Intlaw Library, RFLaw File [hereinafter Government Resolution #78].
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been repealed, some of its provisions are no longer applicable, because
they have been codified by the Securities Law. However, certain aspects
of Government Resolution #78 remain important. For example, the provisions concerning investment institutions, such as financial consultants
and investment companies, are beyond the scope of the Securities Law
and are not otherwise regulated.
Government Resolution #78 was supplemented by other instructions
and orders of government agencies having jurisdiction over the securities
market. In particular, several instructions of the Ministry of Finance
elaborated on specific matters of securities issuance, trading rules, and
registration requirements." Most of these regulations have been super-

86. Some of the more important regulations and instructions are Instruktsia
Minfina RF #2 "0 pravilakh vypuska i registrataii tsennykh bumag na territorii
Rossiyskoi Federatsii" [Instruction of the Ministry of Finance #2 "Regulations on the
Issuance and Registration of Securities on the Territory of the Russian Federation"]
(Mar. 3, 1992) (amended Jan. 27, Feb. 4, and Nov. 15, 1993), FINANcIAL NEWSPAPER
1992, No. 11, translated in Economic Law of Russia, "Instruction of the Ministry of
Finance of the RSFSR No. 2 of March 3, 1992 on Rules for Issue and Registration of
Securities on the Territory of the Russian Federation (with the Additions and Amendments of January 27, February 4 and November 15, 1993)" (Garant-Service 1996, Doc.
5102), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, RFLaw File; Pismo Minfina RF #59 "0
poriadke sostavlenia i predstavlenia emitentami tsennykh bumag otchetov ob itogak
vypuska tsennykh bumag i o sostavlenia i predstavlenia aktsionernymi obshestvami
godovykh otchetov po tsennymi bumagami" [Ministry of Finance Letter #59 "On Procedures for Submission by the Issuers of Securities the Reports on the Results of the
Issue of Securities and Procedures for Submission by Joint Stock Companies of Annual
Reports on Securities"] (May 5, 1994) Ross1YsKIE VESTI No. 95, May 26, 1994, translated in Economic Law of Russia, "Letter of the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation No. 59 of May 5, 1994 on the Procedure for Making Up and Submitting by the
Issuers of Securities the Reports on the Results of the Issue of Securities and the Procedure for Making Up and Submitting by Joint Stock Companies Annual Reports on
Securities" (Garant-Service 1996, Doc. 2981), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library,
RFLaw File; Pismo Minfina RF#53 "Instruktsia o pravilakh sovershenia i registratsii
sdelok s tsennymi bumagami (izdana na osnovanii postanovlenia Pravitelstva
Rossiyskoi)" [Ministry of Finance Letter #53 "On Securities Trading"] (July 6, 1992)
FINANcIAL NEWSPAPER 1992, No. 28, translated in Economic Law of Russia, "Letter of
the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation No. 53 of July 6, 1992 on Securities
Trading (issued pursuant to Decision of the Government of the RSFSR No. 78 of December 28, 1991)" (Garant-Service 1996, Doc. 7080), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, RFLaw File; Pismo Minfina RF 5-1-04 "0 Vypolneni osobykh uslovii sovershenia
sdelok, sviazannykh s priobreteniem krupnykh paketov aktsii" [Ministry of Finance
Letter #5-1-04 "On Fulfillment of Special Conditions for Acquisition of Large
Shareholdings"] (May 13, 1993) RossisKiE VESTI No. 95, May 26, 1994, translated in
Economic Law of Russia, "Letter of the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation
No. 5-1-04 of May 13, 1993 on the Fulfillment of Special Conditions for Making
Transactions with Acquired Large Shareholdings" (Garant-Service 1996, Doc. 1743),
available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, RFLaw File; Prikaz GKAP "Ob utverjdenii
instruktsii o poriadke kontrolia za priobreteniem paev dolei uchastya tovarishestv i
prostykh imennykh aktsii aktsionernykh obshestv i poriadke priznania lits,
kontrolirushikh imushestva dryg dryga" [Instruction of the Russian State Anti-monopoly
Committee No. 5 "Control Over the Acquisition of Shares and Stakes of Partnerships
and Common Shares of Joint Stock Companies and on the Recognition of Persons Con-
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seded by the Securities Law.
D. Instructions of the Federal Securities Commission
The Federal Securities Commission exercises its rule-making authority by instructions approved by the Federal Securities Commission
Board and signed by its Chairman. 7 All decrees must be considered by
the Expert Council before their adoption is valid.88 Instructions issued
by the Federal Securities Commission concerning matters within its
authority are binding on all federal ministries and executive agencies,
the executive agencies of constituent members of the Russian Federation,
agencies of local government, securities market participants, and
SROs.8" No regulations concerning the securities markets, or the activities of securities market participants and SROs, may be adopted by
other federal ministries and executive agencies without concurrence of
the Federal Securities Commission.'
When the Federal Securities Commission was established in 1994,
it was primarily responsible for creating a legal framework for mutual
funds in Russia. 1 During 1994-1995, most of the activities of, and instructions issued by, the Federal Securities Commission concerned mutual fund regulation. 2 Recently, the Federal Securities Commission has

trolling the Property of One Another"] (Jan. 18, 1994) ROSSIYsKIE VEsTI No. 55, Mar.
29, 1995, translated in Economic Law of Russia, "Order of the State Committee of
Russia for Anti-monopoly Policy and Support for New Economic Structures No. 5 of
January 18, 1994 on the Approval of the Instructions on the Control over the Acquisition of Shares and Stakes of Partnerships and Ordinary Registered Shares of Jointstock Companies and on the Recognition of Persons Controlling the Property of One
Another (with the Additions and Amendments of December 29, 1994) (abolished)"
(Garant-Service 1996, Doc. 1538), available in LEXIS, IntlawLibrary, RFLaw File; Ministry of Finance letter #5-1-06 (Aug. 19, 1993) "On Stock Exchange Activity",
NORMATIVNYE AcTY Po FINANSAM, NALoGAM I STRAKHOVANIYU 1994, No. 2 (1994),
translated in Economic Law of Russia, "Letter of the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation No. 5-1-06 of August 19, 1993 on Stock Exchange Activity" (Aug. 30,
1995)(Garant-Service 1996, Doc. 3605), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, RFLaw File.
87. Securities Law, supra note 2, art. 43.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Decree #2063, supra note 21, art. 6.
92. Postanovlenie Federalnoj Komissii po Tsennum Bumagam #7 "0 poryadke
litsenzirovaniya deyatelnosti po otsenke nedvizhimogo imushchestva paevykh
investitisionnykh fondov" [Resolution of the Federal Securities Commission #7 "On
licensing evaluation activities of mutual funds real estate property"] (Aug. 30, 1995)
ECON. AND LIFE 1995, No. 41, translated in Economic Law of Russia, "Decision of the
Federal Commission for Securities and the Capital Market No. 7 of August 30, 1995
on the Procedure for Licensing the Activity Involved in the Appraisal of the Real Estate of Share Investment Funds" (Garant-Service 1996, Doc. 4937) available in LEXIS,
Intlaw Library, RFLaw File; Postanovlenie Federalnoj Komissii po Tsennum Bumagam
#9 "0 programme razvitiya paevykh investitsionnykh fondov" [Resolution of the Federal
Securities Commission #9 "On development program of mututal funds in Russia"] (Oct.
10, 1995), ECON. AND LIFE 1995, No. 40, translated in Economic Law of Russia "Deci-
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focused its attention on development of the Russian securities market.
It assisted with the preparation of the new Joint Stock Company Law
adopted by the Russian Parliament at the end of 1995,"3 and was primarily responsible for drafting the Securities Law.
E. PrivatizationLegislation
The process of privatization of state and municipal enterprises in
the Russian Federation is regulated by The Law on "Privatization of
State and Municipal Enterprises in the Russian Federation" of July 3,
1991, as amended;" Presidential Decree #1535 "On State Privatization

sion of the Federal Commission on Securities and the Share Market under the Government of the Russian Federation No. 9 of September 1, 1995 Programme of the Development of the Share Investment Funds" (Garant-Service 1996, Doc. 4888), available
in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, RFLaw File; Postanovlenie Federalnoj Komissii po Tsennym
Bumagam #13 "0 tipovkykh pravilakh otkrytogo investitsionnogo fonda" [Resolution of
the Federal Securities Commission #13, Model Rules of Open Mutual Funds] (Oct. 12,
1995) (as amended), ROSS1YSKAYA GAZETA, Nov. 18, 1995, translated in Economic Law
of Russia, "Decision of the Federal Commission on Securities and the Capital Market
No. 13 of October 12, 1995 on the Standard Rules for an Open Unit Investment Fund
(with the Amendment and Addenda of January 12, 1996)" (Garant-Service 1996, Doc.
5513), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, RF Law File [hereinafter Resolution #13];
Postanovlenie Federalnoj Komissii po Tsennym Bumagam #15, 0 tipovom prospecte
emissii investitssionnykh paev [Resolution of the Federal Securities Commission #15,
Model Stock Prospectus of Investment Shares of Mutual Funds] (Oct. 18, 1995) (as
amended), ROsSiYsKAYA GAzETA, Nov. 16, 1995, translated in Economic Law of Russia,
"Decision of the Federal Commission on Securities and the Capital Market No. 15 of
October 18, 1995 on the Standard Prospectus for an Issue of Investment Units (with
the Amendments and Addenda of January 11, 1991)" (Garant-Service 1996, Doc. 5515),
available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, RFLaw File [hereinafter Resolution #15];
Postanovlenie Federalnoj Komissii po Tsennym Bumagam #14 [Resolution of the Federal Securities Commission #14 Model Rules of Interval Mutual Funds] (Oct. 16, 1995)
translated in Economic Law of Russia, "Decision of the Federal Commission on Securities and the Capital Market of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 14 of
October 16, 1995 on Standard Rules for an Interval Unit Investment Fund (with the
Amendments and Addenda of January 11, 12, 1996)" (Garant-Service 1996, Doc. 5515),
available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, RFLaw File. See infra part IXB. One exception
is Postanovlenie Federalnoj Komissii po Tsennym Bumagam #6, Vremennyi poryadok
litsenzirov aniya deyatelnosti p vedeniyu reestrov vladeltsev immennykh tsennykh
bumag [Temporary Regulations on Licensing Activities of Specialized Registrars approved by the Resolution of the Federal Securities Commission #6] (Aug. 30, 1995)
translated in Economic Law of Russia, "Declaration of the Federal Commission on
Securities and the Capital Market No. 6 of August 30, 1995 on Interim Procedures for
Licensing and Maintenance of Registries of Holders of Registered Securities" (GarantService 1996, Doc. 6943), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, RFLaw File [hereinafter
FSC Regulation #6], which concerns registrars. See also infra part VI.C.4.
93. See Joint Stock Company Law, supra note 3.
94. Zakon "0 Privatizatsii gosudarstvennykh i munitsipialnykh predpriyatiy v
Rossiyskoi Federatsii" [Law on "Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises in the
Russian Federation"] (July 3, 1991)(as amended) ROSSlYSKAYA GAZETA, July 19, 1991,
translatedin Economic Law of Russia, "Law of the Russian Federation of July 3, 1991
on the Privatization of State (Additions and Amendments of June 5, 1992") (GarantService 1996, Doc. 5710), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, RFLaw File.

1996

RUSSIAN SECURITIES & REGULATION

Program for State and Municipal Enterprises after July 1, 1996" of July
22, 1994; 9" RF GK195 Regulations #342-R "Regulations on Investment
Tenders for Sale of Shares of Privatized State and Municipal Enterprises" of February 15, 1994;" 7 and RF GKI Instruction #151-r on "Investment Tenders" of January 28, 1993, as amended. 8 Although other federal regulations may be relevant, they are supplemental in nature to the
legal framework established by the above-mentioned legislation.
Privatization in Russia was introduced following the collapse of the
USSR and at the beginning of the market reform. The distribution of
state and municipal property among the general public through voucher
privatization provided its cornerstone. Each Russian citizen received one
voucher worth of 10,000 rubles that could be exchanged for shares in
privatized companies. Privatization attempted to create mass shareholder capital in Russia through organization of voucher tenders, sale of
government shares in companies to workers and the general public, and
investment tenders. In addition, with respect to regional and municipal
enterprises, certain local regulations are relevant, but only if they are
consistent with federal legislation. It is worth noting that, with the exception of Moscow, very few Russian autonomous republics or municipal-

95. Ukaz Presidenta #1535 "Ob osnovnykh polozheniyakh gosudarstvennoy
programmy privatizatsii gosudarstvennykh i munitsipalnykh predpriyatiy v Rossiyskoi
Federatsii posle 1 iyulya 1994 goda" [Presidential Decree #1535 "On State Privatization
Program for State and Municipal Enterprises after July 1, 1994"] (July 22, 1994),
SOBR. ZAKONOD. R.F. 1994, No. 13, Doc. 1478, translated in Economic Law of Russia,
"Basic Provision of the State Programme of Privatisation of State-owned and Municipal
Enterprises in the Russian Federation After July 1, 1994 (Approved by Decree of the
President of the Russian Federation No. 1535 of July 22, 1994)" (Garant-Service 1996,
Doc. 1222), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, RFLaw File.
96. "RF GKI" are the Russian language initials of the State Property Committee
of the Russian Federation or Gosudarstveney Kommityet Imuschestva. See infra note
97 for full cite.
97. Rasporyazhenie Goskomimushchestva RF ot 15 fevralya 1994 goda #342-r Ob
utverzhdenii Polozheniya ob investitisionnom konkurse po prodazhe paketov aktsiy
aktsionernykh obtschest, sozdannykh v poryadke privatizatsii gosudarstvennykh i
munitsipalnykh predpriyatiy [RF GKI Regulations #342-R "Regulations on Investment
Tenders for Sale of Shares of Privatized State and Municipal Enterprises"] (Feb. 15,
1994), ROSSIYSKIE VESTI, No. 52, Mar. 24, 1994, translated in Economic Law of Russia,
"Order of the State Committee of the Russian Federation for the State Property Management No. 342-r of February 15, 1994 on Approving the Regulations for Investment
Contests for Sale of Shareholdings of Joint-stock Companies Set up by Way of Privatization of State owned and Municipal Enterprises" (Garant-Service 1996, Doc. 1537),
available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, RFLaw File.
98. Rasporyazhenie Goskomimushchestva RF ot 28 fevralya 1993 #151-r 0
dopolnenii vtorogo razdela plana privatizatsii predpriyatiy, predusmatrivayushchikh
prodazhu chasti aktsiy na investitsionnom konkurse [RF GKI Instruction #151-r on
"Investment Tenders"] (Jan. 28, 1993) (as amended), EcONOMY AND LIFE NEWSPAPER
1993, No. 32, translated in Economic Law of Russia, "Order of the State Property
Management Committee of Russia No. 151-r of January 28, 1993 on Adding the Second Section of Privatization Plan of Enterprises Envisaging Sale of a Part of the
Shares on Investment Tenders (with the Additions and Amendments of Oct. 8, 1993)"
(Garant-Service 1996, Doc. 1502), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, RFLaw File.
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ities enacted significant privatization regulations to supplement federal
regulations.
F. Other LegislationAffecting Securities
1. Federal Law "On Joint Stock Companies"
The Joint Stock Company Law, effective as of January 1, 1996,"
supplements the provisions of the Civil Code concerning joint stock companies."° The Joint Stock Company Law is organized into several
chapters concerning, inter alia, company formation and liquidation,"'
securities and dividends, 2 meetings of shareholders and other constituent bodies (such as boards of directors), 03 purchases by a company of
its own shares,"° transactions involving large blocks of shares," conflicts of interest,"e and reporting and disclosure requirements.'" It
is a significant addition to Russian company law.
The Joint Stock Company Law authorizes several types of securities, including common stock,"° convertible securities,"° bonds and
debentures,"0 cumulative preferred stocks,"' and voting preferred
stock."' It also permits authorized but unissued shares". and treasury shares to be sold to new investors at any time upon the decision of
a company's board of directors without further approval of its shareholders. This concept was a novelty in Russian law first introduced by the
Joint Stock Company Law.
2. Law "On Currency Regulation and Currency Control"
Another legislative act that impacts securities operations in Russia
is the Law "On Currency Regulation and Currency Control" of October
9, 1992 (the "Currency Control Law")." It concerns securities denomi-

99. Joint Stock Company Law, supra note. 3, art.94.
100. See generally Civil Code, supra note 1, ch. VI.
101. See Joint Stock Company Law, supra note 3, ch. II.
102. See Id. chs. III, IV, V, and VI.
103. See Id. chs. VII and VIII.
104. See Id. ch. IX.
105. See Id. ch. X.
106. See Id. ch. XI.
107. See Id. ch. XIII.
108. Id. art. 11.
109. Id. art. 39.
110. Id. art. 33.
111. Id. art. 32.
112. Id. art. 32.
113. Id. art. 27.
114. Zakon "0 valyutnom regulirovanii i valyutnom kontrole" [Law "On Currency
Regulation and Currency Control"] (Oct. 9, 1992), VEDOMOSTI S'EZDA NARODNYKH
DEPUTATOV I VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA ROSSIYSKOI FEDERATSII 1992, No. 45, Doc. 2542,
translated in Economic Law of Russia, "Law of the Russian Federation No. 3615-1 of
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nated in foreign currency and governs procedures for Russian securities
transactions in when using foreign currency. The Currency Control Law
classifies such securities and transactions as "operation[s] related to the
movement of capital,"' thus subjecting them to Central Bank licensing procedures." 6
IV. SECURITIES MARKETS AND PARTICIPANTS
A. DistributionMarkets
Distribution markets in Russia include companies that first issue
securities to the public as well as secondary distributions involving sales
of large blocks of outstanding shares by insiders."7 These markets are
largely undeveloped. The initial distributions of securities of most formerly government-owned companies occurred through voucher privatization, a process that is now relevant for historical purposes." 8 To date,
most other primary distributions have been carried out by investment
banking firms affiliated with major Russian commercial banks and Western investment banking houses, many of which have established operations in Russia. Issuances of securities in the distribution market governed by the Securities Law are discussed below."'

October 9, 1992 on Hard Currency Regulation and Control" (Garant-Service 1996, Doc.
2479), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, RFLaw File [hereinafter Currency Control
Law].
115. Id. arts. 1(8), 10.
116. Id. arts.1-2. Pismo Gosbanka SSSR #352 ot 24 maya 1991 goda "Osnovnye
polozheniya o regulirovanii valyutnykh operatsiy na territorii SSSR" [Letter of the
USSR Gosbank # 352, as subsequently amended by the Russian Central Bank] (May
24, 1991), NORMATIVNYKH AcTOv MINISTERSTV I VEDOMSTV SSSR 1991, No. 12,
translated in Economic Law of Russia, "Letter of the State Bank of the USSR No. 352
of May 24, 1991 on Basic Provisions of Regulation of Foreign Exchange Operations in
the Territory of the USSR (with the Amendments and Additions of Nov. 18, 1991,
Jan. 20, Mar. 25, July 16, 1993, and September 2, 1994)" (Garant-Service 1996, Doc.
5607), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, RFLaw File (providing for detailed procedures on licensing the operations related to the movement of capital. According to
these regulations, any sale or purchase of securities for foreign currency has to be
licensed by the Central Bank of Russia. Since the licensing process is difficult and
time consuming, many Western companies that are heavily engaged in securities trading in Russia, open special investment accounts with Russian banks for settlement
purposes. Such accounts may be used for sale and purchase of Russian securities
through a two-way conversion of foreign currency into rubles).
117. Transactions concerning large blocks of shares are discussed below. See infra
part VIII. D.
118. See B. Weinstein, The Russian Federation and the Central Asian Republics, in
INTERNATIONAL

CAPITAL

MARKETS

AND

Bloomenthal and S. Wolff, eds., 1995).
119. See infra part VI.
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B. Trading Markets
The Russian Trade System (RTS) is an electronic interdealer quotation system operated by NAUFOR for securities traded outside the
stock exchanges. The RTS was established by NAUFOR pursuant to the
Rules of Trade in the Russian Trade System, 20 which were approved
by the NAUFOR board of directors on August 8, 1995. NAUFOR calculates and distributes an inside quotation for each security quoted for
which there are at least two market makers displaying firm two-sided
quotations.
The Trade Rules apply to transactions in securities among participants in the RTS, provided that such securities are quoted in the RTS
by at least one participant.12' The participant need not be a market
maker." m A participant must place a firm quotation in the RTS except
in certain cases when indicative quotations (i.e., offers wanted, bids
wanted) are allowed." Trading sessions on the RTS are from 11:00
a.m. to 6:00 p.m. on business days."2 The minimum unit of trading
cannot be less than US $10,000 and the maximum spread inside quotations may not exceed ten percent of the best quotation. If a quotation
is beyond the allowed spread, the participant must alter its quote or
withdraw it." All quotations must indicate the currency, using either
rubles or US dollars, in which transaction will be settled. 26 If the quotation allows settlement in any currency, then the currency of settlement
is determined by whomever initiates the transaction." As of July
1996, there were 21 securities quoted on the RTS.' Securities of several substantial Russian companies, including, LukOil, Norilsk Nikel,
Mosenergo, Chernogorneft, Rostelekom, and several other, primarily oil,
companies, are actively traded on the RTS.

120. NAUFOR Rules of Trade in the Russian Trade System as approved on August
8, 1995, Unpublished material available on file at NAUFOR offices [hereinafter Trade
Rules].
121. Id. art. 5.1.
122. A market maker is a participant approved by the NAUFOR Trading Committee
that has assumed certain obligations for quoting securities in RTS. Id. Definitions. RTS
has a list of market makers that are registered by NAUFOR. Market markers are
required to make quotations for a particular lot in the amount not less than
U.S.$20,000. Id. attachment 2. In the United States, the decision to act as a market
maker is often a result of sponsorship by an integrated dealer of a particular security
which its investment banking department has previously underwritten. H. Bloomenthal,
United States, in INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SEcURrTIEs REGULATION
§ 3.03121[b] (H. Bloomenthal and S. Wolff eds., 1995).
123. Trade Rules, supra note 120, art. 3.
124. Id. Definitions.
125. Id. attachment 2, art. 1.1.
126. Id. art. 3.2.
127. Id.
128. Craig Mellow, After Slow Start, the New Russia Inspires Bulls, INTL HERALD
TRIB., July 15, 1996, at 13.
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Indicative quotations are permitted either outside or during the
trading sessions if a participant announces its quotation and must alter
or withdraw it. They are also allowed if the participant is a market maker; otherwise, transactions must be concluded under firm quotations.129
Unless otherwise agreed by the participants before conclusion of the
transaction, the participants must comply with an integral part of the
Trade Rules, the Standard Agreement on Purchase and Sale of Securities (NAUFOR Agreement).3 0 The participants must complete the procedure for execution of the NAUFOR Agreement within one business day
following the transaction conclusion date, as deemed by the Trade Rules.
However, the participants can agree to a later date for procedural compliance, if the participants agree at the moment of conclusion of the
transaction.' The procedures provide, inter alia, that the NAUFOR
Agreement be registered with NAUFOR on the date of its execution." 2
The seller of securities may register the NAUFOR Agreement prior to its
execution." Violation of the procedures is not a sufficient basis for refusal to conclude a transaction or for the termination of an executed
NAUFOR Agreement."
The Trade Rules require the seller of securities to report the
transaction to NAUFOR before 7:00 p.m. of the day of conclusion of such
transaction." The report must include the price, number of securities,
terms of payment, name of the buyer, and the name of the party that
undertook the registration of the transaction." 6 Registration of transactions on RTS must be effected within three business days, if the registrar is located in Moscow. If the registrar is located outside of Moscow,
registration must occur within seven business days." 7
The importance of stock exchanges is uncertain; however, the relative importance of exchanges, especially the larger exchanges, such as
the Moscow Stock Exchange, the St. Petersburg Stock Exchange, and the
Vladivostok Stock Exchanges, can be expected to grow in importance as
the Russian securities market continues to develop. Presently, there are
66 stock exchanges, or the securities departments of commodities exchanges, operating on the basis of licenses awarded by the Ministry of
Finance." Shares, some bonds issued by privatized companies, and
government securities, bonds, and negotiable promissory notes are trad-

129.
130.
131.
132.

Trade Rules, supra note 120, art. 3.2.
Id. attachment 1, art. 5.6.
Id. art. 5.7.
Id.

133. Id.

134. Id.
135. Id. art. 7.1.
136. Id. art. 7.
137. Id. art. 6.3.

138. A. BUrger, Capital Markets in Central and Eastern Europe: Impact of the European Agreements, INTL Bus. LAWYER, Mar. 1996, at 122 [hereinafter Capital Markets].
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C. Securities Market Participants
The Federal Securities Commission's authority with respect to licensing of securities market participants extends to brokers, dealers,
clearing organizations, asset managers, depositaries, and registrars.14
Securities market participants also include so-called "investment institutions," a concept that survived from Government Resolution #78. Investment institutions may function in all the securities market participant
categories identified under the Securities Law.141 Another category of
securities market participants are nominees which are not separately
licensed by the Federal Securities Commission. The Securities Law contemplates integration of securities market participants in most phases
of the securities business."' Currently, a commercial bank may act in
any of the foregoing capacities without a separate license from the Federal Securities Commission. Commercial banks do not require a separate
license for acting as security market participants, because they must be
independently licensed by the Central Bank to operate." Securities
market participants also are regulated by the SROs, if any, to which
they belong.'"
1. Brokers and Dealers
According to the Securities Law, in order to engage in brokerage
and dealing activities in Russia, brokers" and dealers 46 (brokerdealers) must be licensed by the Federal Securities Commission or by
state agencies to which the Federal Securities Commission has granted

139. Id.
140. Securities Law, supra note 2, ch. 2, arts. 3-10.
141. Government Resolution #78, supra note 85, provision III, arts. 14-15. Government Resolution #78 defined four categories of investment institutions: broker, investment consultant, investment company, and investment fund. The Securities Law codified the status of a broker. There is a draft law on investment funds which is expected to clarify their status. It is not clear, however, what will happen to investment
consultants and investment companies since the regulation of their activities is not
covered in the Securities Law.
142. Registrar activities may not be combined with other securities market participant activities. Integration may be further limited by determination of the Federal
Securities Commission. Securities Law, supra note 2, art. 10.
143. Id. art. 52. See infra part IV.E. This authority is temporary. See infra text
accompanying note 151.
144. See infra part IV.D.
145. A "broker" is a securities market participant that concludes securities
transactions as an agent or commission agent under an instruction or commission or
a power of attorney for the account of others. Securities Law, supra note 2, art. 3.
146. "Dealers" are securities market participants that conclude securities transactions on their own behalf, and at their own expense, through public two-sided quotations. Id. art. 4.
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general licensing authority.147 Since the Federal Securities Commission

has not yet issued licensing requirements concerning broker-dealers, the
existing regulations of the Ministry of Finance and other government
agencies still apply to the extent that they are consistent with the Securities Law.'" The scope of exemptions from licensing is uncertain.149
Currently, a bank may act as a broker-dealer based on its Central Bank

license without a separate license from the Federal Securities Commission. 53 Broker-dealers also are subject to regulation and disciplinary
proceedings by SROs in which they participate."'
The authority of the Ministry of Finance to issue licenses to brokerdealers has been technically superseded by the authority granted to the
Federal Securities Commission under the Securities Law. Nonetheless,
all current brokerage licenses were issued by the Securities Department
of the Ministry of Finance.152 At the beginning of 1995, there were approximately 13,000 specialist brokers registered with the Ministry of

Finance."
In 1993 and 1994, 1,380 and 1,400 investment institutions were
issued licenses by the Ministry of Finance. 1" Before beginning operation, an investment institution must obtain a special license of the
Ministry of Finance or of a financial department of local municipal administrations, as appropriate.'55 A company's application for licensing
must include, inter alia, its certificate of incorporation and other corpo-

147. Id. arts. 39, 44(1), 51(6).
148. Today the principal documents governing the licensing of broker-dealers are
Government Resolution #78 and the Pismo Ministerstva Finansov RF "0 litsenzirovanii
deyatelnosti na rynke tsennykh bumag v kachestve investitsionnykh institutov" [Letter
of the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation No. 91 "On Licensing the Activities of Investment Institutions on the Securities Market"] (Sept. 21, 1992) (amended
Dec. 28, 1992, Dec. 22, 1993, Mar. 31, 1993, May 11, 1994, and Aug. 15, 1994), ECONOMY AND LIFE NEWSPAPER 1992, No. 42, translated in Economic Law of Russia, "Letter
of the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation No. 91 of September 21, 1992
on the Licensing of Activities of Investment Institutions on the Securities Market (with
the Additions and Amendments of December 28, 1992, December 22, March 31, 1993,
May 11, August 15, 1994)" (Garant-Service 1996, Doc. 2474), available in LEXIS,
Intlaw Library, RFLaw File [hereinafter MinFin Letter #91].
149. *Persons dealing exclusively in private securities transactions, i.e., where there
is no public quotation, and persons announcing one-sided quotations, by definition, may
be exempt from the licensing requirements under the Securities Law. See Securities
Law, supra note 2, arts. 4, 39. It remains to be seen whether Federal Securities Commission instructions will be more expansive.
150. Id. art. 52. See infra part IV. E. This is consistent with legislation in the European Union.
151. See infra part IV.D.
152. See generally Government Resolution #78, supra note 85, provision II, art. 2.
153. Capital Markets, supra note 138, at 122.
154. Id.
155. Government Resolution #78, supra note 85, provision III, art 21. Although this
provision has been superseded by the Securities Law, all the current brokerage licenses
have been issued by the Securities Department of the Ministry of Finance.
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rate documents (i.e., charter and founders' agreement), its certified balance sheet, and its qualification certificates entitling its specialists to
conduct securities market operations in Russia. 116 MinFin Letter #91
sets forth minimum capitalization requirements for companies that ap5 7
ply for an investment institution license."
It is expected that these requirements will be amended by the Federal Securities Commission for
each particular type of the investment institution.
The Federal Securities Commission may deny, suspend, or cancel
broker-dealer licenses under certain circumstances. The grounds on
which a broker-dealer license may be denied are uncertain and will likely be the subject of future instructions of the Federal Securities Commission. "In cases of repeated or gross violation ... of the legislation of
the Russian Federation concerning securities," the Federal Securities
Commission may suspend or cancel a broker-dealer's license.' If the
Federal Securities Commission suspends a broker-dealer's license, the
state agency that issued the license must cause the broker-dealer to
remedy the violation or cancel the license."5 s
The Securities Law broadly outlines a broker-dealer's obligations to
its clients. Thus, a broker-dealer must conscientiously comply with all
of its clients instructions."6 Authority to complete transactions may be
assigned to another broker-dealer, but only if the client agrees or, in the
absence of the client's agreement, where necessary to protect the client's
interests.' In every situation, the client must be informed of the assignment. A broker-dealer must complete its clients' transactions before
completing transactions on its own behalf. 62 Further, a broker-dealer

156. MinFin Letter # 91, supra note 148, art. 7. Qualification certificates were issued by the Ministry of Finance in accordance with the procedures set forth in Pismo
Ministerstva Finansov Rossiyskoi Federatsii #23 [Letter of the Ministry of Finance of
the Russian Federation #23] (Apr. 21, 1992), FINANcIAL NEWSPAPER 1992, No. 17,
translated in Economic Law of Russia "Letter of the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation No. 23 of Apr. 21, 1992 on the Procedure for Certifying the Specialists
Investment Institutions and Stock Exchanges (Stock Departments of Exchanges) for the
Conduct of Transactions with Securities (with the Additions and Amendments of Mar.
31, May 5, Dec. 22, 1993, and June 8, 1994)" (Garant-Service 1996, Doc. 5110), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, RFLaw File.
157. MinFin Letter #91, supra note 148, art. 3.
158. Securities Law, supra note 2, art. 44(4). For example, it is grounds for suspension or cancellation of a broker-dealer's license if a broker-dealer is found to have
engaged in price manipulation on the securities markets or in securities transactions
on the basis of misleading information about securities, issuers, or prices. Id. art.
51(2).
159. Id. art. 44(4).
160. Id. art. 3. Of course, the broker's instructions may specify otherwise, in which
case the broker must follow the instruction. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. "Recent regulations have begun to put rules into place to ensure that the
line between brokers and dealers is clear. For instance, entities which hold shares as
both nominees and beneficial owner must have two 'personal accounts' in the shareholder register." M. Schwartz, Russia Capital Markets Update, 7 LAW OF THE C.I.S.,
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is obliged to inform its clients of its interests in transactions that may
conflict with its ability to effect the clients' transactions on terms most
favorable to the client.'" In addition, if the broker-dealer acts according to its client's instructions but to the client's detriment without informing the client of conflicts of interest, a broker-dealer must repay its
client's losses.'"
Where a broker-dealer is acting as a commission broker, the commission contract may require the broker-dealer to retain funds for securities investment or to retain securities sale proceeds in the brokerdealer's balance accounts. Further, the commission contract may impose
conditions on the broker-dealer's rights to utilize such funds before they
are returned to the client."6 The broker-dealer may not offer any assurance or guarantee to its client regarding profits to be paid while the
funds are in the brokers possession.' A broker-dealer that trades securities on the RTS must guarantee its client's performance. 7 Thus,
if its client fails to perform, the broker-dealer is liable to the other party
for any damages incurred as a result of such failure. 6 '
Additional conditions of trading may be set by a broker-dealer, such
as the amount of securities offered for trade at the declared rate or the
duration that the quoted prices apply. If other essential conditions are
not included in a broker-dealer's commission contract, then the brokerdealer must act according to any essential conditions proposed by the
client. The client may attempt to legally compel the dealer to enter a
contract containing such essential conditions. The broker-dealer may be
financially liable for any losses suffered by its client by its failure to
contract.'69
2. Clearing Organizations
A clearing organization operates as intermediary in the settlement
of securities transactions, including the collection, verification, and correction of information for securities transactions and related documentation. 7 ' Clearing organizations settle securities transactions through

Mar. 1996, at 6.
163. Securities Law, supra note 2, art. 3. For example, a broker-dealer who is also
a market maker of a security probably must disclose this fact to its clients; whether
more must be disclosed, such as, the structuring of the broker-dealer's commission

structure to favor trading in securities in which the broker-dealer is a market maker,
is uncertain.
164. Id.

165. Id.
166. Id.
167.
168.
169.
170.
zations

Trade Rules, supra note 120, art. 5.4.
Id.
Securities Law, supra note 2, art. 4.
Id. art. 6. The Depositary Clearing Company is one of the first clearing organiestablished in Russia.
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accounting procedures stipulated in their contracts with their brokerdealer clients. Clearing organizations must maintain special funds to
reduce the risks of default in securities transactions.171 The Federal Securities Commission, in conjunction with the Central Bank, determines
the minimum size of the special funds that clearing organizations must
maintain.7 2
3. Asset Managers
The Securities Law provisions concerning asset managers were
intended to provide a framework for regulation of mutual fund managers. An asset manager is defined as any person, which over a specified
period of time and for compensation, manages in trust for its client securities, funds intended to be invested in securities and the proceeds thereof.173 The Securities Law and contractual obligations define the asset
manager's business procedural requirements and the asset manager's
rights and obligations. 74 An asset manager must disclose the capacity
in which it is transacting business.175 Conflicts of interest must also be
disclosed because asset managers are liable to their clients for any conflict of interest between the client and itself or the client and its other
clients, 6which are not disclosed and which result in financial loss to a
17
client.
4. Registrars
Registrars are legal entities that maintain a register of owners of
securities (register) by collecting, recording, processing, storing, and
disseminating pertinent ownership information.1 7 The register must
contain sufficient data to permit identification of all securities holders
so that information may be sent to and obtained from them. 7 s The
registrar's management system also must contain a record of each security holder's rights related to the securities registered in its name. 7 '
The register consists of a list of registered owners with a statement of
the number, the nominal value, and the class of securities owned."8'
Bearer securities are not maintained in a register. 8 '
There are two general types of registrars in Russia: independent
registrars and so called "pocket" registrars. Pocket registrars are con-

171.
172,
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id.
Id.
Id. art. 5.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id. art. 8(1).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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trolled by, or maintained by, the issuer acting as a registrar.182 An independent registrar is usually affiliated with a securities market participant or a bank and maintains a register on behalf of more than one
issuer," pursuant to instructions of such issuers.'8 The register for
companies with more than 500 shareholders must be maintained by an
independent specialized registrar. I" Issuers may contract for the maintenance of the register with only one registrar, although the registrar
may delegate some of its functions to other registrars."
Registrars are licensed as a separate class, distinct from licenses
issued to other securities market participants, in terms of the types of
licenses authorized under the Securities Law. 7 This may be because
regulations concerning registrar licensing was one of the first initiatives
undertaken by the Federal Securities Commission."8 In addition to requirements applicable to investment institutions" and set forth in
MinFin Letter #91,"9° an application for a registrar's license must include, inter alia, the registry's internal maintenance rules and a list of
joint stock companies planning to use the registrar. 9' The license is
issued by the Federal Securities Commission within sixty days after the
application"9198 for a term of one year and is not transferable to any
third party.

Registrars are limited in what they can do to ensure their independence. Registrars may not buy or sell securities of an issuer whose securities are maintained on its register." 4 Indeed, registrars are prohibited from acting as a broker, dealer, clearing organization, asset manager,

182. Id.
183. The number of issuers for whom a registrar may maintain a register is unrestricted. Id.
184. In the event of termination or expiration of the contract between the registrar
and the issuer, the registrar must transfer all information and documents, including
the register as of the date the contract ended, to another registrar selected by the
issuer. The issuer must notify the mass media or, in the alternative, send notification

to all of its securities holders in writing. Id. art. 8(3).
185. Id. art. 8(1).
186. Id. Such delegation does not relieve the primary registrar of its liabilities to
the issuer. Id.
187. Id. art. 39.
188. FSC Regulation #6, supra note 92. Recently, the Federal Securities Commission
has amended the regulations concerning registrar activities. Postanovlenie Federalnoy
Komissii po rynku tsennykh bumag #18 at 17 Sentyabrya 1996 goda "06 izmeneniyahk
idopolneniyahk poryadba Petzenzirovaniya deyatel'nosti po vedeniyu reestra vladeltzev

immennykh tsnnykh bumag" [Federal Securities Commission Regulation #18 "On
Amending the Procedure for Licensing Registrar Activities"](Sept. 17, 1996)[hereinafter
with FSC Regulation #6, Registrar Regulations].

189.
190.
191.
192.

See supra text accompanying note 156 and note 157.
See supra note 157.
Registrar Regulation, supra note 188, § 5.
Id. § 6.

193. Id. § 10.
194. Securities Law, supra note 2, art. 8(1).
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or depositary.195 Registrars must meet certain minimum capital requirements, equalling approximately U.S. $70,000. Registrars of companies whose controlling shareholders are federally owned require approximately U.S. $140,000 as a minimum capital requirement.' The Securities Law also proscribes how a registrar may charge fees and authorizes the Federal Securities Commission to set maximum rates for certain
transactions."
Securities owners or their nominees have the right to request a
statement of their personal account from the registrar. 98 The registrar
must provide this statement containing data on the ownership and the
number and type of securities registered to the account within five days
of the request free of charge. Fees for the registrar's services generally
correspond to the complexity of an issuer's instructions regarding the
transfer of securities.' The Federal Securities Commission defines the
maximum rates for the keeping of a register. The registrar is prohibited
from setting fees as a percentage of the value of a securities transaction.2"
A registrar must maintain a personal account for each owner and
nominee of securities, 1 comply with the owners' and nominees' instructions regarding their personal accounts, record transactions in its
registered securities,2" inform securities holders on behalf of the issuer, ensure that owners and nominees holding more than one percent of
the issuer's voting securities receive the register, and inform owners and
nominees about the rights conferred by their securities and procedures
for exercising such rights."° Registrars are liable for errors in their op-

195. Id. art. 10.
196. FSC Regulation #6, supra note 9, §§ 2, 4.
197. The registrar has the right to charge the parties to a transaction a fee corresponding to the number of instructions concerning the transfer of securities, and the
fee must be identical for all persons. The registrar may not charge the parties to a
transaction a fee based on a percentage of the value of a transaction. The Federal Securities Commission controls the procedure for determining the maximum amount that
may be charged for a registrar's services in entering data in the register and issuing
statements. Securities Law, supra note 2, art. 8(3).
198. Id.
199. Id.

200. Id.
201. Id. Personal account statements must indicate the owner of the personal account, the number of securities from each issue registered to the account, whether the
securities are encumbered, and other information. Id.
202. Id. A transaction must be recorded if the owner, his agent, or nominee instructs a security transfer. The instruction for the transfer should be in accordance
with the registrar's rules of management as defined by the law of the Russian Federation. Alternatively, if the transaction is an initial placement of securities, the instruction should be in accordance with the procedure defined in the present article or
on the basis of other documents confirming the transfer of property rights in securities
under the civil law of the Russian Federation. Id. A registrar may not refuse to record
a transaction except in the instances specified by federal laws. Id.
203. Id.
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erations and compilations and for breaches of accounting procedures. In
such event, registrars must compensate the affected parties for losses,
including lost profits, resulting from the loss of opportunity to exercise
the rights conferred by the securities.2"
5. Nominees
Securities market participants, such as banks, investment institutions, broker-dealers, and depositaries, may act as nominees for shareholders.2" Nominees are not separately licensed. The Securities Law
proscribes detailed arrangements for registrars concerning securities
registered in the name of a nominee.2" The presence of a nominee's
name in the register does not indicate any transfer of property rights to
the nominal holder. Nominees are permitted to enjoy the rights associated with a security only if the owner expressly conveyed that authority. 207 Securities transactions among clients of the same nominee are
not reflected in the register or by the depositary of the nominee.
Nominees holding registered securities must act conscientiously on
behalf of their clients, including obtaining and transferring payments
due to the clients, following instructions of the clients, and maintaining
separate records and accounts on behalf of the clients.2" Registration
of securities held by nominees must be transferred to the name of the
owner at the owner's request. A nominee is required to comply with
requests from registrars for a complete list of the owners represented by
such nominee.
In order to protect the interests of securities owners, nominees are
required to record the assets of their clients on separate off-balance accounts. Such assets are not the nominee's property. Thus, the nominee
cannot pledge, mortgage, or otherwise encumber the assets. In the case
of the nominee's insolvency or bankruptcy, the nominee must return all
assets it held on behalf of its client. Such assets are not included in the
bankruptcy proceedings. 2" A typical nominee agreement in Russia

204. Id.
205. Id. art. 8(2). A depositary may be registered as a nominal holder of securities
under the terms of a depositary contract. A broker-dealer may be registered as a nominal holder pursuant to a brokerage agreement. Id. In practice, a separate nominee or
custodial agreement is executed in connection with depositary and brokerage contracts.
206. Id.

207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Ukaz Presidenta #662 "O merakh po formirovaniyu vserossiyoskoy
Telekommukatsionnoy sistemy i obespecheniyu pray sobstvennikov pri khranenii
tsennykh bumag i raschetakh na fondovom rynke Rossiyskoi Federatsii" [Presidential
Decree #662 "On Measures of Creating Russian Telecommunication System and Protecting the Rights of Owners in Safekeeping of Securities and Settlements on the Russian Securities Market"] (July 3, 1995) (amended Jan. 4, 1996), SOBR. ZAKONOD. R.F.
1995, No. 28, Doc. 2639, translated in Economic Law of Russia, "Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 662 of July 3, 1995 on the Measures for the For-
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obliges the nominee to keep his assets separate from his client's assets.
However, a nominee may keep the assets of all his clients together, provided that it has definitive rules to separate such assets among the clients if requested.
6. Depositary
Article 7 of the Securities Law governs security depositaries. Depositaries provide safekeeping for the certificates evidencing securities,
as well as other documents evidencing the rights afforded by such securities and transfer instruments" ' and custodial services.211 Brokerdealers may act as custodians,212 but safekeeping functions may be performed only by securities market participants licensed to provide depositary and safekeeping services.21 Depositaries may not engage in any
other activities with securities without special permission of the Federal
Securities Commission.21 '
Depositary contracts must be in writing and must contain certain
essential terms, including the following: a detailed definition of the services provided by the depositary; the method by which the depositor
informs and instructs the depositary; the duration of the contract, payment and fee information; the frequency of depositary reports to the
depositor; and other obligations of the depositary. 2 5 The contract also
must verify the conditions under which the depositary operates.2 6
No property rights are transferred by a depositary contract. Accordingly, the depositary may not manage, sell, or utilize the depositor's
securities unless expressly provided for in the depositary contract and
pursuant to the depositor's instructions. The depositary must register
any restrictions or duties encumbering the depositor's securities, maintain a separate deposit account for each depositor, and inform the depositor of any securities information recieved from the issuer or relevant
registrar. To fulfill its obligations, a depositary may contract with other

mation of the All Russian Telecommunication System and the Ensuring of the Rights
of Owners in the Custody of Securities and in the Settlements of the Russian Federation (with the Additions and Amendments of January 4, 1996)" (Garant-Service 1996,
Doc. 3748), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, RFLaw File, art. 2.
210. Securities Law, supra note 2, art. 7.
211. Postanovleni Federalnoj Komissi po Tsennum Bumagam #20 "Vremennoey
polozhenie o depositarnoy deyatelnosti na rynke tsennykh burnag Rossiyskoj Federatsii
i poryadke ee litsuzirovakiya" [Federal Securities Commission Regulation #20 "Temporary Procedures on Depositary Activities on the Securities Market of the Russian Federation and Licensing of Depositary Activities"] (Oct. 20, 1996) § 3, VESTNIK
FEDERALNOJ KoMissnI P0 RYNKU TSENNYKH BUMAG #4 (Oct. 22, 1996) [hereinafter
Depositary Regulations].
212. Id. § 8.1.
213. Id. § 9.1.
214. Id. § 9.2.
215. Securities Law, supra note 2, art. 7.
216. Id.
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depositaries or choose to act itself as a depositary." 7 They may also cooperate with another depositary to act as a nominee shareholder, if so
authorized under their depositary contracts.1 8 Additionally, depositary
contracts may allow a depositary to retain revenue obtained from securities held for transfer to its depositors' accounts.219
Depositaries are licensed by the Federal Securities Commission or
agencies authorized by the Federal Securities Commission.220 A depositary license authorizes its holder to provide depositary services in any
region of the Russian Federation.2"2' Applications for licenses are reviewed within thirty days, although the licensing agency may extend the
review period by notifying the applicant in writing.2" Licenses are issued for an indefinite term and cannot be transferred, 22 although they
may be revoked if the licensee violates Russian law, engages in activities
outside the scope of its license, fails to submit periodic reports ot the
Federal Securities Commission, or misrepresents information in the
license application or subsequent reports. 2
The role of the depositaries is expected to increase in the Russian
securities market. There have been several attempts to create a unified
Russian depositary system that would facilitate all settlements, provide
easy access to security ownership information, and ensure the property
rights of the securities holders. One of the attempts to create such a
system is the recently established Depositary Clearing Company. Currently, it services several Russian companies and brokerage houses.
Depositaries are anticipated to play a significant role in investment fund
transactions."
D. NationalAssociation of Securities Market Participants(NAUFOR)
NAUFOR, an SRO with authority over its members, is analogous
to the NASD in the United States. Any securities market participant
with capitalization over U.S. $100,000 may become a NAUFOR member.2" Admission decisions are made by the NAUFOR board of directors upon recommendations of an existing member and the NAUFOR

217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Depositary Regulations, supra note 211, § 36.
221. Id. § 37.
222. Id. §42.
223. Id. § 47.
224. Id. § 51.
225. For the discussion of the investment funds and the draft legislation on investment funds, see infra part DCA.
226. NAUFOR Membership Rules as approved on April 21, 1995, unpublished material available on file at NAUFOR offices, art. 1.1 [hereinafter NAUFOR Membership
Rules].
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membership committee.2" A nominal admission fee for new membership2" with a recurring, nominal monthly fee is required.2 29 Any
NAUFOR member may assign its membership to another entity that is
eligible to be admitted if the NAUFOR board of directors approves such
assignment."' Members may be expelled on the following grounds: payment default of the membership fees during any three-month period,
violation of the NAUFOR Membership Rules, or dissolution of the membership. Expulsion requires the vote of three-fourths of the NAUFOR
board of directors.3 1
All NAUFOR members must submit disputes among themselves
related to securities operations to the NAUFOR arbitration tribunal. Any
operation agreement between members must include an arbitration provision. 232
E. Role of CommercialBanks in Securities Markets
Commercial banks may act as issuers of the securities, brokersdealers, clearing organizations, depositaries, and investors. As issuers,
banks may issue shares and bonds, checks, savings books and certificates of deposit, and promissory notes. The issuance of shares by the
banks is regulated by Central Bank Instruction #8.2 s Most Russian
commercial banks are established as joint stock companies; thus, the
issue of shares and bonds by such banks is subject to CB Instruction #8
as well as the Joint Stock Company Law.
Commercial banks also act as depositaries. Large banks, including
several subsidiaries of Western banks, initiated American Depositary
Receipt programs for their securities in the United States and other
markets. The Central Bank promulgated the rules of providing depos-

227. Id. arts. 2.2, 2.3, 3, 4.1, 4.3.
228. U.S.$5,000 is payable within five days after the decision of the board of directors. Id. art. 5.1.
229. All members of the association are also required to make periodic payments
in the amount of U.S.$500 per month. Id. art. 5.2.
230. Id. arts. 7.1, 7.5.
231. Id. arts. 8.3, 8.5.
232. Id. art. 6.3.
233. Instruktsiya Tsentralnogo Banka #8 "0 pravilakh vypuska i registratsii
tsennukh bumag i kommercheskimi bankami na territorii Rossiyskoi Federatsii" [Central Bank Instruction #8 "On Issuance and Registration of Securities by Commercial
Banks in the Russian Federation"] (Feb. 11, 1994) (amended Oct. 6, 1994, Aug. 4,
1995, Jan. 3, 1996, Apr. 11, 1996), FINANCIAL NEWSPAPER 1996, No. 20, translated in
Economic Law of Russia, "Instructions of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation
No. 8 on the Rules for the Issue and Registration of Securities by Commercial Banks
on the Territory of the Russian Federation (New Edition) (Approved by Letter of the
Central Bank of the Russian Federation No. 75 of February 11, 1994) (with the Additions and Amendments of Oct. 6, 1994, Aug. 4, 1995, Jan. 3, Apr. 11, 1996)" (GarantService 1996, Doc. 395), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, RFLaw File [hereinafter
CB Instruction #81.
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itary services.23 These rules stipulate that banks may only provide
depositary services for Russian securities.2" They also establish procedures for conducting and reporting depositary operations and for safekeeping of share certificates.2 36
As the government securities market developed,237 commercial
banks played a key part. The Russian Central Bank acts as the main
agent for the placement of the federal government securities and appoints commercial banks to act as dealers and depositaries for government securities.
Although banks do not regularly act as broker-dealers (other than
through their brokerage departments), in certain cases clients prefer to
use a bank rather than a brokerage house. This is particularly true for
Western companies that do not have any presence in Russia. In addition,
clients often use banks to overcome restrictions imposed by Russian
currency regulations.238 Banks that are licensed to conduct foreign currency operations simplify settlements for a Western company that wants
to buy or sell Russian securities for foreign currency. This is because
such banks may perform currency conversion operations and may make
and receive payments in any currency. In that respect, commercial banks
and their brokerage departments have significant competitive advantages over independent Russian broker-dealers that are prohibited from
dealing in foreign currency. Recently, some NAUFOR members have
raised concerns that commercial banks may eventually oust independent
broker-dealers from the market for foreign clients.
V.

WHAT IS A SECURITY?

A security is broadly defined under the Civil Code as a document
confirming property rights, the exercise or transfer of which must be
made by presentment." 9 Thus, for purposes of the Civil Code, securities include bonds (government and company issued), promissory notes,
cheques, deposit and savings certificates, bearer savings bank books,
bills of lading, shares, privatization securities, and similar docu-

234. Pismo Tsentralnogo Banka #176 "Vremennoe Polozhenie o depositarnykh
operatsiyakh bankov v Rossiyskoi Federatsi" [Temporary Regulations on Depositary
Operations of Banks in the Russian Federation, approved by the Central Bank Letter
# 167] (May 10, 1995), available in USIS, translated in Economic Law of Russia, "Letter of the Central Bank of Russia No. 167 of May 10, 1995 on Approval Provisional
Regulations on the Depositary Operations of Banks in the Russian Federation"
(Garant-Service 1996, Doc. 21070), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, RFLaw File
[hereinafter CB Depositary Regulations].
235. Id. art. 2.1.
236. Id. arts. 5.6, 6.1-6.3.
237. For the discussion on government securities, see infra part V. C.
238. For the discussion of the Currency Control Law, see supra part III. F. 2.
239. Civil Code, supra note 1, art. 142.
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ments.24 ° The Civil Code recognizes that securities may be issued in
bearer and registered forms 24' and in documentary or non-documentary
form. 2

Similarly, the Securities Law broadly defines a security as a document conferring property and other rights placed by means of issues. 3
Moreover, the rights conferred must be identical within any one issue,
regardless of when the security was acquired.2 " Although shares and
bonds are particularly identified by the Securities Law, promissory
notes, certificates of deposit, and cheques are not expressly excluded and,
provided they meet the foregoing criteria, fall within the definition of
securities for purposes of the Securities Law. As for joint stock companies, the Joint Stock Company Law identifies typical corporate securities, such as common stock, preferred stock (including voting, nonvoting,
and convertible preferred stock), and bonds.245
A. Corporate Securities
A share is a security that confers on its owner the right to receive
dividends, participate in the management of a company (for a joint stock
company, through the general meeting of shareholders),' and receive
distributions in liquidation.' 7 The Joint Stock Company Law provides
that a company may issue shares of common and preferred stock.'
Holders of common stock must be given identical rights; however, preferred stock may be issued in several classes with different rights for
each class. Nonetheless, the rights granted within each class must be
identical.249 If a company issues several classes of preferred stock, its
charter must specify the rights of each class and the priority rights of
the preferred stock holders with respect to dividend distributions and
distributions in liquidation. 2 0 A company may issue bearer shares up
to a percentage established by the Federal Securities Commission. The
percentage is related to a company's paid-up charter capital.251
A bond confers on its holder the right to receive the nominal value
of the bond at the expiration of the bond's term and a set rate of interest. The bond may stipulate other property rights for its owner in accor-

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Id. art. 143.
Id. art. 145.
Id. art. 149.
Securities Law, supra note
Id.
Joint Stock Company Law,
Id. art. 31(2).
Securities Law, supra note
Joint Stock Company Law,
Id. art. 32.
Id. art. 32(2).
Securities Law, supra note

2, art. 2.
supra note 3, arts. 31-33.
2, art. 2.
supra note 3, art. 25(2).
2, art. 2.
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dance with law.252 A company may issue bonds only after its charter
capital is fully paid. Unsecured bonds may not be issued until a company
has at least a three-year operating history. The par value of such bonds
may not exceed the amount of the paid-up charter capital. A company
may issue asset-backed securities in the form of secured bonds at any
time even without an operating history, so long as the aggregate par
value
of such bonds does not exceed the value of the related collater2
al. 53
B. PromissoryNotes
The Civil Code defines promissory notes as securities that certify
the unconditional obligation of a promisor to pay to the holder on a certain date a stated amount of money.' The inconsistency between the
Civil Code and the Securities Law definitions of "security" creates uncertainty with respect to the issuance and circulations of promissory notes.
If a promissory note is not a security under the Securities Law, the
promisor does not have to register the promissory note prior to its issue. 2' The Securities Law, however, does not expressly exclude promissory notes from its ambit. For example, if a company issues promissory
notes for equal amounts of money and places them in series, the Securities Law governs. Nonetheless, in practice, the potential application of
the Securities Law to issuances of promissory notes creates substantial
difficulties for Russian companies, particularly in the regions where the
local registering agencies believe that all promissory notes should be
registered in accordance with the Securities Law. Thus, the drafters of
the Securities Law did not learn from the experience of the United
States, where the applicability of the securities laws to promissory notes
has been a major source of litigation.
C. Government Securities
Government securities are primarily debt obligations of local or
federal authorities issued to the general public or large financial institutions and banks. At present, most government securities issued by the
federal government are one of two types: short-term couponless govern-

252. Id.
253. Joint Stock Company Law, supra note 3, art. 33.
254. Civil Code, supra note 1, art. 815.
255. Uzak Presidenta #1233 "0 zashchite interesov investorov" [Presidential Decree
# 1233 "On Protection of Investors' Rights"] (June 11, 1994) (amended Nov. 6, 1996),
SOBR. ZAKONOD. R.F. 1994, No. 8, Doc. 803, translated in Economic Law of Russia,
"Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 1233 of June 11, 1994 on the
Protection of the Rights of Investors (with the Additions and Amendments of November 6, 1994)" (Garant-Service 1996, Doc. 3093), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library,
RFLaw File, art. 1 (providing that promissory notes are not subject to state registration and cannot be placed among unlimited number of investors through public offer-

ing).
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ment bonds (GKOs) or federal bonds (OFZs). GKOs are primarily traded
at a discount and redeemed by the Ministry of Finance at their par value; OFZs, on the other hand, have a fixed interest rate payable quarterly, semi-annually, or annually.
Bonds are issued by the Ministry of Finance in numbered series for
a limited time period. The rate of interest is fixed such that all issues of
bonds with the same maturity date have the same value.256 Authorized
Russian banks act as depositaries and payment agents. They are selected upon agreement with the initial holders of the bonds, federal ministries, and departments.2 57
Issued in a non-documentary form as entries in the accounts of
authorized depositaries, government bonds may be presented for payment or exchanged for tax exemptions within the time periods prescribed
by the Ministry of Finance and recorded on a global certificate.' A depositary must redeem government bonds for cash or exchange them for
tax exemptions within five days after a bond holder submits its application to the depositary.259 Bond holders can demand immediate payment
of the nominal value of their bonds plus accrued interest if the issuer is
unable or refuses to perform its obligations under the bond.2"
The Ministry of Finance may impose restrictions on the circulation
of government bonds, including restrictions on settlement, transfer,
transactions, and restrictions on maturities.261 The Ministry of Finance
also controls the exchange of government bonds for tax exemptions.2"
Consequently, the Ministry of Finance must publish notices about such
restrictions and controls, as well as the issuance and pricing of new bond
series on a regular basis.

256. Pismo Ministerstva Finansov #140 "Polozhenie o poryadke razmeshcheniya,
obrascheniya i pogasheniya kaznacheiskikh obyazatelstv" [Letter of the Ministry of Finance # 140] (Oct. 21, 1994) (amended Mar. 9 and Mar. 28, 1995), ROSSIYSKIE VESTi,
No. 10, Jan. 19, 1995, translated in "Letter of the Ministry of Finance of the Russian
Federation No. 140 of October 21, 1994, the Regulations for the Procedure of Placement, Circulation and Payment of Treasury Bonds (with Amendments and Additions
of Mar. 9 and Mar. 28, 1995)" (Garant-Service 1996, Doc. 3258), available in LEXIS,
Intlaw Library, RFLaw File, §§ 1.3, 1.4, 1.6 [hereinafter MinFin Letter #140].
257. Id. §§ 1.7, 1.9, 2.1.

258. Id. §§ 1.8.
259. Id. §§ 4.1.1, 4.1.2, 4.1.3.
260. Postanovlenie Pravitelstva Rossiyskoi Federatsii #229 "0 vypuske obligatsij
vnutrennego gosudarstvennogo valutnogo obligatsionnogo zajma" [Resolution of the Rus-

sian Federation Government # 229 "On Issuance of Hard Currency Bonds of Domestic
Debt"] (Mar. 4, 1996), SOBR. ZAKONOD. R.F. 1996, No. 12, Doc. 1115, translated in
Economic Law of Russia, "Decisions of the Government of the Russian Federation No.
229 of March 4, 1996 on the Issuance of Bonds of Internal State Currency Bond Loan
(with the Amendments and Additions of Aug. 13, 1996)" (Garant-Service 1996, Doc.
5329), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, RFLaw File, art. 9.
261. MinFin Letter #140, supra note 247, § 2.4.
262. Id.
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The market for federal government securities has recently become
more liberalized with respect to foreign investors. As of August 15, 1996,
foreign investors may open special "S" accounts at accredited Russian
financial institutions to purchase rubles that may be invested in either
GKOs or OFZs.2" Purchases of GKOs or OFZs are made through auctions of new issues or in the trading market. Some restrictions on the
operation of the financial markets are still maintained; for example, the
Central Bank retains its control of the exchange rates used by Russian
banks for transactions with foreign investors and the new regulations
did not remove limits on repatriation of funds.
VI. PUBLIC OFFERINGS OF SECURITIES BY COMPANIES

All issuances of securities by companies in Russia require some
registration. If securities are not publicly offered, the issuer must register its decision to issue the securities under the Securities Law with an
authorized registering agency or the Federal Securities Commission.2"
If securities are publicly offered by a domestic issuer in Russia, the issuance will require registration under the Securities Law and filing of
a prospectus. The registering agency's, or the Federal Securities
Commission's, authority in this regard is broad. Either registering entity
may refuse to register an issue of securities if the issuer has violated
Russian law. In practice, however, the registering agency or the Federal
Securities Commission probably will limit its role to determining the
adequacy of the registration application and accuracy of prospectus disclosure. 2" The registering agency or the Federal Securities Commission
must act within thirty days after receipt of the registration application
and related documents.2" A decision to refuse registration may be ap-

263. Prikaz Tsentralnogo Banka #02-262 [Order of the Central Bank # 02-262] (July
26, 1996).
264. See generally Securities Law, supra note 2, arts. 16-18. Issues of securities
which have not been registered in accordance with the requirements of the present
Federal Law shall not be placed. Id. art. 18. See also Id. art. 24. The issuer may only
commence the placement of securities the issuer is issuing after their issue has been
registered.
265. The grounds on which the Federal Securities Commission may refuse to register an issuance of securities include:
a violation by the issuer of the requirements of the legislation of the
Russian Federation concerning securities. . . . ; the failure of the documents presented and the information contained therein to correspond to

the requirements of the present Federal Law; the inclusion in the issue
prospectus or the decision to issue securities (or other documents which
represent the basis for the registration of the issue of securities) of false
information or information which does not correspond to the true facts
(inaccurate information).
Id. art. 21.
266. Id. art. 20. "The registering agency is obliged to register an issue of securities
or to provide grounds for a decision to refuse registration no later than 30 days after
the date of receipt [sic] of the documents indicated in this article." Id.
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pealed in a court or arbitrage tribunal. 7 The Federal Securities Commission has adopted regulations that provide general guidance for registration and preparation of prospectuses by joint stock companies.2
A. Registration
The issuer must register its decision to issue securities with a sample certificate, if any, evidencing such securities. To be valid, the issuer's
decision to issue securities must include, inter alia, the name and legal
address of the issuer, the date of its decision to issue securities, the form
of securities, the state registration number of the securities, the rights
conferred by the security on its owner, the procedure for placement of
the securities, the issuer's obligation to protect the owner's rights, and
the number of securities to be issued. 269 The decision also must comply
with the issuer's charter and other applicable laws, including the Joint
Stock Company Law. Where securities are issued in documentary
form, a sample certificate must be filed.2 1 The certificate must include
most of the elements of the decision and whether the securities are issued in documentary form with or without compulsory centralized storage.2" Both bearer and registered securities may be issued.
The legal significance of a registered decision is that it certifies the
rights conferred by the security on its owner. In the case of certificated
securities, the decision and the certificate together certify such rights.
However, in the case of conflict, the certificate controls.7 This provision is designed to protect the rights of the security holders in the face
of changes in the issuer's constituent documents. A significant investor
may be able to negotiate for charter amendment protections as well.
When an issue of securities is registered, the issue is allocated a state
registration number. 4

267. Id. art. 21.
268. Postanovleni Federalnoj Komissi po Tsennum Bumagam #19 "Standarty emissi
aktsiy pri uchrezhdenii aktsionernykh obschestv dopolnitel'nykh aktsiy, obligatsiy i ikh
prospektov emisii" [Federal Securities Commission Regulation #19 "Standards on the
Issue Shares upon Formation of Joint Stock Companies, Issue of Additional Shares and
Bonds and Model Stock Prospectus"] (Sept. 17, 1996), VESTNIK FEDERALNOJ KoMIssll
PO RYNKU TSENNYKH BUMAG #4 (Oct. 22, 1996) [hereinafter Standards].
269. Id. art. 17.
270. See, e.g., Joint Stock Company Law, supra note 3, art. 28 (concerning increases
of a company's charter capital).
271. Securities Law, supra note 2, art. 17.
272. Id. art. 18.
273. Id.
274. Id. art. 20.
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B. Prospectus Filing and Approval
If securities are publicly offered by a domestic issuer in Russia, the
issuance requires registration under the Securities Law with a registering agency or the Federal Securities Commission and filing of a prospectus. A prospectus must be registered "if the securities are placed with an
unlimited number of owners or if it [sic] is known in advance that the
number of owners exceeds 500, and also in cases where the total issue
volume exceeds the value of the minimum [sic] wage by 50 thousand
times.""5 A prospectus also must be registered if a foreign issuer is
placing the securities issuance, whether or not the securities are publicly
offered. 6
1. Contents of the Prospectus
The contents of the prospectus are prescribed by the Securities Law
and instructions of the Federal Securities Commission. The Securities
Law requires that a prospectus include: (1) information about the
issuer's legal status, significant shareholders, management, subsidiaries
and branches; (2) financial information about the issuer; and (3) information about the offering.
Information about the issuer must include: (1) the issuer's name
and legal address and the names of its founding partners; (2) the number and date of the certificate of state registration of the issuer as a legal
entity; (3) information about holders of five percent or more of the
issuer's authorized capital; (4) the issuer's management structure; (5) the
names of its directors and officers, their experience, and their interests
in the issuer's authorized capital; (6) a list of all legal entities in which
the issuer owns five percent or more of authorized capital; (7) a list of all
the issuer's subsidiaries and branches; 27 7 (8) a list of affiliated companies; (9) the issuer's main business acitivities; and (10) its material contracts."'
Financial information about the issuer must include: (1) the issuer's
balance sheets and financial reports concerning its business, for the last
three complete financial years or for each complete financial year since
the decision was taken to issue securities; (2) a report on the sources and
uses of the issuer's reserve fund for the last three years; (3) the issuer's
overdue debts to its creditors and payments overdue to the government
at the date on which the decision to issue securities was adopted; (4)

275. Id. art. 19.
276. Id. art 16. Securities issued by foreign issurers may be accepted for circulation
or initial placement on the securities market of the Russian Federation after the issue
prospectus of these securities has been registered with the Federal Commission for the
Securities Market. Id.
277. Id. art. 22.
278. Standards, supra note 267, attachment 3, paras. 26.30.
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information about the issuer's authorized capital (including the amount,
the number of securities, and their nominal value) and the owners of the
securities whose shares in the authorized capital exceed the norms established by the anti-monopoly legislation 279 of the Russian Federation;
and (5) a report on previous issues of securities by the issuer, including
the types of securities issued, the number, and date of state registration,
the title of the registering agency, the size of issue, the number of securities issued, the terms on which dividends are paid, and other rights of
the owners thereof.2"
Information about the offering must include: (1) a description of the
securities, including the form and type of securities offered, the accounting of rights in the securities, the amount of the issue, and the number
of securities in the issue; (2) the procedure for issuance of the offered
securities (including the date on which the decision was adopted, the
title of the agency which took the decision, the restrictions on potential
owners, where potential owners can obtain the securities, and where the
securities certificates are stored, if an accounting of rights is conducted
in a depositary, and the title and legal address of the depositary); (3) the
dates on which the placement of the securities begins and ends; (4) the
price and procedures for payment for securities offered; (5) the names of
securities market participants or their associations that are involved in
the placement of the securities; (6) if dividends are to be paid, the procedure for the payment, and the method used to calculate dividends; and
(7) the name of the registering agency.281 The prospectus also should
include information on securities transfer restrictions, risk factors, and
where the securities may be purchased.2
2. Delivery and Publication Requirements; Placement Conditions
In offerings requiring a prospectus, within five days after registration of its prospectus, the issuer must provide access to the information
contained in the prospectus and publish an announcement of the procedure for the disclosure of such information in a newspaper or other
printed periodical with a circulation of at least 50,000 copies and in the
attachments to the Official Digest of the Federal Securities Commission." The issuer and stock market participants who carry out the
placement of the securities must provide offerees with access to the in-

279. See infra text accompanying note 338.
280. Securities Law, supra note 2, art. 22.
281. Id.
282. Standards, supra note 267, attachment 3, paras. 47-52.
283. Securities Law, supra note 2, art. 23; Postanovleniye Federalna Komissi po
Rynku Tsennykh Burnag #8 ot 7 maya 1996 goda "0 poryadke u ob'eme informatsii,
kotoruyu aktsionernoye obtschestvo obyaza no publikovat'y slychae publichnogo
razmetscheniya im obligatsii inykh tsennykh bumag" [Federal Securities Commission
Regulation #8 (May 7, 1996) "On Procedures and Scope of Information to be Disclosed
by Joint Stock Companies in case of Public Placement of Bonds and Other Securities"].
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formation before any securities are acquired. ' "
The number of securities placed may not exceed the amount covered
by the decision concerning the issue and disclosed in the prospectus. Yet,
the issuer can place a smaller number of securities. The actual number
of securities placed must be reflected in the issuer's report following the
placement.2"
Placement must be completed within one year from the date of the
commencement of the issue process but may not commence until two
weeks after all offerees have had the opportunity to consult the information on the issue disclosed under the Securities Law."M The price of
an issue need not be established until the day that placement commences. 8 ' Particular potential investors are not allowed any advantage over
other potential investors in acquiring securities in a public offering.
Exceptions to the rule against bias are: an issue of state securities; a
joint stock company where the existing shareholders are excercising
their preemptive rights; or issuer restrictions on non-resident shareholders are applicable.'
The issuer must present a report on the results of the issue to the
registering agency within thirty days after completing the placement.
The report must contain: (1) the dates on which the placement began
and ended; (2) the price of the securities placed; (3) the number of securities placed; and (4) the total consideration received, including (a) the
amount paid for the securities in rubles; (b) the amount of foreign currency paid, expressed in rubles at the exchange rate of the Central Bank
on the date of payment and (c) the value of other consideration given for
the securities, expressed in rubles. 9 If the securities placed were
shares, the report must include a list of the owners of blocks of shares
of a certain size as determined by the Federal Securities Commission.2" The registering agency may review the report for up to a period
of two weeks after its filing. If it finds no violations of law, it will register the report. The registering agency is responsible for the completeness of the report once it is registered.291

284. Securities, supra note 2, art. 23.
285. Id. art. 24.

286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. art. 25.
Id.
Id.
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VII. TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING LARGE BLOCKS OF SHARES, TRADING
BY AFFILIATES, AND PURCHASE BY A COMPANY OF ITS OWN SHARES

A. Large Block of Shares
The Joint Stock Company Law includes special procedures for a
company issuing a large block of shares. A block of shares is a large
block if, in one or a series of related transactions, a company issues common or convertible preferred stock (convertible into common stock) representing more than twenty-five percent of the company's authorized and
issued shares of common stock.2" If the value of the shares to be issued... is more than twenty-five percent and less than or equal to fifty
percent of the balance sheet value of the company's assets,2" the
company's board of directors or supervisory board must unanimously
approve the issuance. The value of the shares is determined by the
company's board of directors or supervisory board.2" If the issuance
does not receive unanimous approval, a majority of directors or supervisory board members may refer the matter to the company's shareholders
for approval.2" The general meeting of shareholders acts on the matter
in accordance with the company's charter. Most often company charters
require a majority vote of shareholders present at a duly constituted
general meeting. If the value of the shares to be issued exceeds fifty percent of the balance sheet value of the company's assets, the matter must
be referred to the company's shareholders for approval. In that case, a
three-fourths majority vote of shareholders present at a duly constituted
general meeting is required.2" These provisions, which are designed to
protect investors, also apply to sales and purchases by a company of
assets of substantial value relative to a company's total assets.298
B. Trading by Affiliates
Certain restrictions apply to transactions by affiliates of a company,
including securities transactions by such affiliates. Under the Joint
Stock Company Law, the term "affiliate" includes an officer, members of
a company's board of directors and supervisory board, a shareholder
owing more than twenty percent of a company's voting stock, and certain
relatives of such persons.2 Affiliates are required to provide the com-

292. Joint Stock Company Law, supra note 3, art. 78(1).
293. Id. art. 78(2).
294. The balance sheet value is determined as of the date the decision concerning
the issuance is taken by the board. Id. art. 79(1).
295. Id.
296. Id. Presumably no further approval of the board of directors or supervisory
board is required if the matter is duly authorized by the general meeting of shareholders.
297. Id. art. 79(2).
298. Id. arts. 78-79.
299. Id. art. 81.
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pany certain information about substantial share ownership equalling
twenty percent or more of the voting stock in other companies, offices
held in other companies, and certain affiliate transactions. Substantial
share ownership in other companies is defined as twenty percent or more
of the voting stock."° For companies with fewer than 1,000 shareholders, affiliate transactions must be approved by a majority of the
company's disinterested directors or supervisory board members."' 1 For
companies with 1,000 or more shareholders, affiliate transactions must
be approved by a majority of the company's independent directors or
supervisory board members0 2 having no interest in the
transaction. 3 A majority of the disinterested shareholders must approve an affiliate transaction if the consideration involved exceeds two
percent of the company's assets. Additionally, a disinterested shareholder majority vote is required if the transaction, or a series of related
transactions, involve issuing of voting stock or other securities convertible into voting stock that exceed two percent of the voting stock issued
prior to the transaction or transactions in question."° Shareholder approval is not required for loans made to the company by an affiliate. Nor
is shareholder approval needed for transactions entered into in the ordinary course before the affiliate/company relationship began."05 If the
foregoing approval requirements are not satisfied, the affiliate transaction is deemed invalid"° and the affiliate may be liable to the company
for losses caused.0 7 In addition, reporting requirements under the Securities Law may also be triggered in the case of acquisitions by affiliates.3"
C. Purchase by a Company of its Own Shares
If its charter so stipulates, a company may redeem its own shares
upon a decision of its board of directors." s Nevertheless, redemption
is prohibited in the following cases: (1) if the charter capital of the company is not fully paid; (2) if the company is bankrupt or insolvent; (3) if
the net assets of the company are less than its charter capital, reserve
31
fund, and the amount payable on its preferred stock in liquidation;
and (4) if as a result of the redemption, the authorized and issued shares

300. Id. art. 82.
301. Id. art. 83(1).
302. Id. art. 83(2). A director is an independent director if his spouse, parents, children, brothers, or sisters are not persons holding office in the management bodies of
the company.
303. Id.
304. Id. art. 83(3).
305. Id. art. 83(4).
306. Id. art. 84(1).
307. Id. art. 84(2).
308. See infra part VIII. D.
309. Joint Stock Company Law, supra note 3, art. 72(1), (2).
310. Id. art. 73(1).
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of the company would be less than ninety percent of its charter capital."' If the redemption is effected to reduce a company's charter capital, the redeemed shares must be canceled; otherwise, they become treasury shares and may be resold within one year after their redemption.3 12 The value of the net assets of the company determines the redemption price of the common stock."' Preferred stock may be purchased by a company at a price stipulated in its charter or at fair market value.""
In certain cases, holders of voting stock have appraisal rights
whereby they may force a company to repurchase their shares. For example, a dissenting shareholder has appraisal rights in the case of a
company's reorganization, the purchase of a large block of a company's
shares, or if a charter amendment is effected limiting such shareholder's
rights.3 15 The Joint Stock Company Law contains detailed procedures
for the purchase of shares upon demand from shareholders1 6 at the
price calculated based upon the value of the company's then net assets." 7
VIII. CONTINUOUS DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION

The Joint Stock Company Law and the Securities Law require issuers of securities to report periodically to their shareholders, the Federal
Securities Commission, and the public. Although the reporting requirements under the two laws overlap in certain respects, the requirements
under the Securities Law differ both in breadth and in scope from the
Joint Stock Company Law. The Securities Law requirements are generally more detailed than the Joint Stock Company Law requirements.
These differences obviously reflect the emphasis of the Securities Law
on disclosure designed to promote transparency and the efficiency of
Russian securities market. Consequently, the emphasis of the Joint
Stock Company Law emphasizes effective corporate governance.
A. Joint Stock Company Law Disclosure Requirements
An open joint stock company " s' must publish the following infor-

311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

art. 72(2).
art. 72(3).
arts. 72(4), 77.
art. 72(6).
art. 75.
art. 76.
art. 7.

318. Id. art. 7. The shareholders of an open joint stock company may dispose of the
stock owned by them without the consent of the other shareholders. The company has
the right to hold open subscriptions to stock to be issued and sell such stock without
limitations, subject to federal law. It may also hold closed subscriptions to the stock
it is issuing, except for instances when the possibility of holding closed subscriptions
is limited by the company charter or federal law. Id.
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mation annually: (1) its annual report, balance sheet, and profit and loss
account; (2) any prospectus for the issue of its securities; (3) notices of
shareholders' general meetings; (4) lists of its affiliates specifying their
shareholdings; and (5) other information determined by the Federal
Securities Commission."'9 A closed joint stock company3 2 ° involved in
a public issue of bonds or other securities must publish information as
determined by the Federal Securities Commission.321
The Joint Stock Company Law also addresses the issue of disclosure
of a company's charter. Every shareholder of a company is entitled to
receive a copy of the company's charter." 2 Persons interested in the
company, as well as the company's auditors, must be given access to the
company's charter, although such persons may not be entitled to a copy
of the charter.s The charter of the company contains the full and abbreviated names of the company, the location of the company, the type
of company (open or closed), the number, par value, classes of shares,
and the types of preferred stock to be placed by the company, the rights
of shareholders of each class of shares, the amount of the charter capital
of the company, the composition and authority of the governing bodies
of the company and the procedure for adopting resolutions by them, the
procedure for conducting general meetings of shareholders, and details
of the branches and representative offices of the company. The charter
may also impose limits on the quantity and total par value of stock held,
or the maximum number of votes cast, by any one shareholder. 2 4
B. Quarterly and CurrentReports
Issuers that have issued securities under circumstances requiring
a prospectus must prepare quarterly reports disclosing information about
their securities and its financial condition and business.3" In addition,
such issuers must provide periodic current reports. 26 The Federal Securities Commission has not yet prescribed the forms or other requirements concerning quarterly and current reports. In addition, the Securities Law does not expressly contemplate an annual report. An instruction of the Federal Securities Commission will likely address the issue

319. Id. art. 88.
320. Id. art. 7. A closed company's stock is only distributed among its founders or
a previously determined range of persons. Its shareholders have preemptive rights
when the company issues stock. The company may not hold open subscriptions or offer
its stock to be issued to an unlimited number of persons. The maximum number of
shareholders in a closed company is 50. Id.
321. Id. art. 88.
322. Id. art. 11(4).
323. Id.
324. Id. art. 11(3).
325. Securities Law, supra note 2, art. 23. The quarterly report also must include
information about the formation and use of the issuer's reserve fund and other special
funds. Id.
326. Id.
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soon.
1. Quarterly Reports
Issuers of publicly offered securities must prepare quarterly reports
that contain the following information: (1) information about the issuer,
including (a) a list of directors, officers, and their shareholdings and the
issuer's subsidiaries, branches, and dependent companies, (b) a list of the
issuer's shareholders with more than twenty percent of its authorized
capital, and (c) information concerning the reorganization of the issuer,
its subsidiaries, and dependent companies; (2) information about the
issuer's financial and economic activity, including (a) its balance sheets
and profit and loss statements for the last three complete financial years
and for the quarter of the report, (b) information about substantial increases in the issuer's profits or losses during the quarter, (c) information about the formation and use of the issuer's reserve fund and other
special funds, and (d) information about significant transactions; (3)
information on the issuer's securities, including the classes of securities
issued during the quarter and information about dividends; and (4) other
information, in particular, the minutes of shareholder general meetings
during the quarter." Quarterly reports must be prepared within thirty
days after the end of each quarter and submitted to the Federal Securities Commission or the registering agency."a An issuer must provide
its quarterly report to each of its shareholders who request the report;
however, the issuer may charge requesting shareholders for the cost of
preparing the report."a
2. Current Reports
Issuers of publicly offered securities also must file a current report
if certain events occur. These events include: (1) a reorganization of the
issuer, its subsidiaries or dependent companies; (2) an increase or decrease by more than ten percent in the value of the issuer's assets, net
income, or net loss or a single transaction completed by the issuer that
involves consideration valued at ten percent or more of the issuer's assets at the date of the transaction; (3) the issuance of the issuer's securities, a decision about such issuance or the termination of an issuance
and information about dividends declared, accumulated, or paid on the
issuer's securities; (4) the acquisition of more than twenty-five percent
of the issuer's securities of any class; (5) the establishment of a record
date for the exercise of shareholder rights with respect to a particular
matter; (6) changes in the officers, directors, managers, supervisory
board, management board, or audit board of the issuer; (7) changes in
management's shareholdings in the issuer, its subsidiaries, and depen-

327. Id. art. 30.
328. Id. arts. 23, 30.
329. Id.
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dent companies; (8) changes in management's shareholdings in entities
in which management owns more than twenty percent of the share capital; (9) changes of control of the issuer with respect to shareholders owning twenty percent or more of the issuer's share capital; (10) acquisitions
or dispositions of entities in which the issuer owns twenty percent or
more of the share capital; (11) the redemption by the issuer of its shares;
and (12) a shareholder acquires more than twenty-five percent of any
class of an issuer's securities."'0 The issuer must file its current reports
with the Federal Securities Commission or the registering agency and
publish such report in a newspaper, or other periodical publication with
wide circulation, no later than five days after any triggering event takes
place.33
C. Auditing Standards
All financial information disclosed by a joint stock company, including the issuer's balance sheet and profit and loss statement, must be
certified by an independent auditor approved by the issuer's shareholders. 3 2 A statutory audit is required for all open and closed joint stock
companies that plan to make a public offering of their securities." In
addition, any shareholder that owns more than ten percent of the authorized and issued shares of a company may demand the audit of the
company's books at any time.' Russian auditing standards are set
forth in Temporary Regulations of Audit Activities in the Russian Federation approved by Presidential Decree #2263 of December 22, 1993.131
All audits must be conducted in accordance with Russian accounting
standards in effect at the time of the audit."' Audit reports contain
three sections: (1) an introduction that identifies the auditor; (2) an analytical part that identifies the company's name, the period covered by the
audit, and any violations of tax and accounting principles discovered by
the auditors; and (3) a statement by the auditor verifying the company's
financial statements. 37 Under the Audit Regulations, a company is only required to disclose the auditor's statement.' 38

330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Joint Stock Company Law, supra note 3, arts. 86, 88.
333. Civil Code, supra note 1, art. 97.
334. Id. art. 103.
335. Ukaz Presidenta #2263 [Temporary Regulations of Audit Activities in the Russian Federation approved by Presidential Decree #2263] (Dec. 22, 1993), COMPILATION
OF THE LEGISLATIVE AcTS OF THE PRESIDENT AND GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 1993, No. 52, Doc. 5069, translated in Economic Law of Russia, "Decree of the
President of the RF No. 2263 of December 22, 1993 on Auditing in the Russian Federation," (Garant-Service 1996, Doc. 2821), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, RFLaw
File [hereinafter Audit Regulations].
336. Id. art. 5.
337. Id. art. 18.
338. Id.
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D. Disclosure Related to Acquisitions
Under the Securities Law, a person must report to the registering
agency or the Federal Securities Commission information about its ownership of an issuer's securities if it acquires twenty percent or more of
any class of an issuer's securities or if after acquiring twenty percent or
more of any class of securities, there is a material change in such ownership.339 In this context, a material increase or reduction in ownership
involves five percent or more of any class of an issuer's securities.3"
The report must identify the owner of the securities, the issuer, the class
and state registration number of the securities, and the number of securities owned. The report must be filed within five days after the occurrence of the event or events triggering the reporting requirement.341
The Joint Stock Company Law also includes provisions designed to
protect shareholders of widely-held joint stock companies. 42 If a person
alone or with its affiliates intends to purchase more than thirty percent
of the authorized and issued common stock of a company, such person
must notify the company in writing at least thirty days before the acquisition.3" Once a person has acquired thirty percent or more of authorized and issued common stock of a company, it must offer to purchase
all the common stock of the remaining shareholders at an average price
per share calculated on the basis of the company's share price for the
preceding six months, unless the disinterested shareholders amend the
company's charter to provide otherwise.3 The offer must be madc to
all holders of common stock in writing' and contain the name and address or location of the person making the offer, the quantity and price
offered to the shareholders, and the period allowed for the acquisition of
the stock.3 " The offerees have thirty days to accept the offer from the
date that they receive it. 347 The original transaction and the offer to
the shareholders must be completed within 120 days after the acquiring
party's written statement to the company. 3 " If a person acquires thirty
percent or more of the common stock of a company without complying
with these provisions, it may exercise its voting rights at shareholders'
general meetings with respect to thirty percent of the voting stock of the

339. Securities Law, supra note 2, art. 30.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. See Joint Stock Company Law, supra note 3, art. 80. These protections apply
to companies with more than 1,000 common stockholders. Id. art. 80(1).
343. Id.
344. Id. art. 80(2). The charter amendment must be approved by a majority of the
disinterested shareholders present at a duly constituted general meeting. Id.
345. Id. art. 80(3).
346. Id. art. 80(5).
347. Id. art. 80(4).
348. Id. art. 80(6).
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company. 3' 9 Any purchase of more than twenty percent of a company's
authorized and issued shares requires the approval of the Anti-Monopoly
Committee of the Russian Federation." Additionally, the company is
also required to file a current report with respect to acquisitions and
dispositions of large blocks of shares. 5 1
E. Disclosure by Securities Market Participants
Broker-dealers, clearing organizations, asset managers, depositaries,
and registrars must disclose certain information to the Federal Securities Commission or registering agency under which they are licensed.
Each of these actors are considered securities market participants. Information must be provided quarterly if a securities market participant has
concluded transactions concerning all an issuer's outstanding securities
of one class or concluded a specific transaction involving at least fifteen
percentof all an issuer's outstanding securities of one class.5 2 A securities market participant must identify itself and the issuer, report the
class and state registration number of the securities, the price of the
securities, and the number of securities involved in the transaction or
transactions within five days after either the end of the relevant quarter
or the specific transaction." s In connection with concluding transactions, a broker-dealer must disclose all of the information it possesses
that has been disclosed by the issuer. Alternatively, the broker-dealer
must indicate that it does not possess such information. 5'
IX. INVESTMENT FUNDS

A. Investment Funds
Investment funds were created in the Russian Federation to organize the financing of enterprises by individuals and to secure participation of Russian citizens in the privatization process. Currently, investment funds serve as intermediaries between both Russian and foreign
investors and issuers of securities. Although the idea of an investment
fund first appeared in Government Resolution #78, the actual growth of
the funds began with the voucher privatization process in 1992 pursuant

349. Id. art. 80(7).
350. Zakon "0 konkurentsii i ogranichenii monopolisticheskoj deyatelnosti na
tovarnukh rynkakh" [Law "On Competition and Prevention of Monopolistic Activities"]
(Mar. 22, 1991) (as amended), VEDOMOSTY S'EsDA NARODNYKH DEPUTATOv I
VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA ROSSIYSKOI FEDERATSII 1991, No. 16, Doc. 499, translated in
Economic Law of Russia, "Law of the RSFSR of March 22, 1991 on Competition and
Restriction of Monopoly Activity on Commodity Markets" (Garant-Service 1996, Doc.
5108), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, RFLaw File, art. 18.
351. See infra part VIII.B.2.
352. Securities Law, supra note 2, art. 30.
353. Id.
354. Id.
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to the Presidential Decree #1186 of October 7, 1992, which created the
legal framework for the operations of investment funds.3 " Investment
funds may exclusively undertake the issuance of shares to mobilize investment capital and the investment of that capital on the fund's be56
half."
All risks, income, and losses related to such investments are
fully reflected in the shareholders' accounts held by an investment fund
and are directly tied to the market value of the shares in the particular
fund.
Investment funds must be established and registered as Russian
open joint stock companies.357 Russian law recognizes two types of investment funds: common funds which may not accept privatization
vouchers from Russian citizens and special funds which may accumulate
privatization vouchers. A common investment fund may purchase its
own shares from shareholders upon the request of any shareholder.
Thus, common investment funds are "open." Special investment funds
may not purchase their own shares from shareholders and, therefore, are
"closed."3s
As securities market participants, investment funds must be licensed by an authorized state agency. 59 Prior to adoption of the Securities Law, special funds were licensed by the State Property Committee and common funds were licensed by the Ministry of Finance. Now,
the Federal Securities Commission, under the Securities Law, licenses
investment funds." The Federal Securities Commission is soon expected to issue new regulations on licensing investment funds.
An investment fund may be managed by an individual or by an
entity. The Federal Securities Commission regulates investment funds'
management activities. An investment fund, excluding banks, insurance
companies, and their subsidiaries, may only appoint a manager that is
authorized to purchase shares of Russian companies undergoing privatization. 61

355. Ukaz Presidenta #1186 "0 merakh po organizatsii rynka tsennykh bumag v
protesse privatizatsii gosudarstvennykh i munitsipalnykh predpriyatij" [Presidential
Decree #1186 "On Organizational Measures for the Development of the Securities Market in the Privatization Process."] (Oct. 7, 1992), VEDOMOSTI SEZDA NARODNYKH
DEPUTATOV ROSSIYSKOI FEDERATSLI I VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA 1992, No. 42, Doc. 2370,

translated in Economic Law of Russia, "Decree of the President of the RF No. 1186
of October 7, 1992 on Measures to Organize a Stock Market in the Process of Privatization of State-Owned and Municipal Enterprises" (Garant-Services, Doc. 5983), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, RFLaw File [hereinafter Decree #1186].
356. Government Resolution #78, supra note 85, provision III, art. 19.
357. Decree #1186, supra note 355, attachment 1, § 2.
358. Id. attachment 2, § 9.
359. Id. attachment 2, § 4; Government Resolution #78, supra note 85, provision III,
art. 24.
360. Securities Law, supra note 2. arts. 5, 42(6).
361. Decree #1186, supra note 343, attachment 1, § 11; attachment 2, § 12.
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A depositary authorized by the shareholders at a general meeting
must conduct all transactions involving an investment fund's securities
and cash.362 An investment fund may appoint only one depositary.
Managers and others affiliated with the fund are excluded from such appointments. This prohibition extends to members of the board of directors and other officers of the fund, founders, or shareholders owning
twenty-five percent or more of the fund's shares."s Shareholders of an
investment fund must be able to transfer their shares without the consent of any other shareholder of the fund.'" All shares must convey
identical rights to the shareholders.3" An investment fund may not issue preferred stock. Particular investment fund shares can only be purchased with privatization checks, money, securities, or real estate.3"
Investment activities of the funds are subject to numerous limitations under federal law. For instance, Decree #1186 provides that investment funds may not, inter alia, (1) make investments other than investments in securities; (2) acquire the voting shares of any joint-stock company, if after the acquisition thereof, the fund and its affiliates will own
more than ten percent of such company's voting shares; (3) acquire and
own more than ten percent of the securities of an issuer where the percentage is determined by reference to the aggregate par value of such
issuer's securities; (4) invest more than five percent of the fund's net
assets in the securities of one issuer; (5) invest in securities of its affiliates; (6) contract for the sale of securities that are not owned by the
fund or that it has no right to acquire; (7) borrow funds; (8) invest in
general partnerships or other enterprises with unlimited liability; (9)
issue guaranties of any sort or encumber the fund's assets; (10) act as an
agent, intermediary, or seller of privatization facilities, including investment in, and issuance of, debentures (other than government securities);
(11) conclude transactions unrelated to its investments; (12) invest in
options or futures contracts of any kind; or (13) invest in shares of other
investment funds.6 7 The foregoing and other restrictions on fund activities limit the ability of funds to compete with other securities market
participants.
The Duma is currently considering two draft laws on investment
funds to regulate fund activities in the post-privatization period. Both
drafts eliminate special voucher funds and allow the option to create
either joint stock investment funds which would be registered as legal
entities in Russia or open-ended investment funds which would closely
approximate open mutual funds as discussed below. The Duma also is
debating favorable investment fund taxation legislation. Reportedly, that

362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

attachment
attachment
attachment
attachment
attachment
attachment

3,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,

§ 43.
§ 4; attachment 3, §§ 41-42, 44.
§ 7; attachment 2, § 7.
§ 9; attachment 2, § 10.
§ 13; attachment 2, § 14.
§§ 20-22.

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 25:1

tax legislation eliminates an adverse tax regime for investment funds
making them more attractive investment vehicles.
B. Mutual Funds
The concept of mutual funds is relatively new in the Russian Federation. Originally, the general public invested in government securities
and Russian company securities through separate legal entities governed
by their own internal corporate structures. In 1995, the Federal Securities Commission began preparing the legal framework for Western-style
mutual funds that would be subject to a more favorable investment and
tax regime than the previous privatization era. Newly created mutual
funds are expected to revive and to encourage investment by the general
public.
The legal status of mutual funds is primarily regulated by the Civil
Code provisions on trust management, the Securities Law, and the
Presidential Decree #765 of July 26, 1995, "On Additional Measures for
Improving Investment Policy in the Russian Federation."" 9 A mutual
fund is not a legal entity; rather, it is a "property complex" managed in
trust by a management company. 7 ' A mutual fund may be established
either as an open mutual fund or as an interval mutual fund.371
There are several differences between the two types of mutual
funds. Shares of an open mutual fund may be offered continuously and
may be purchased at any time by prospective investors. Interval mutual
fund shares may be sold and purchased only during specific periods. The
two types of mutual funds also differ with respect to when fund shares
may be redeemed. An open mutual fund must redeem fund shares upon
an investor's request which may be made at any time. Interval mutual
fund investors, however, may redeem their shares only once a year.
There also are differences in the structure of their assets. Open funds
may only invest in very liquid securities that are publicly traded, bank
deposits, and bank accounts. 72 Conversely, because interval mutual

368. Civil Code, supra note 1, arts. 209, 1012, 1026.
369. Ukaz Presidenta #765 "0 dopolnitelnykh merakh po povysheniyu effectivnosti
investitsionnoj politiki Rossiyskoi Federatsii" [Presidential Decree #765 "On Additional
Measures for Improving Investment Policy in the Russian Federation"] (July 26, 1995),
SOBR. ZAKONOD. R.F. 1995, No. 31, Doc. 3097, translated in Economic Law of Russia,
"Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 765 of July 26, 1995 on Additional Measures for Raising the Efficiency of the Investment Policy of the Russian
Federation" (Garant-Service 1996, Doc. 3833), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library,
RFLaw File [hereinafter Decree #765].
370. Id. § 4.
371. Id. § 8.
372. Postanovlenie Federalnoj Komissii po Tsennum Bumagam #12 "Ob utverzhdenii
vremennogo polozheniya o sostave i structure aktivov paevykh investitsionnykh fondov"
[Resolution of the Federal Securities Commission #12 "On Approval of Temporary Procedures for Composition and Structure of Assets of Mutual Funds"] (Oct. 10, 1995),
ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, Nov. 18, 1995, translated in Economic Law of Russia, "Decree
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funds are regulated less stringently, they may invest up to fifty percent
of their assets in securities that are not liquid and in securities of closed
joint stock companies.373
A mutual fund may begin operation once its rules and fund prospectus are registered with the Federal Securities Commission or applicable
registering agency. The model rules and stock prospectus, developed by
the Federal Securities Commission mandates, mutual funds to include
particular rules and provisions in its prospectus. 37' Decree #765 and
instructions of the Federal Securities Commission contain requirements
for registration of the fund's prospectus, provide general principles for
share redemption, and define the rights of investors. 5 Instructions of
the Federal Securities Commission also describe the procedure for issuing fund shares, placing shares, trading shares, and maintaining a share
register.
Shares in mutual funds certify the rights of an investor to demand
redemption of its shares upon presentation in exchange for an amount
determined on basis of the value of the fund's assets as of the date of
redemption. By acquiring investment shares of mutual funds, investors
enter into a trust management agreement with the fund's management
company. Thus, the investors participate in the mutual fund's investment activities37 s as conducted by the management company in compliance with rules of the mutual fund and fund prospectus. Subscription
time for open mutual fund shares is not limited. Generally, a tax is levied on a company's initial public offering. However, the issuance of open
mutual fund shares is not subject-to a securities transaction tax. 7
A mutual fund's management company must manage the fund's assets solely for the benefit of its investors. 78 The activities and responsibilities of the management company are regulated by the Resolution of
the Federal Securities Commission #11 of "Temporary Regulations on
Management Companies of Mutual Funds, Trust management Activities

of the Federal Commission on Securities and the Capital Market of the Government
of the Russian Federation No. 12 of October 10, 1995 as Interim Regulations on the
Composition and Structure of Assets of Unit Investment Funds" (Garant-Service 1996,
Doc. 5499), available in LEXIS, Intlaw, RFLaw File, § 4.

373. Id. § 8.
374. See Resolution #13, supra note 92; see also Resolution #15, supra note 92.
375. Decree #765, supra note 357, §§ 7-21.
376. Id. §§ 1, 5.
377. Pismo Gosudarstvennoj Nalogovoj Sluzhby #NP-2-01/80N "0 nekotorykh
voprosakh nalooblozheniya, voznikayushchikh b svyuzi s obrazovaniem i funktsioni-

rovaniem paevykh investitsionnykh fondov" [State Tax Service Letter # NP-2-01/80N]
(Dec. 15, 1995), ROSSIYSKIE VESTI, Feb. 8, 1996, translated in Economic Law of Russia,
"Letter of the State Tax Service of the Russian Federation No. NP-2-01180N of December 15, 1995 on Certain Issues of Taxation, Arising in Connection with Farming and
Functioning of Share Investment Funds" (Garant-Service 1996, Doc. 5972), available
in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, RFLaw File.
378. Decree #765, supra note 369, § 5.
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and Licensing" of October 10, 1995.' Management companies must be
licensed by the Federal Securities Commission to perform trust management activities for mutual fumds.3" Although one management company may manage several mutual funds, it is limited to mutual fund management with the exception of trust management of non-governmental
pension funds and other investment funds.38 ' A management company
must be capitalized with at least one billion rubles (approximately U.S.
$200,000).
The management company of a fund has fiduciary obligations to the
fund's investors and must act in their best interests. In that respect the
Civil Code and Decree #765 create certain investor favorable statutory
liabilities for harm resulting from a management company's "guilty actions" or conflicts of interest. 382 Unfortunately, neither Decree #765 nor
subsequent regulations of the Federal Securities Commission define the
term "guilty actions." In addition to its liability to the investors, the
management company also is responsible to the Federal Securities Commission for ensuring that its mutual fund management complies with
the applicable regulations of the Federal Securities Commission. This includes portfolio structure, redemption of investment shares, and other
issues. The management company may be paid for its services out of the
assets of the mutual fund with consideration for payment set out in the
rules of the mutual fund."
X. INSIDER TRADING
The Securities Law contains provisions designed to prevent trading
on the basis of inside information. Inside information is defined as any
information about an issuer and its securities that is not available and
gives the persons that possess it an advantage over other persons actively involved in the securities market, because of their employment, their
responsibilities at work, or a contract.'" Persons in possession of insider information may not use it to conclude transactions or tip third parties. 3"

379. Postanovlenie Federalnoj Komissi po Tsennym Bumagam #11 [Resolution of the
Federal Securities Commission #11] (Oct. 10, 1995), ROSSiYSKAYA GAZETA, Nov. 18,
1995, translated in Economic Law of Russia, "Decision of the Federal Commission on
Securities and the Capital Market No. 11 of October 10, 1995 Interim Regulations as
Management Companies of Unit Investment Funds on Activities of Trust Management
of the Property of Unit Investment Funds and its Licensing" (Garant-Service 1996,
Doc. 5517), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, RFLaw File, §§ 4, 19 [hereinafter Management Company Regulation].
380. Decree # 765, supra note 369, § 6.
381. Management Company Regulation, supra note 367, §§ 4, 19.
382. Civil Code, supra note 1, art. 1022; Decree #765, supra note 357, § 11.
383. Decree #765, supra note 369, § 16.
384. Securities Law, supra note 2, art. 31.
385. Id. art. 33.
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XI. ENFORCEMENT OF SECURITIES LEGISLATION

The Securities Law, the Criminal Code, and the Civil Code provide
a general framework for enforcement of securities legislation. This legislation contemplates administrative and civil actions against violators of
securities legislation by various government agencies, including the Federal Securities Commission. The legislation allows criminal actions as
well as private remedies. Potential liability for violations of securities
legislation extends to all securities market participants, issuers, and
issuers' officers and directors."s
A so-called "dishonest issue" of securities, i.e., one that violates the
procedures for an issuance under Section III of Securities Law, 87 may
result in the issue being declared invalid or the issuer being stopped
from completing the placement of the issue."' Violation of the issuance
procedures also is grounds for refusing to register an issue."89 The Securities Law limits the remedies depending on the character of the violation in question. Thus, if procedural violations are discovered, the registering agency may stop the placement of the issue until the procedural
violations are remedied and then may decide to resume the placement."9 According to the broad definition found in Article 26 of the
Securities Law, an issue is invalid if the issuer violates any Russian law
during the issue or if the issuer's registration materials are inaccurate.391 However, Article 51 follows a narrower approach. Thus, if in
connection with a dishonest issue the offerees are significantly misled or
if the objectives of the issue conflict with a fundamental principle of law
or are immoral, the Federal Securities Commission may apply to a court
for the issue to be declared invalid.3" When an issue is declared inval393
id, the issuer must refund all the proceeds received from the offering.

If the registering agency discovers a dishonest issue of securities, it
must inform the Federal Securities Commission or one of its regional
agencies within seven days."9 The Federal Securities Commission may

386. Id. art. 51(3) (officer liability in connection with dishonest issues); Id. art. 51(4)

("[t]he officials of the issuer who have taken a decision on the issue of securities that
have not passed state registration shall bear administrative or criminal responsibility
in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation.").
387. Securities Law, supra note 2, arts. 16-29 (section III of the Securities Law
describing the manner in which an issue of securities must be effected by a company,
including registration, prospectus content requirements, procedures for the disclosure
of information about an issue, continuous reporting requirements, and requirements
affecting placement).
388. Id. art. 26.
389. Id. See also supra note 256.
390. Securities Law, supra note 2, art. 26.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Id. arts. 26, 51(5).
394. Id. art. 26.
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seek an injunctive order to compel refund if an issue is declared invalid.3 95 It may, on its own initiative, take various measures to stop the
placement of an issue, publish notices warning the general public, investigate the violations, and seek administrative remedies against the issuer and its officers."s Where the violations are criminal in nature, the
matter must be forwarded to the procurator."s
In addition to issuers, securities market participants are subject to
sanctions for violations of securities legislation. It is unlawful for securities market participants to engage in activities requiring a license if they
have no license. 98 The Federal Securities Commission has several remedies available, including administrative actions against the participant
and compulsory liquidation of the participant if it fails to obtain a license within a prescribed time period. ' If a securities market participant manipulates prices of securities by providing false or inaccurate
information and such price manipulation is established by appropriate
legal proceedings, its license may be suspended or revoked."' Securities market participants also are subject to sanctions of SROs of which
they are members.''
The new Criminal Code, which will go into effect on January 1,
1997,' ° provides criminal sanctions for specific violations of securities
legislation. 4' These violations and related sanctions include: (1) unlicensed activities on the securities market authorizing penalties up to 500
times the minimum wage;' 4 (2) willful misrepresentation in a prospectus subjecting the issuer and its officers and directors to penalties up to
500 times the minimum wage;... (3) fraud during share issues allowing
penalties of fines or compulsory labor; 4' and (4) forgery of securities,
which is punishable by imprisonment from five to eight years.0 7
Private remedies are available under the Civil Code. The Securities
Law also expressly recognizes the possibility of civil liability for violations of securities legislation in the cases and to the extent allowed by
the Civil Code. ° Under Chapter 1 of the Civil Code, a person whose

395.
396.
397.
398.
399.

Id.
Id. art. 51(3).
Id.
Id. art. 51(6).
Id.

400. Id. art. 51(2).
401. Id.
402. Criminal Code, supra note 18, art. 1.
403. The existing Criminal Code of 1964 does not have any such provisions since
at the time of its adoption Russia did not have (and did not expect to have) any securities market.
404. Criminal Code, supra note 18, art. 171.

405. Id. art. 177.
406. Id. art. 185.
407. Id. art. 186.
408. Securities Law, supra note 2, art. 51(1).
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rights have been violated is entitled to fully recover his losses, unless
provided otherwise by contract or law."' A person is entitled to be indemnified for expenses incurred in enforcing his rights as well as losses
and damages to his property and lost profits." In determining the affected person's lost profits, courts are to consider the profit made by the
alleged violator as a result of the alleged violation."" Chapter 59 of
Part Two of the Civil Code concerns liability for damages. 2
XII. CONCLUSION

The Russian Federation has stimulated the development of financial
markets as it moves towards the establishment of a free market economy. Many steps have already been taken to regulate securities transactions. This article shows that the current framework is a leap forward
from the preceding period, although forthcoming directions from the
regulations will expectedly advance and clarify existing law.

409.
410.
411.
412.

Civil Code, supra note 1, art. 15(1).
Id. art. 15(2).
Id.
See id. art. 1064.

Legal Consequences of Force Majeure
Under German, Swiss, English
and United States' Law
DR. THEO RAUH*
I. INTRODUCTION
Long-term contracts, whether for the turnkey construction of a
plant, the construction of works or installations, or for the periodic
supply of goods, frequently face the problem that the economic,1 political2 and/or natural3 surroundings change far more than the parties
contemplated or expected when they signed the contract. This is especially true for long-term construction contracts where a European or
North-American contractor agrees to perform construction work in a
third world country. Here, subsequent events which render the performance of the contractor's obligation radically different from what
was originally contemplated occur much more often than in a domestic
contract. The possible risks in the performance of such a long-term
contract are so numerous that they cannot reasonably be considered
when the contract is signed.
In view of these imponderable risks, the parties often agree to add
a Force Majeure Clause. These clauses are worded much like the following:
In the Contract "force majeure" shall mean any occurrence outside
the control of the parties preventing or delaying their performance
of the contract.
Force majeure shall mean extraordinary events independent of the
Parties' will that cannot be foreseen or averted by them even with
due diligence, being beyond their control and preventing the Contracting Party/or Parties/ from fulfilling the obligation(s) undertaken in this Contract.
The expression "force majeure" shall mean circumstances which
were beyond the control of the party concerned exercising the standard care of a reasonable and prudent operator.

* Law studies at Universitit Trier and University of East Anglia in Norwich,
LL.M., 1989, doctoral degree for comparative studies on Frustration and Force Majeure in Contract Law, Universitat Trier, 1992; admitted to the Superior Court of
Diisseldorf in 1993; member of the law firm of Scholz, Kraatz, Dittman & Partner.
1. E.g., inflation, increase in the price of raw materials.
2. E.g., civil unrest, revolution, war.
3. E.g., flood, earthquakes, storms.
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Most clauses of this type require four essential criteria for an event to
qualify as Force Majeure:
1) the event must be external;
2) it must render the performance radically different from that
originally contemplated;
3) it must have been unforeseeable (objective standard) or at least
unforeseen (subjective standard); and
4) its occurrence must be beyond the control of the party concerned.
These criteria are also required by the definition of Force Majeure
under most national legal systems.' In this respect the term Force
Majeure is described as "Wegfall der Geschdftsgrundlage" (destruction
of the basis of the contract-Germany and Switzerland), "frustration"
(England) and "impracticability" (United States).
Parties often, however, pay less attention to Force Majeure clauses. These clauses are generally included under "Miscellaneous" and
their wording as well as their structure is not as detailed and accurate
as they should be. Quite frequently, the contractual Force Majeure
Clause broadly articulates the definition of a Force Majeure event
without delineating the legal consequences to follow the occurrence of
a Force Majeure event. To remedy this omission, the parties would
have to insert detailed and lengthy provisions dealing with the effect of
a Force Majeure event on the contractual duties already and still to be
performed, provisions responding to questions such as: on what basis is
work already performed to be calculated if such work is of no further
use for the employer? can the contractor claim compensation for investments already made but not yet visible for the employer? etc. Instead
of dealing with these complicated questions, the parties hope that a
Force Majeure event will not happen and leave the determination of its
effects to the applicable law - to the principles developed in each of
the jurisdictions with respect to Wegfall der Geschdftsgrundlage, frustration or impracticability.
This note will examine the effects of Force Majeure clauses under
German, Swiss, English and American law, and how these effects
greatly differ. The legal consequences of a recognized Force Majeure
vary from a judicial adjustment for the altered circumstances to a
division of loss to annulment of the contract.

4. Cf. THEO RAUH, LEISTUNGSERSCHWERUNGEN IM SCHULDVERTRAG (1992) (deal-

ing with English, US-American, German and French Law as well as with the CISG
and International Arbitration).
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II.

PRESERVATION OF THE CONTRACT UNDER MODIFIED CONDITIONS

A. Alteration of the Contract by the Court
1. Germany
Under German law, not every destruction of the basis of the
transaction results in per se legal consequences. The principle of pacta
sunt servanda may only be breached if it is in general unreasonable to
expect the obligor to fulfill the contract. In Machine Games,' the Federal Supreme Court stated that the destruction of the basis of the
transaction only has legal consequences where called for given the
totality of circumstances and where necessary in order to avoid results
which are intolerable and in general incompatible with law and justice.
Consequently, "unreasonableness" has a double function: in addition to
determining whether the basis of the transaction has been destroyed,
it serves to determine the legal consequences. 6
If the relationship between the parties largely breaks down, then
a modification of the contract for the changed circumstances is to be
considered first. The primacy of adjustment follows from the principle
of pacta sunt servanda, since an adjustment encroaches less severely
on the contract. In this respect, the contractual relationship as such is
maintained. Modifying the contract to the changed circumstances
should ensure that continuing the contract is reasonable for both parties.7 Contract modification, because of its flexibility, is particularly
suited to taking individual circumstances into account,8 and every
possible restructuring of the contract can, in principle, be achieved.
The following types are possible:
" comprehensive reform of the contractual relationship, which can
go so far 9as to replace the original obligation with a completely
new one.
" partial restructuring of the contractual relationship"
" partial preservation of the contract"
" alteration of the contractual obligation 2
* increase in the amount payable"3

5. BGH 20.31967.WM 1967 (561) (F.R.G.).
6. KARL
LARENZ,
GESCHAFTSGRUNDLAGE
UND
VERTRAGSERFULLUNG:
BEDEUTUNG "VERANDERTER UMSTANDE" IM ZIVILRECHT (3d ed. 1963).

7.
8.
9.
10.

DIE

VOLKER EMMERICH, DAs RECHT DER LEISTUNGSSTORUNGEN 321 (1984).
BGHNJW 1972 (580) (F.R.G).
BGHJZ 1952, 145 (146) (F.R.G.).
BGHNJW 1953, 1585 (1586) (F.R.G.).

11. LM § 242 Nr.12 Bfirgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB).
12. BGHNJW 1954, 1323 (supply of alternative current instead of direct current)
(F.R.G.).
13. BGHZ 1991, 32 (36) (F.R.G.).
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" grant of additional equalization claim 4

" reduction of the contractual performance 5
" postponement of performance"6
2. Switzerland
a. Basic Admissibility of an Alteration of the Contract
A modification of the contract aligns it to the new circumstances.
The contractual relationship as such is maintained. Scholarly opinion
concerning judicial contract modification is very different from that
concerning annulment. The older textbooks, in general, apply the principle clausula rebus sic stantibus and reject contract modification.
Some authors would only permit an alteration of the contract if the
contracting parties wished or appeared to desire to preserve the contract. 7
More recent commentaries, however, express no reservations
about granting the judge competence to alter the contract. In principle,
they acknowledge the alteration of the contract.'" In one of its fundamental decisions, the Federal Court, based on the principles enshrined
in Art. 373(2) Law of Obligations, allowed judicial alteration of the
contract instead of annulment. The Federal Court continues to strictly
adhere to this practice. 9
b. Restrictions on Alteration of the Contract
As with contract dissolution, in a case cf contract alteration the
principle of private autonomy requires that the judge take into account
the parties' agreements concerning the consequence of adjustment. If
neither party wishes to continue the contract with altered contents or
if both parties request that the contract be dissolved, even with different effects, then the judge must dissolve the contract. In long-term and
economically significant contracts, the parties normally have a greater
interest in preserving than in dissolving the contract." Weighing the
interests of the parties, the judge will focus on the particular concrete
facts of the case, for example, on new offers of contracts.

14. RG 21.6. 1933, RGZ 141, 212, 217
15. LM § 242 Nr.33 BGB (F.R.G.).
16. LM § 284 Nr.2 BGB (F.R.G.).
17. JACQUES BISCHOFF, VERTRAGSRISIKO UND CLAUSULA REBUS SIC STANTIBUS:
RIsIKOZUORDNUNG IN VERTRAGEN BEI VERANDERTEN VERHALTNISSEN 233 (1983).
18. PETER JAGGI & PETER GAUCH, ZORCHER KOMMENTAR, OBLIGATIONENRECHT, 3

Aufl. (3d ed.) no. 635/636 to § 18 Law of Obligations (1980); PIERRE TERCIER, La
clausula rebus sic stantibus en droit suisse des obligations, 127 JOURNAL DES
TRIBUNAUX 194, 210 (1979).

19. BundesGerichts Entscheidungen [BGE] 97 II 398; BGE 68 II 173 (Switz).
20. BISCHOFF, supra note 17, at 234.
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c. Possibilities for Alteration
(i). Alteration of the Content of the Contract
The first possibility for altering the contract is to restructure the
content of the contract. The judge has a number of options. The judge
may postpone the date on which performance is due, order payment by
installments, authorize partial performance, delete an agreement to
pay interest, or redetermine the place of performance.21 Adjustments
of the contract increasing one party's obligation or reducing the other
party's obligation are of great significance in practice. For example, the
Federal Court settled the grossly disproportionate lease obligations resulting from an extraordinary increase in the price of coal by appropriately increasing the interest rate.22
The Federal Court also raised the contractual obligations in a case
involving the reevaluation of debts in German Marks. Both pecuniary
obligations and obligations in kind may be reduced (in so far as they
do not involve specific goods). In order to meet changed economic conditions, the rent in a lease for operating a restaurant on ships on Lake
Lucerne was reduced from Swiss Francs 40,000 to Swiss Francs
17,000. 2 Obligations for performances in kind can also be adjusted
for altered circumstances by reducing the quantity of goods owed while
the counter-performance remains unchanged.24
(ii). Alteration of the Duration of the Contract
The judge may also shorten or lengthen the duration of the contract.2 Such adjustment may be required if the restoration of normal
circumstances (e.g., conclusion of a peace treaty, removal of an export
prohibition) can be expected shortly and the obligor could then perform
the contract after an appropriate extension of the contract.2 .
3. Anglo-American Law
a. Common Law
Both English and American 27 common law give the judge abso-

21. JAGGI & GAUCH, supra note 18, at no. 635 to art. 18 Law of Obligations.
22. BGE 47 II 318 (Switz).
23. BGE 48 II 252 (Switz).
24. BGE 47 II 454 (Switz).
25. JAGGI & GAUCH, supra note 18, at nos. 573/574, 635/636 to art. 18 Law of
Obligations.
26. BGE 44 II 526-27 (Switz.) (contract was extended for six months).
27. EwAN MCKENDRICK, Frustrationand Force Majeure-Their Relationship and A
Comparative Assessment, in FORCE MAJEURE AND FRUSTRATION OF CONTRACT 38
(1991).
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lutely no power to alter legal rights with respect to a concluded contract. In British Movietonews Ltd. v. London & Dist. Cinemas Ltd.,28
the Court of Appeals made its only attempt to override this principle.
In this case, the defendants (cinema owners) had agreed to obtain
films exclusively from the plaintiffs, (wholesale film distributors) for
the period when a statutory instrument was in force. This statutory
instrument had been passed in 1943 under the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act 1939. Its purpose was the preservation of public life during
the war by allocating the few available films evenly.
At the end of the war, however, this Statutory Instrument was not
repealed, but was simply included in another statute (Supplies and
Services [Transitional Powers] Act 1945). In this context the Statutory
Instrument had a completely different purpose, serving to protect Sterling currency against film imports from countries with hard currency 29. Based on this change of purpose, the defendants pled frustration
since they had concluded the original contract on completely different
grounds - shortage of films during war - which no longer existed.
Lord Denning believed that the court only had the power to adjust
a contract to the changed situation if the contract could be interpreted
as recognizing such an intent by the parties. However, he never addressed the question of whether an essential change of the original
content of the obligation had arisen:
In these frustration cases, the court really exercises a qualifying
power-a power to qualify the absolute, literal or wide terms of the
contract-in order to do what is just and reasonable in the new situation. The court qualifies the literal meaning of the words so as to
bring them into accord with the contemplated scope of the contract.
Even if the contract is absolute in its terms, nevertheless, if it is
not absolute in intent, it will not be held absolute in effect."0
This statement was rejected, on one hand, because it made the
criterion of radical change of the obligation superfluous and, on the
other hand, it would introduce the principle of clausula rebus sic stantibus into English contract law.31 Therefore, it is not surprising that
Lord Denning's statement caused some concern in the House of Lords
and Lord Denning's decision was overturned.32 Viscount Simon held

28. 2 All E.R. 390 (1950).
29. Clive Schmitthoff, Frustrationof International Contracts in English and Comparative Law, in INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LEGAL SCIENCE: SOME PROBLEMS
OF NON-PERFORMANCE AND FORCE MAJEURE IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS OF SALE

126, 135 (1961).
30. British Movietonews Ltd. v. London & Dist. Cinemas Ltd., 2 All E.R. 390,
395 (1950).

31. Schmitthoff, supra note 29, at 136.
32. British Movietonews, Ltd. v. London & Dist. Cinemas, Ltd., 2 All E.R. 617
(1951).
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that the requirements for frustration were not fulfilled:
The suggestion that an uncontemplated turn of events is enough to
enable a court to substitute its notion of what is just and reasonable... leads to some misunderstanding." Though the legislative
authority behind the words of the order is altered, the words themselves mean the same thing. This is not a case in which there has
been a vital change of the law.84
Consequently, the only legal effect which comes into question is the
annulment of the contract.
b. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-615
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-615 does not make any express
provision for the legal effects; it is evident from Comment 6 that this
provision however does not exclude the possibility of adjustment: 5
In situations in which neither sense nor justice is served by either
answer when the issue is posed in flat terms of excuse or no excuse,
adjustment under the various provisions of this Article is necessary, especially the sections on good faith, on insecurity and assurance and on the reading of all provisions in the light of their purposes, and the general policy of this Act to use equitable principles
in furtherance of commercial standards and good faith.
All the same, the overwhelming majority of decisions continue to proceed on the assumption that there are generally the two alternatives of
preservation and annulment.
The first case in which the contract was adjusted was the ALCOA
case. 8 ALCOA had entered into a long-term supply contract for the
conversion of minerals into aluminum (toll conversion service contract).
The contract contained a price adjustment clause, whereby the parties
chose the wholesale price index for industrial goods as an objective
measure for the alteration of non-operation related production costs.
However, when OPEC began to raise the price of crude oil in 1973 and,
in addition, unexpected environmental protection measures greatly
increased ALCOA's electricity costs, the rate of increase of the nonoperation related production costs considerably exceeded the rate of
increase of the index.

33. Id. at 625.
34. Id. at 623.
35. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 272(2) (1981) ('In any
cases governed by the rules stated in this Chapter, if those rules . . . will not avoid
injustice, the court may grant relief on such terms as justice requires including
protection of the parties' reliance interests.").
36. Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (1980)
[hereinafter ALCOA].
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ALCOA stated that the parties had proceeded on the assumption
that the wholesale index was to be an objective measure of ALCOA's
non-operation related production costs. It further stated that the mutual error on this fundamental consideration led to a significant imbalance in the mutual obligations and required-on the basis of a total loss
for ALCOA of US $ 75,000,000-an alteration of the contract. In absolute figures the price increase was 500%.
After the court affirmed the existence of Force Majeure, it refused
to terminate the contract since this would give the plaintiffs business
an unexpected profit, because ALCOA could only conclude a contract
on increased present prices. The court further stated that the completion of a long-term contract required a careful examination of the circumstances of the contract, the intent of the parties and the supervening event.
The court, no doubt impressed by the huge sum involved, admitted that in certain cases terminating the contract was the only appropriate option. The court further stated that if the defendant wished to
secure a long-term supply of aluminum at a price which still allowed it
to make a profit and if the plaintiff had a continuing interest in the
contract based on its desire for the full use of its production capacities,
then both parties had the same interest in a long-term relationship.
The court held that an adjustment was the suitable legal remedy since
it came closest to the intentions and expectations of the parties and
avoided inequities."
On the basis of its superior expert knowledge the court even considered itself more able than the parties themselves to adjust the contract. The court declared that it possessed "information from hindsight
far superior to that which the parties had when they made their contract."" After considering the original contract and the expectations
of the parties, the court drafted the following price clause:
For the duration of the contract the price for each pound of aluminum converted by ALCOA shall be the lesser of the current Price A
or Price B indicated below. Price A shall be the contract ceiling
price computed periodically as specified in the contract. Price B
shall be the greater of the current Price B1 or B2. Price B1 shall be
the price specified in the contract, computed according to the terms
of the contract. Price B2 shall be that price which yields ALCOA a
profit of one cent per pound of aluminum converted. 9
In addition, the court fixed the invoice arrangements and rules for
mutual provisions of information (in part for up to two years after

37. Id. at 78.
38. Id. at 91.
39. Id. at 80.
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expiration of the contract).4
There are several approving comments"' on the ALCOA decision.
Supporters of judicial adjustment consider it a decisive step toward
allowing judicial changes of contractual duties according to fairness 2
and flexibility.
B. Allocation of Loss
1. Germany
In some German cases a division of the loss comes into question
as a legal consequence of the disappearance of the basis of the transaction.' The assumption underlying the basic principle of determination of loss is that the loss resulting from the contractual breakdown is
to be appropriately fixed and allocated between the parties with consideration given to the interests of both parties," their economic circumstances"5 and the originally expected profits. 6
In a case which occurred under the equalization of burdens legislation, "'7 a seller who had sold a war-damaged piece of land with a
house for the price of DM 8,000. demanded compensation from the
purchaser in the amount of DM 10,000, which was granted to him by
the competent equalization of burdens authority for the property. The
Federal Supreme Court held that an equal division of the respective
advantages and disadvantages between the two contracting partners
was appropriate." The court granted the plaintiff DM 5,000 because
the grant of such a claim for equalization would always be possible
when the continued enforcement of the contract would lead to a result
which was intolerable and no longer compatible with law and equity.
An equal allocation of the loss is, by no means, a rigid principle; rather, all the circumstances of the case must be considered and valued to
achieve an equitable and just equalization. This includes considering
whether or not one of the parties has accepted a greater risk. Consequently, every possibility of allocation is open to the court. 9
40. Id.
41. Michael N. Zundel, Equitable Reformation of Long-term Contracts-The 'New
Spirit" of ALCOA, 1982 UTAH L. REV. 985, 1001; see also J.G. Ryan, Note, UCC § 2615, Excusing the Impracticable, 60 B.U. L. REV. 575, 596 (1980).
42. Zundel, supra note 41, at 1000.
43. GERHARD KEGEL ET AL., DIE EINWIRKUNG DES KRIEGES AUF VERTRAGE IN DER
RECHTSPRECHUNG DEUTSCHLANDS, FRANKREICHS, ENGLANDS UND DER VEREINIGTEN

STAATEN VON AMERIKA 127 (1941).
44. Id. at 403.
45. OLG Nuremberg, 29.4.1971, RdL 1971, 322, 323.
46. KEGEL, supra note 43, at 127.
47. BGH LM No. 41 to § 242 Buirgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB].
48. See also BGH 8.2.18.1984, NJW 1984, 1746, 1747; BGH 23.11.1989, NJW
1990, 572, 573.
49. See OLG Nuremberg, supra note 45, at 322-23. "An allocation as to 2/3 and
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2. Anglo-American law
Due to the general reluctance of Anglo-American courts to
adjust the contract, it is not surprising that in only one case has the
court allocated the loss. The National Presto Case5" was based on a
mutual error of the parties concerning the level of further contractual
costs and not on impracticability.
There are many opinions on impracticability which also demand
an allocation of the loss in cases of commercial impracticability."' The
reason given is that it is equitable that both parties, having landed in
a losing situation without any fault, should share the loss. Both parties would probably have profited if the contract had been properly
implemented; therefore, why should they not then also bear the losses?52
C. Pro-rataPerformance
Where a seller has concluded several contracts for the delivery of
specific goods and the supply of those goods subsequently becomes
restricted, the restriction frustrates the seller's ability to fulfil all his
obligations to supply. The question then becomes how to distribute the
remaining goods.
1. United States of America
Both the Common Law53 and the Uniform Commercial Code § 2615 provide for the allocation of available goods" instead of dissolving
one contract because of impracticability and declaring the other contracts capable of being fully performed. There is, however, no fixed
allocation standard, so that the seller has some room for discretion in
the distribution.55
In the Atlantic Richfield 6 cases, an oil company was forced to
limit supplies to its customers because of a gasoline shortage in the

1/3 is the appropriate legal result." Id.
50. National Presto Indus. v. United States, 338 F.2d 99 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
51. Glanville L. Williams, The End of Chandler v. Webster, 6 MOD. L. REV.
(1942) 46, 50 (1942).
52. Id.
53. See Acme Mfg. v. Arminius Chem. Co., 264 F. 27 (4th Cir. 1920); See also
Yuba v. Mattoon, 325 P.2d 162 (Cal. App. 1958); Amsden Lumber Co. v. Stanton,
294 P. 853 (Kan. 1931).
54. See Intermar, Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 364 F. Supp. 82 (D. Pa. 1973);
See also Mansfield Propane Gas Co. v. Folger Gas Co., 231 Ga. 868 (Sup. Ct. 1974);
Terry v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 72 Cal. App. 3d. 962 (1977).
55. J. White, Allocation of Scarce Goods Under Sec. 2.615 UCC: A Comparison of
Some Rival Models, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 503 (1978).
56. Terry v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 72 Cal. App. 3d. 962 (1977); Intermar, Inc. v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 364 F. Supp. 82 (D. Pa. 1973).
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United States and the United Kingdom arising out of the oil crisis and
because of a state regulation requiring the company to keep certain
amounts in storage. In order to guarantee an equal supply to all customers the following distribution scheme was applied:
Until further notice, our sales of gasoline to you will be limited to (104%) of our sales to you during the comparable calendar
month of 1972, except in those cases where a different basis is
approved due to such factors as the lack of 1972 sales history or the
occurrence of a material intervening event. 7
Where no comparable figures for 1972 existed, the consumption of the
individual petrol station was estimated by the suppliers based on such
details as size and position. Two petrol station tenants took action
against this. The plaintiff in the first case argued that, although no
comparable figures were available for 1972, the value estimated by the
suppliers was far too low58 and was done deliberately to drive him
from the market. The second plaintiff claimed an inequitable hardship
since the petrol station had only opened in 1971 and the current turnover was much higher.59 In both cases the courts upheld the allocation formula. On the basis of the UCC § 2-615 (b) requirement that the
allocation be fair and reasonable, the focus of the inquiry was on
whether unequal treatment or discrimination in comparison with the
other petrol station tenants was evident. "The fact that plaintiff, under
the allocation formula, receives less than its marketing needs is the
result of its lack of sales history in 1972 rather than the result of any
arbitrary and discriminatory conduct by the defendant." ° Consequently, whether better and more exact methods for calculating the
comparison standard existed was irrelevant. What mattered was that
both the disadvantages and the advantages of the allocation formula
were shared equally amongst the customers. These principles of prorata performance are applied in the same way when the contract contains a Force Majeure clause.
2. Germany
German law also allows a pro-rata performance in cases where
the basis of the transaction is destroyed.61 When the seller of specific
restricted goods encounters difficulties in obtaining these goods with-

57. Intermar, Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 364 F. Supp. 82 (D. Pa. 1973).
Intermar, supra note 54, at 90.

58. Id.
59. Terry, 72 Cal. App. 3d at 962.
60. Intermar, 364 F.Supp. at fn 54; See also Terry 72 Cal. App. 3d at fn 54, at

968. "The statutory demand for a fair and reasonable allocation denotes a collective
quality characterizing the supplier's treatment of his customers as a group ....

dealers were treated alike." Id.
61. RG 3.2.1914, RGZ 84, 125; RG 22.10.1920, RGZ 100, 134.
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out any fault on his part, and when these difficulties constitute an
unreasonable demand on him such that he can no longer comply with
his obligations, then he may reduce the supply to his customers proportionately. At the same time, he is exempted from claims for damages under § 242 of the German Civil Code.
In the Sugarbeet Seeds case,62 the Supreme Court of the German
Reich' permitted a seller, who had sold a specific amount of sugarbeet seeds for several years in advance, to allocate the seeds proportionately amongst all purchasers when events of nature reduced the
harvest so that there were no longer sufficient supplies. The Federal
Supreme Court said that in these cases, the seller's obligees represent
a group of equally entitled persons who find themselves in a group
with a common interest. The court added that it would be against the
principles of good faith if one purchaser received more at the expense
of the others Since the court stressed that the claimants enjoyed equal
contractual rights and belonged to a group entitled to raise the claim,
only those claimants who have concluded a contract with the obligor,
and not his regular customers, will benefit from the pro-rata allocation.
3. England
While legal writers support the principles existing in the United
States for pro-rata performance," English case law has not developed
any fixed precedents in this respect.
In the decision The Super Servant Two, Dillon L.J. dealt with
this problem and rejected the remedy of pro-rata performance for frustration. He reasoned that the contract is terminated with the occurrence of the contractual breakdown. He stated that the party relying
on this could not subsequently incur an obligation to make an appropriate allocation. It therefore follows that the obligor is either completely discharged or must completely perform his contractual duties.
The problems this rule creates are made clear by the Super-Servant-Two case. If the defendant had only named one ship in the contract, then he would have been discharged from performance. The
same would be true if both ships had sunk. With the sinking of only
one ship he can, even as a matter of fact, only fulfil one part of the
contract; but this is not considered a sufficient excuse. Accordingly, it
would66have been better for the defendant in this case if both ships had
sunk.

62. RGZ 84, 129.
63. Now called the "Federal Supreme Court".
64. A. H. Hudson, Prorating in the English Law of Frustrated Contracts, 31
MOD. L. REV. 535, 543 (1968).
65. [1990] 1 Ll. L.R. 1, 13-14
66. Ewan McKendrick, Self-Induced Frustrationand Force Majeure Clauses, 1989

LL.M.C.L.Q. 3, 6.
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In contrast, the principle of pro-rata performance has been applied
in contracts with exemption clauses. In Tennants, Ltd. v. Wilson & Co.
Ltd,. 7 the Force Majeure clause provided that the seller can suspend
its supplies when particular Force Majeure events occur. When the
seller, who obtained chemicals from Germany and resold them in Eng-.
land, was no longer able to perform due to the outbreak of the First
World War, one of the purchasers nevertheless sued for specific performance. The House of Lords dismissed the claim and allowed a pro-rata
performance to be effected because, according to the Court, the seller
was either obligated to all of his contracting partners in the same way
or was obligated to none of them. Therefore, the chronological sequence
of the contracts was irrelevant.68
There is, however, uncertainty as to how the allocation is to be
carried out. In general, no specific method is required; rather, the
Courts allow the seller a measure of discretion in light of the individual circumstances of each case. The only requirement is that a reasonable allocation be used in the particular case. 9 Accordingly, an equal
treatment of all contracting partners is not absolutely necessary. The
means of allocation can also take into account when the contracts were
concluded. 0 Moreover, allocation can also be done solely on a mathematically equal basis without taking into account the content and the
scope of the contracts.71
III. ANNULMENT OF THE CONTRACT
Whereas a termination of all contractual duties is seen as the last
option in both German and Swiss law, this is the primary remedy in
Anglo-American law. Accordingly, the requirements for an annulment
of the contract are different.
One consequence of contract annulment is the reversal of performances already effected. In this respect there are significant differences, in particular in English law, on the question of which services
performed are to be reimbursed. This ultimately led to the passing of
the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943.

67. Tenants Ltd. v. Wilson & Co. Ltd., [1917] A.C. 495.
68. Id. at 512.
69. Intertradex S.A. v. Lesieur-Tourteaux S.A.R.L., [1977] 2 Ll. L.R. 146, 155
(Donaldson, J.).
70. Id.
71. Bremer Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Continental Grain Co., [19831 1 Ll. L.R.

269, 281.
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A. Requirements for ContractAnnulment
1. Anglo-American law
Both English and American law, in the event of significant frustration, only annul the contract at the time of frustration:
"[firustration brings the contract to an end forthwith, without more
and automatically."72 The rationale for this is that the resulting contractual certainty should make cases of frustration predictable.
2. Germany
In German law, contract annulment replaces contract adjustment
where the adjustment alone is insufficient to avoid a result incompatible with the principle of good faith and where this aim can only be
achieved by discharging the aggrieved party from the contract. This
occurs when the adjustment of the transaction leads to an obligation
on one or both parties which can no longer be justified.
In the Vigogne7" spinning case, one partner in a commercial partnership had entered into an obligation in favor of a third party in a
preliminary contract, whereby, after the termination of the partnership
agreement and in the course of the distribution of the partnership
assets he would purchase a certain piece of property and sell it to the
third party at a fixed price. During the distribution of the partnership
assets inflation forced the partner to pay a much higher price than
that fixed in the preliminary contract. On this basis, he refused to
perform because the high rate of inflation had frustrated the fulfillment of the contract.
The Supreme Court examined whether or not the contract could
be preserved with altered conditions.74 The Court said that the obligor
could only be discharged from his obligations if further performance of
the contract would significantly contravene the principle of good faith
and continue to bind the obligor either because the factual situation
would not permit an adjustment or because the obligee refused to consent to an adjustment.75
3. Switzerland
a. The Acceptance of Contract Annulment
Textbooks and case law regard contract annulment as the usual

72.
73.
74.
75.

J. Lauritzen A.S. v. Wijsmuller B.V., [1990] 1 Li, L.R. 1, 8.
RG 3.2.1922, RGZ 103, 328.
RGZ 103, 333, 334.
See also RG 12.5.1928, RGZ 121, 141.
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legal consequence" of the application of the principle clausula rebus
sic stantibus7 This is the normal reaction to determining that a contract is unenforceable because of events following conclusion. The rules
for interpretation of statutory gaps allow the judge to annul the contract by creating a rule in accordance with Art. 1 (2) of the Swiss Civil
Code, which gives the aggrieved party a right to give notice of termination or to annul the contract directly. 8
b. Restrictions on Annulment of the Contract
The judge's fundamental freedom to create an adjustment rule to
annul the contract is restricted by the wishes of the parties. This is the
case, when one party has already accepted the unfavorable effects of
altering the contract "by agreeing to the appropriate adjustment of the
contract. "7 9 The other contracting party cannot then in good faith refuse to continue performance of the contract. Therefore, the judge cannot annul the contract by formulating a rule under Art. 1 (2) of the
Swiss Civil Code. In addition, the principle of private autonomy prohibits an annulment of the contract where both parties agree to the
preservation of the contract, 80 but cannot agree on the means of preserving the contract. The judge must then adjust the contents of the
contract to the changed circumstances with the greatest possible adherence to its binding nature as determined by the parties.
Accordingly, the question of the legal effect of annulling the contract arises when 1) the intent of the parties regarding the preservation and continuation of the contract cannot be determined, 2) the
parties wish to annul the contract, but the further consequences (e.g.,
damages) are in dispute, or 3) one party needs to continue the contract
but is not prepared to accept the risk.
B. Reversal of performances already made
If the Courts acknowledge the existence of significant Force Majeure, which leads to an annulment of the contract, then they must decide which of the performances already made need to be reversed.
1. England

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

BISCHOFF, supra note 17, at 230.
JAGGI & GAUCH, supra note 18, at no. 635 on § 18 Law of Obligations.
Id.
BISCHOFF, supra note 17, at 230.
See also BGE 47 II 319, (Switz.).
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a. Common Law
On the basis of annulment of the contract ex nunc at common law
the parties cannot only keep the benefits already received, but they
can also maintain their claims to obligations which became due before
the frustration. At this point, any obligations not yet due can no longer
be claimed.
Chandler v. Webster"1 is the leading case for this rigid rule. On
the occasion of the coronation of King Edward VII, a room with a view
over the coronation procession was rented. The contract provided that
the tenant was to pay the whole rental of £ 141 before the procession
took place. After he had only paid £ 100, the whole event was postponed.
Because the contract had only been annulled upon the occurrence
of the frustrating event, the Court, relying on the tenant's duty of
advance performance, decided that the tenant was under an obligation
to pay the remaining sum. Thus, all debts owed before the occurrence
of the event remain: the loss lies where it falls. This was justified on
the grounds that the seller, despite being released from performance,
still had the burden of preparing for performance and consequently
had also to perform work which could be reimbursed. Because of the
burdens of preparation, the court did not find a total failure of consideration, which would have led to the conclusion that no valid contract
had existed. Accordingly, it is inappropriate to explain this case on the
basis of the principle of consideration.82
Although the Court in Chandler based its opinion for a termination ex nunc on old precedents, this decision has been criticized many
times as inequitable." It forces a debtor to continue paying, although
he can expect no counter-performance. Furthermore, the debtor has no
possibility of obtaining a refund for payments already made or of receiving compensation. In contrast, an obligor who has to perform in
kind can obtain substantial advantages with this arrangement under
certain circumstances. If the performance, as in the coronation case,
can be rendered later, then he obtains a double renumeration for his
performance.
It took 38 years, however, before this decision was overturned by
the Fibrosa case." This case involved a British company that had entered into an obligation in July, 1939, to deliver machines to a Polish

81.
82.
(1964).
83.
REV. 1,
84.

[1904] 1 K.B. 493.
ERNST RABEL, DAS RECHT DES WARENVERKAUFS, Vol. I, 369 n.5
R.G. McElroy, Glanville L. Williams, The Coronation Cases-H, 5 MOD. L.
(1941).
Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbain Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd., [1943] A.C.
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company. A third of the total price of £ 4800 was paid in advance. The
German occupation of Poland made it impossible for the English supplier to deliver, thus, frustrating the contract. The House of Lords
decided that the Polish plaintiff could demand his advance payment
because the absolute failure of performance by the English company
constituted a total failure of consideration.85 This means that the
plaintiff, if he has received no counter-performance at all so that no
contract was performed, can demand advance payments back under a
quasi-contract theory.88
Since the Court, however, only allowed recovery in cases of a total
failure of consideration, the principle laid down in Chandler will continue to apply with all of its disadvantages for common law cases in
which only a small counter-performance is effected.87 The Court saw
the inequity in cases where one party has already incurred expenses in
reliance on the implementation of the contract;88 it therefore requested that Parliament pass a law to eliminate these inequities.89 The
Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 accomplished that purpose.'
b. Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 (L.R.F.C.A.)
The most important sections of this Act provide:
Section 1
(1) All sums paid or payable to any party in pursuance of the
contract before the time when the parties were so discharged8 '
shall, in the case of sums so paid, be recoverable from him as the
money received by him for the use of the party by whom the sums
were paid, and, in the case of sums so payable, cease to be so payable:
Provided that, if the party to whom the sums were paid or
payable incurred expenses before the time of discharge in, or for
the purpose of, the performance of the contract, the court may, if it
considers it just to do so having regard to all the circumstances of
the case, allow him to retain or, as the case may be, recover the
whole or any part of the sums so paid or payable, not being an
amount in excess of the expenses so incurred.
(2) Where any party to the contract has, by reason of anything
done by any other party thereto in, or for the purpose of, the performance of the contract, obtained a valuable benefit 2 before the

85. Id. at 48.
86. A. Goodhart, Mistake and Frustration in English Contract Law, in: FS ffir A.
Simonius 99, 105 (1955).
87. SER ROBERT GOFF & GARETH JONES, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 366 (1978).
88. Chandler, [1904] 1 K.B. 493 at 49, 55.
89. Id. at 50, 57.

90. RAUH, supra note 4, at 137.
91. In this Act it is referred to as "the time of discharge."
92. This excludes a payment of money to which the last foregoing subsection ap-
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time of discharge, there shall be recoverable from him by the said
other party such sum (if any), not exceeding the value of the said
benefit to the party obtaining it, as the court considers just, having
regard to all the circumstances of the case and, in particular,
(a) the amount of any expenses incurred before the time of
discharge by the benefited party in, or for the purpose of, the performance of the contract, including any sums paid or payable by
him to any other party in pursuance of the contract and retained or
recoverable by that party under the last foregoing subsection, and
(b) the effect, in relation to the said benefit, of the circumstances giving rise to the frustration of the contract.

The Fibrosa decision is contained in § 1(2), which provides for
recovery of advance payments. The statute, however, goes further by
allowing a claim for a reversal of performances already made, where
only partial failure of consideration exists.93

Section 1(3), which in contrast to § 1(2) provides for the reimbursement of non-pecuniary amounts, was the subject of extensive discussion in B.P. Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd. v. Hunt,9 so far the only
opinion on the L.R.F.C.A. The very complex facts are as follows: In
December 1957, the Libyan government granted the defendant a license to search for and extract crude oil from a certain area of the
desert. Since Mr. Hunt did not have sufficient resources to invest in
such a large area, he concluded a company agreement with the plaintiffs, designated as a farm-in-agreement. The contract provided that
the costs for the exploration and development of the license area and
the extraction should be borne equally by the parties. Also, the oil
extracted would be divided equally among the parties.
In accordance with the contract, the plaintiff advanced the initial
costs for development. The defendant was to reimburse this money
after extraction of the oil had begun by transferring crude oil from his
share of the amount extracted. B.P. was thereby to receive "reimbursement oil"95 for the share of the costs of the search for oil, which were
to be borne by Hunt until B.P had recovered 125% of its initial expenditure. This covered B.P.'s risk in the event no oil was discovered. Ultimately, oil was extracted starting in 1967. The new Libyan government, under Gaddafi, expropriated the plaintiff in 1971 and the defendant two years later, declaring the oil industry nationalized. In
response, B.P. sued based on frustration and demanded repayment of a
sum to be equitably determined by the Court in accordance with section 1 (3) L.R.F.C.A.
Sir Robert Goff, who felt that the main purpose of the law was to

plies.
93. GOFF & JONES, supra note 87, at 565.
94. B.P. Exploration Co. v. Hunt, [1979] 1 W.L.R. 783.
95. To be taken at the rate of three-eighths of Mr. Hunt's share.
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avoid the unjust enrichment of one of the parties," took a two-step
approach. First, he determined and measured the benefit received and
measured it in monetary terms. He, thereby, interpreted the central
concept of § 1(3)-valuable benefit-in such a way that only the end-product of the services performed and received by the other party, and not
the services themselves, was to be considered in assessing the benefit.
He based his view on the fact that § 1 (3) did not put the plaintiffs
performance on an equal footing with the defendant's benefit, but distinguished between the two. 7
The focus on the end-product alone has, however, brought criticism.98 In particular, according to this opinion, there can be no valuable benefit in those cases where no end-product has been produced. If,
for example, a house was destroyed by fire shortly before its completion, the contractor would receive nothing." Consequently, all performances made must be taken into consideration when evaluating the
benefit. This argument was irrelevant in this situation, since Mr. Hunt
received a benefit. This benefit consisted of the value of the crude oil
he received and the compensation paid by the Libyan government.'0°
This amounted to almost $85,000,000.00.
Sir Robert Goff next determined a sum which appeared equitable,
but which was independent of the valuable benefit and was not to be
in excess of that amount. In this respect, all the circumstances of the
case were considered.' 01 Accordingly, the judge regarded a sum which
appeared equitable and which at the same time signified a benefit for
the defendant as the appropriate value for the plaintiffs performance."° Since part of the money had already gone to B.P. in the
form of oil, Sir Robert Goff set the remaining sum at $35,000,000.00.
2. United States of America
In contrast to English law, American law allows the interests of
the parties to be balanced on the basis of the rights and obligations
accrued before the failure of the contract: "[a] party whose duty of performance does not arise or is discharged as a result of impracticability
of performance, frustration of purpose ... is entitled to restitution for
any benefit that he has conferred on the other party ....

96.
97.
98.
218-21
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

BP Exploration Co. v. Hunt, supra note 94, at 799.
Id. at 783.
A.M. Haycroft & D.M. Waksman, Frustrationand Restitution, J. BUS. L. 207,
(1984).
G.H. TREITEL, THE LAw OF CONTRACT 689 (1983).
This had to be taken into consideration on the basis of § 1(3)(b).
J. Baker, Frustration and Unjust Enrichment, C.L.J. 266, 269 (1979).
B.P. Exploration Co. at fn 94.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 377 (1981).
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In Butterfield v. Byron," a contractor was obligated to co-operate in the construction of a house. Part of the cost was to be paid in
advance and the rest was due when the house was completed. The
building, however, burned down shortly before completion and further
performance of the contract was frustrated. The Court distanced itself
from the English decisions"°5 and held that the contractor was entitled to receive full compensation for the performances already made,
even if payment was not due when the contract was frustrated. The
Court stated, [i(n such a case defendant can recover for work and
material done and furnished on an implied assumption at the contract
rate.""° While recovery of damages for performances effected in advance is allowed,"°7 recovery of the loss incurred for reliance on a
promise to perform is not permitted."
3. Germany
In German law, the settlement of an annulled contract depends on
the method of the contract's annulment. If the aggrieved party has a
right to terminate on notice, then the annulment of the contract only
°
takes place when the basis of the transaction has been destroyed.'O
If the aggrieved party has a right of rescision, the reversal of the contract is effected in accordance with the law of unjust enrichment.1
When the contract is annulled without a legal declaration, it is necessary to differentiate between the types of contracts.
4. Switzerland (Annulment ex nunc)
Case law has yet to answer the question of whether the annulment arrangement constructed by the judge should have legal effects
ex tunc or ex nunc. The opinions represented in legal literature are
contradictory. Neither theoretical nor practical considerations support
the consequences of annulment with effect ex tunc. If the application of
the principle clausula rebus sic stantibusleads to the premature termination of the contract, it requires that the contract was valid when the
events after the conclusion of the contract occurred, "and there can

104. Butterfield v. Byron, 27 N.E. 667 (Mass. 1891).
105. Id. at 668.
106. Id. at 669.
107. Alabama Football, Inc. v. L.C. Greenwood, 452 F.Supp. 1191, 1196-97 (D. Pa.
1978); West v. People's First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 106 A. 2d 427 (Pa. 1954);
Baer v. United States Lines Co., 43 N.Y.S. 2d 212 (App. Term 1943) (Stating that
performances due before the breakdown of the contract are no longer recoverable).
Alfred Marks Realty Co. v. Churchills, 153 N.Y.S. 264, 265 (App. Term. 1915); Alfred Marks Realty Co. v. Hotel Hermitage Co., 156 N.Y.S. 179 (App. Term. 1915);
108. Carroll v. Bowerstock, 164 P. 143 (Kan. 1917); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 704 (1982).
109. BGH 21.11.1968, NJW 1969, 233, 234; BGH 12.6.1987, BGHZ 101, 143, 150
110. BGH 25.10.1989, BGHZ 109, 139, 144; LARENZ, supra note 6, at 186.
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therefore never be a question of terminating it with effect ex tunc.""
In addition, the question of premature annulment of the contract is
important when performance of the typical continuing obligation has
already commenced and the reversal of the transaction therefore presents difficulties. The contract can only then be terminated with effect
ex nunc.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article has shown that the effects of Force Majeure events
vary greatly. Even within a particular national legal system, the outcome of a Force Majeure event cannot be determined with certainty,
and with the exception of English law the options for the courts are
broad.
The impossibility of determining the legal effect of a Force Majeure event leads'to great risk for the parties concerned. Given the uncertainty as to future events, their effects on the parties and their
legal consequences, both parties bear this risk. It is, therefore, highly
advisable that an appropriate clause which deals with the effects of
Force Majeure events be inserted into the contract. As a good example
of the possible wording of such a clause, the Force Majeure Clause
proposed by the ICC is cited. After having stated what will be regarded as a Force Majeure event, this clause goes on to deal with the effects of a Force Majeure event:
Effects of grounds of relief
6. A ground of relief under this clause relieves the failing party
from damages, penalties and other contractual sanctions, except
from duty to pay interest on money owing as long as and to the
extent that the ground subsists.
7. Further it postpones the time for performance, for such period as
may be reasonable, thereby excluding the other party s right, if
any, to terminate or rescind the contract. In determining what is a
reasonable period, regard shall be had to the failing party's ability
to resume performance, and the other party's interest in receiving
performance despite the delay. Pending resumption of performance
by the failing party the other party may suspend his own performance.
8. If the ground of relief subsist for more than such period as the
parties provide [the applicable period to be specified here by the
parties], or in the absence of such provision for longer than a reasonable period, either party shall be entitled to terminate the contract with notice.
9. Each party may retain what he has received from the performance of the contract carried out prior to the termination. Each
party must account to the other for any unjust enrichment result-

111. BISCHOFF, supra note 17, at 231.
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ing from such performance. The payment of the final balance shall
be made without delay.

Recent Developments

Kadic v. Karadzic: Whose International Law?
AMY E. ECKERT
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in
1
Filartigav. Pefia-Irala,
a number of foreign plaintiffs have pursued
their tort claims in American federal courts under the the Alien Tort
Claims Act (ATCA). The ATCA allows the district courts to exercise
"original jurisdiction of any civil action by any alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States."2 Although the ATCA dates back to the Judiciary Act of 1789,
it was largely ignored prior to the Filartigadecision. ATCA jurisdiction
3
had been sustained in only two cases prior to Filartiga.
In addition to
the rarity of cases in which courts sustained ATCA jurisdiction, the
denial of ATCA jurisdiction in several other claims "created the impression that the law of nations.. . could not be violated when the
victim was a national of the acting state."4 After the Filartiga decision, use of the ATCA to gain access to federal courts increased dramatically.
While Judge John 0. Newman, writing for the Court of Appeals,
noted that "[m]ost Americans would probably be surprised to learn
that victims of atrocities committed in Bosnia are suing the leader of

1. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1993).
3. Jurisdiction was sustained in Bolchos v. Darrell, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C.
1795)(The District Court accepted jurisdiction for a claim that slaves belonging to a

Spanish subject but seized on board a British ship should be returned) and Adra v.
Clift, 195 F.Supp. 857 (D.Md. 1961)(The District Court exercised jurisdiction over a

child custody claim between a Lebanese national and an Iraqi national).

4. Jeffrey M. Blum and Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act after Filartigav. Peria-Irala,
22 HARV. INTL L.J. 53, 55 (1981).
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the insurgent Bosnian-Serb forces in a United States District Court in
Manhattan,"5 Kadic v. Karadzic represents just the latest link in a
chain of tort claims against aliens litigated in the U.S. Since the comparative flood of ATCA litigation after the Filartiga opinion,6 many
aspects of this statue have received significant attention from legal
scholars as well as litigants. The scholarly debates over the ATCA
center largely around the origins and purpose of the statute7 and its
application to violations by private individuals as opposed to state actors.8 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals' recent decision in Kadic v.
Karadzic brings to the forefront yet another question about ATCA
claims, that being which international legal obligations apply when
determining whether or not a violation of international law has taken
place.
Kadic v. Karazdic involves appeals by two groups of plaintiffs who
have suffered human rights violations in the course of the conflict in
the former Yugoslavia. These plaintiffs sued Karadzic for the human
rights violations, including genocide, rape and torture.9 In their appellate briefs, both the plaintiffs and defendant alternately alleged that
Karadzic acted as a private individual and as President of Srpska, the
Bosnian Serb entity which declared its independence from BosniaHerzegovina.1 ° The Court of Appeals found that Srpska meets the
requirements of statehood under international law, in spite of a lack of
recognition from other states.11 However, the Court failed to consider
the implications of Srpska's statehood for the determination of
Srpska's obligations under international law, as well as any violations
of these obligations. Principles of state succession and customary international law can potentially create significant differences in the obligations which bind the United States and those which bind Srpska.

5. 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995).
6. As noted above, prior to the Filartiga decision, courts had sustained ATCA

jurisdiction in only two cases. Since Filartiga, a number of foreign tort claimants
have alleged ATCA jurisdiction in U.S. courts, particularly in claims of human rights
violations. One of the most notable of these is In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights
Litigation, 910 F.Supp 1460 (D. Haw. 1995).
7. See Anthony D'Amato, The Alien Tort Statute and the Founding of the Constitution, 82 AM. J. INTL L. 62 (1988); William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of
the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the "Originalists" 19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP.

L. REV. 221 (1996); and Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. INTL L. 461 (1989).
8. See John M. Rogers, The Alien Tort Statute and How Individuals 'Violate'
International Law 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 47 (1988).
9. 70 F.3d at 237
10. 70 F.3d at 239
11. 70 F.3d at 243. While recognition undeniably carries important political and

legal consequences, a lack of recognition does not defeat the unrecognized state's
existence or permit non-recognizing states to treat the entity as anything but a
state. JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (1979) 2324.
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These differences raise the important question of which standard appropriately determines the "violation of international law" required for
jurisdiction under the ATCA: the standard according to American obligations or Srpskan obligations. Applying the American standard may
hold Srpska to obligations set forth in treaties to which Srpska is not a
party. The effect of this would be to create new obligations instead of
enfocring pre-existing obligations.

II. BACKGROUND
A. The District Court's Dismissal
In Kadic v. Karadzic, the two groups of Bosnian plaintiffs appealed from dismissals in District Court.12 In District Court, Judge
Peter K Leisure dismissed both claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.13 In their complaints, the plaintiffs alleged genocide, rape,
forced prostitution and impregnation, torture, and other cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, assault and battery, sex and ethnic
inequality, summary execution, and wrongful death.14 Plaintiffs asserted subject-matter jurisdiction for these claims under the ATCA as
well as the Torture Victim Protection Act (the Torture Victim Act) and
28 U.S.C. § 1331.1' The Court had personal jurisdiction over Karadzic
through personal service while he was present in the Southern District
of New York. In each claim, Karadzic was served personally with a
summons and complaint while he was present in Manhattan on invitation from the United Nations. 6 In District Court, Karadzic moved for
dismissal on four grounds: (1) insufficient service of process, (2) lack of
personal jurisdiction, (3) lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and (4)
nonjusticiability of the plaintiffs' claims."
Without addressing the other issues raised, the District Court
Judge dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 8
Judge Leisure alluded to the question of justiciability, by noting that
the Executive Branch could recognize Karazdic as the head of state of
a friendly nation, thereby entitling Karazdic to head of state immunity
and transforming the plaintiffs' claims against Karazdic into a request
for an advisory opinion. 9 This potential, while not dispositive of the
jurisdictional issues, weighed against the exercise of jurisdiction by the
District Court in his opinion. 0

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

70 F.3d at 236.
Id.
70 F.3d at 237
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Noting this possible problem, Judge Leisure turned to the question of subject-matter jurisdiction. Asserting that non-state actors
could not violate international law, and that the Bosnian Serb entity,
"Srpska," was not a recognized state, Judge Leisure held that the
ATCA could not provide subject-matter jurisdiction because Karadzic,
as a private actor, could not violate international law.21 Similarly,
because Srpska was not a state, Karadzic could not have acted "under
the color of law" of a foreign nation as required by the Torture Victim
Act.22 Judge Leisure's view that no state action was involved, along
with a belief that express Congressional authorization was necessary
to create a cause of action, led the District Judge to reject the Section
1331 argument as well.2" The District Court's opinion did not address
the plaintiffs' alternative argument that Karazdic acted in concert with
Yugoslavia, a recognized state.
B. The Court of Appeals Reverses
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's
dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims and remanded the cases for proceedings on the merits of the case.2" In preparation for the appeal, the
parties had briefed the issues of subject-matter jurisdiction, the basis
of the dismissal, as well as personal jurisdiction and justiciability."5
Karadzic asked the Court of Appeals to affirm the District Court's
dismissal on any of these three grounds.28 While the District Court
had dismissed the complaints on subject-matter jurisdiction alone, the
Court of Appeals addressed each of these three issues.
1. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
The Court commenced its review by reconsidering the question of
subject-matter jurisdiction, which constituted the basis of the District
Court's dismissal. This review included an examination of three potential bases for subject-matter jurisdiction: the Torture Victim Act, Section 1331 and the ATCA. The Court of Appeals held that the Torture
Victim Act created a cause of action but could not alone confer subjectmatter jurisdiction.2 7 To assert this cause of action, the plaintiffs
must base subject-matter jurisdiction in the ATCA or Section 1331.
While the Court also addressed Section 1331 jurisdiction, it pointed
out that the issue of specific Congressional authorization of the
plaintiffs' cause of action was moot in this case because the causes of

21. Id.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

70
Id.
70
70
Id.
70
Id.

F.3d at 238.
F.3d at 251.
F.3d at 238.
F.3d at 246.
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action asserted by the plaintiffs were statutorily authorized by the
ATCA and the Torture Victim Act.29 The Court of Appeals chose to
rest subject-matter jurisdiction on the ATCA.' °
The ATCA endows the District Courts with original jurisdiction
over aliens' tort claims if the tort is also a violation of international
law or a treaty of the United States."' Because subject-matter jurisdiction under the ATCA depends upon a violation of international law,
the Court of Appeals noted that "this statute requires a more
searching review of the merits than is required under the more flexible
'arising under' standard of section 1331. " 32 Before conducting a
searching review of the merits of the plaintiffs' claims, the Court first
addressed the threshold issue of whether non-state actors can commit
violations of international law. The Court of Appeals rejected the District Court's view that only states could violate international law, stating that "certain forms of conduct violate the law of nations whether
undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or only as
private individuals." 3 In support of this position, the Court cited piracy as an early example of individual conduct that violated international law, and slave trading and war crimes as more contemporary examples." Moreover, the two pre-Filartiga ATCA cases in which jurisdiction was sustained, Adra v. Clift and Bolchos v. Darrell, dealt with
conduct by private individuals. 5
To bolster his claim that the District Court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction, Karadzic contended that because the Torture Victim Act
requires state action, this requirement also attaches to any claim under the ATCA.' 8 The Court rejected this argument as well. Relying on
the legislative history behind the Torture Victim Act, the Court stated
that Congress' enactment of the Torture Victim Act left the scope of
the ATCA undiminished. 7 Congress intended the Torture Victim Act
to codify the Filatrigadecision in light of attacks on it, primarily from
Judge Bork in his concurring opinion in the Tel-Oren case. 8 Recognizing that the scope of torts under international law extended beyond
torture and summary execution, Congress intentionally left the ATCA
intact to address those additional torts, as well as potential future
torts which may result from continually-evolving rules of customary

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
(1984).

Id.
Id.
28 U.S.C. §1350 (1988).
30 F.3d 232 at 238.
30 F.3d 232 at 239.
Id.
70 F.3d at 240.
70 F.3d at 241.
70 F.3d at 241.
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 760 F.2d 774, 233 U.S. App. D.C. 384
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international law."9
Having disposed of these objections by the defense and established
subject matter jurisdiction, the Court proceeded to conduct its searching review of the violations alleged by the plaintiffs. For purposes of
this review, the court grouped the plaintiffs' claims into three broad
categories: genocide, war crimes, and torture. Citing its previous decision in Amerada Hess, the Court noted the need to examine "evolving
standards of international law" to determine the scope of subject-matter jurisdiction under the ATCA. 4° Bearing in mind this consideration,
the Court continued by analyzing the substantive law prohibiting the
three categories of violations alleged by the plaintiffs.
Looking first to the allegations of genocide, the Court noted that
after the Second World War, the prohibition against genocide quickly
gained acceptance by states." As evidence of this prohibition, the
Court cited the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide42 and the Genocide Convention Implementation
Act of 1987." Both the Genocide Convention and the Genocide Convention Implementation Act prohibit genocide regardless of whether
the persons committing the genocidal acts are state officials or private
individuals." Because of this prohibition against genocide, the Court
of Appeals held that the District Court has subject matter jurisdiction
over the claims of genocide.45
Similarly, the laws of war, as codified after World War II in the
Geneva Conventions, prohibit violations by private individuals. 6
Common Article 3, which is contained in all four Geneva Conventions,
sets forth some of the key prohibitions of violence against non-combatants. These types of crimes are the ones which the plaintiffs claim that
Karadzic and his troops committed. Consequently, the Court of Appeals found that the District Court also has jurisdiction over the
plaintiffs' claims of war crimes.4 7
While acts of genocide and war crimes are prohibited regardless of
who commits them, prohibitions of torture apply only to those acting
"under color of law." 8 In support of the prohibition on official torture,

39. 70 F.3d at 241.
40. Id., citing Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d
421, 425 2d Cir. 1987). rev'd on other grounds, 488 U.S. 428, 109 S.Ct. 683, 102
L.Ed.2d 818 (1989).
41. Id.
42. 78 U.N.T.S. 277, entered into force Jan. 12, 1951, for the United States
February 23, 1989.
43. 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (1988).
44. 70 F.3d at 241.
45. 70 F.3d at 242.
46. 70 F.3d at 243.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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the Court cited the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 9 the Torture Victim
Act,5" and the Filartiga decision.51 The court noted, however, that
many of the acts of torture alleged by the plaintiffs could be subsumed
under the other categories of violations, genocide and war crimes, provided that the plaintiffs could prove that the acts were committed as
part of a genocidal campaign or in the course of an armed conflict. 2
For purposes of determining jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals found it
sufficient "to hold... that the alleged atrocities are actionable under
the Alien Tort Act, without regard to state action, to the extent that
they were committed in pursuit of genocide or war crimes, and otherwise may be pursued against Karadzic to the extent that he is shown
to be a state actor."53
Because Karadzic's status as a state actor would determine jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' torture claims, the Court of Appeals turned
its attention to the question of whether or not Srpska constitutes a
state under international law. The Court cited the Restatement's definition of a state as "an entity that has a defined territory and a permanent population, under the control of its own government, and that
engages in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal relations with
other such entities."5 This definition also reflects that found in the
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States.55 The Restatement definition does not require that a state receive diplomatic
recognition from other states.5 6 The Court observes that while recognized states "enjoy certain privileges and immunities relevant to judicial proceedings, but an unrecognized state is not a juridical nulli57

ty."

Applying the standard for statehood to Srpska, the Court noted
that "Srpska is alleged to control defined territory, control populations
within its power, and to have entered into agreements with other gov49. Dec. 10, 1984, U.N.G.A. Res. 39/46 Annex, 39 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 51)
197, reprinted in I.L.M. 1027 (1984).
50. Pub.L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note
(Supp. V 1993).
51. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).

52. 70 F.3d at 244
53. Id.
54. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS §201, cited with

approval in Id.

55. Article 1 of the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States provides that:
"The state as a person of internatiional law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d)

capacity to enter into relations with the other states."
Dec. 26, 1933, 49 State. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19.

56. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 202 cmt. b. See also Convention of the Rights and
Duties of States, art. 3, which states that the existence of a state is independent of
recognition by other states.

57. 70 F.3d at 244.
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ernments. It has a president, a legislature, and its own currency."58 In
the Court's view, these circumstances satisfied the requirements for
statehood. 9 The Court also noted that the standard for statehood
could be relaxed for purposes of fulfilling a "state action" requirement
for violations such as official torture. The relevant inquiry in such
cases is "whether a person purporting to wield official power has exceeded internationally recognized standards of civilized conduct, not
whether statehood in all its formal aspects exists."0 The "semblance
of official authority" can suffice for purposes of determining state action. Acting in concert with a recognized state, such as Yugoslavia, can
also satisfy the requirement that an individual act "color of law."6
2. Personal Jurisdiction
Having satisfied the subject matter jurisdictional issues, the Court
of Appeals turned its attention to the sufficiency of service of process
and personal jurisdiction. Both the plaintiffs and Karadzic acknowledge that process servers personally served Karadzic while he was
physically present in the Southern District of New York as an invitee
of the United Nations.62 Such personal service of process is authorized
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(e)(2), and complies with the requirements of the
Due Process clause.63
As a defense to this personal service, Karadzic claimed that he
was immune from service under the Agreement Between the United
Nations and the United States of America Regarding the Headquarters
of the United Nations ("Headquarters Agreement") and federal common law. Karadzic also asserted that the possibility of his recognition
as the head of state of a friendly country, which would entitly him to
immunity, should prohibit the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
him.
While the Headquarters Agreement does provide some immunity
from suit, this immunity is very narrowly defined. One constraint on
immunity is geographical. Within the well-defined U.N. headquarters
district, service of process requires the consent of the Secretary-General. 64 However, Karadzic was not within the headquarters district, as
defined by the Headquarters Agreement, when he was served in either
the Doe or Karadzic action. 6 A second limitation entitles representatives of U.N. member states to the same immunities as other diplo-

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

70 F.3d at 245.
Id.
Id.
Id.
70 F.3d at 246.
70 F.3d at 247.
Id.
Id.
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mats.6" This limitation does not apply to Karadzic either, because he
is not a designated representative of any member state.67 Karadzic
raised a third argument under the Headquarters Agreement. Based on
the prohibition on federal, state, and local U.S. authorities from impeding the transit of U.N. invitees to or from the headquarters district,8
Karadzic argued that allowing service of process on a U.N. invitee
constituted a burden of the type prohibited by the Headquarters
Agreement. 9 The Court rejected Karadzic's argument, stating that
acceptance of Karadzic's claim would create a new immunity not intended by the Headquarters Agreement.7 The language of the Headquarters Agreement does not support the extension of immunity
Karadzic sought, nor did it fall within the intention of the parties to
the Agreement.7
Aside from the arguments he raised under the Headquarters
Agreement, Karadzic claimed immunity from service under federal
common law. Drawing an analogy from the immunity that those on
government service in Washington, D.C., or those appearing for purposes of litigation enjoy, Karadzic contended that he should enjoy similar immunity by virtue of his status as a U.N. invitee.7 2 The Court rejected Karadzic's claim of immunity under federal common law, claiming that to do so would extend the immunities set forth in the Headquarters Agreement and create a new immunity not intended by the
United States or the United Nations.
Finally, Karadzic raised as a defense the possibility that in the
future, he may be recognized as a friendly head of state entitled to
immunity.7 ' While this argument held great weight with the District
Court, the Court of Appeals felt that to create such an immunity would
be inappropriate in light of the Executive Branch's failure to grant
Karadzic this recognition. 5
3. Justiciability
Karadzic challenged the appropriateness of the Court's exercising
its jurisdiction on the grounds of justiciability. 76 Specifically, Karadzic
raised challenges under the political question and act of state doctrines. Turning first to the political question issue, the court noted that

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

72. 70 F.3d at 248.

73. Id.
74. Id.

75. Id.
76. Id.
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the political question and the act of state doctrine both touch on the
issue of this case." While recognizing the potential of judicial action
to impact foreign policy, the Court rejected an absolute position that
every case "touching foreign relations" could not be adjudicated."8
Rather, the Court advocated examining each case individually, taking
into consideration judicial authority to act under §1350 and balancing
against that the political branches' primacy in setting foreign policy. 9
Karadzic alleged that the present question represents a
nonjusticiable political question, but the Court disagreed.'0 Citing the
Supreme Court's decision in Baker v. Carr,8 the Court of Appeals listed six factors which could render an issue nonjusticiable:
(1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue
to a coordinate political department; or (2) a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or (3) the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or (4) the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack
of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or (5) an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or (6) the potentiality of embarassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question."s
While one or more of these factors could compromise the justiciability
of an issue, the Court found none of these factors present in Kadic v.
Karadzic. With regard to the first three Baker factors, the Court noted
that the adjudication of tort claims was constitutionally assigned to
the Judiciary, making a conflict in that respect impossible.' Moreover, "universally recognized norms of international law" could provide
discoverable and manageable standards for adjudicating ATCA cases."' As for the last three Baker factors, the Court stated that these
applied only to cases where "judicial resolution of a question would
contradict prior decisions taken by a political branch in those limited
contexts where such contradiction would seriously interfere with important governmental interests." 5
Karadzic also challenged the justiciability of this case because of
the act of state doctrine. The Court acknowledged that the act of state
doctrine, which restricts American courts' ability to judge the acts of a

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

70 F.3d at 249.
Id.
Id.
Id.
369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962).
70 F.3d at 249, citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 710.
70 F.3d at 249.
Id.
70 F.3d at 249.
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foreign government within its own territory, can apply to some cases
that arise under §1350.86 While the act of state doctrine does limit
courts' capacity to exercise jurisdiction in some cases, it does not apply
to acts which are "taken in violation of a nation's fundamental law and
wholly unratified by that nation's government."87
After rejecting both the political question and the act of state
doctrine as barriers to the justiciability of Kadic v. Karadzic, the Court
derived comfort from reassurances the plaintiffs had received from the
Department of State after the commencement of their action.88 In response to the plaintiffs' inquiry, the State Department replied that
"Karadzic was not immune from suit as an invitee of the United Nations."89 The Court also sought and received reassurances from the
Attorney General.9" The Solicitor General and the Legal Adviser to
the State Department expressly denied the existence of a "political
question" in the present case.9 This denial by the Executive Branch
fortified the Court of Appeals' view "that adjudication may properly
proceed."92
III. SRPSKA'S OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
The Court's resolution of the jurisdictional issues does not resolve
all of the troublesome legal questions in this case. Specifically, the
Court failed to address the question of which standard of legal obligation should determine if Karadzic's conduct violated international law.
The Court of Appeals cited numerous multilateral treaties but failed to
address the issue of whether or not these treaties are binding upon
Srpska. Srpska's status as a new state highlights the complexity of
this issue, as its treaty obligations are uncertain. By imposing an improper standard, the Court of Appeals may have overstepped its authority by creating new obligations, rather than enforcing existing
ones.
A vital element of state sovereignty is the state's independence
from obligations that do not arise from the consent of the sovereign.
Clearly, this implies that each state's obligations under international
law will differ depending on which obligations the sovereign has chosen to accept. The differences in states' obligations mean that an inquiry as to whether or not a tort "in violation of the law of nations" has
taken place, as required by the ATCA, will yield varying results depending on which state's obligations are considered.
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In the past, plaintiffs have raised ATCA claims against established states with determined obligations under international law.
Kadic v. Karadzic brings the issue of legal obligations to the forefront
because Srpska, which the Court of Appeals found to exist as an unrecognized state, is a new state with uncertain obligations under international law. The doctrines of state succession and customary international law raise questions about the nature and extent of Srpska's
obligations under international law. By applying American obligations
under international law, the District Court on remand could potentially impose obligations on Srpska which it would not otherwise have,
merely by virtue of its head of state's physical presence in Manhattan.
A. State Succession
The law of state succession determines which "capacities, rights,
and duties of the predecessor state

. . .

are assumed by the successor

state" upon its creation.9" This body of law includes the rules that
apply to treaty obligations of new states. Unfortunately, the rules on
state succession and treaty obligations do not constitute a unified body
of rules. Authorities are divided between the "universal succession"
view, that the treaty obligations of the predecessor state continue once
the new state becomes independent, and the "clean slate" view, that
successor states can choose which of the predecessor state's obligations
continue.
The Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of
Treaties" supports the former view. However, this treaty lacks sufficient ratifications and has not yet entered into force. The Vienna Convention reflects the view of "universal succession," which holds that a
successor state inherits its territory from the predecessor, along with
the predecessor's personality and legal relationships.95 Due to widespread contrary state practice, the "universal succession" view has
been replaced by the "clean slate" view of state succession, as reflected
in the Restatement. According to the "clean slate" rule, the successor
state "siezes what it can and repudiates what it will."96
The Restatement of the Law of Foreign Relations, in contrast to
the Vienna Convention, supports the "clean state" rule, which allows
the successor state to select which of the predecessor's treaty obligations it wishes to assume. The Restatement provides that
[w]hen part of a state becomes a new state, the new state does not
succeed to the international agreements to which the predecessor
state was a party, unless, expressly or by implication, it accepts

93. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) §208.
94. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 80/31, 72 AM. J. INTL L. 971 (1978).
95. D.P. O'CONNELL, THE LAW OF STATE SuccEssioN (1956) 6-7.

96. Id. at 8.
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such agreements and the other party or parties thereto agree or
acquiesce.'

Boundary and territorial agreements constitute the only exception to
this rule under the Restatement.98
Depending on which of these two rules is applied, Srpska may or
may not be bound automatically by Bosnia-Herzegovina's treaty obligations. Assuming that the application of the Restatement's "clean
slate" rule would be appropriate in an American District Court, then
the extent of Srpska's treaty obligations depends upon which of
Bosnia-Herzegovina's treaty obligations Srpska has chosen to accept.
The issue becomes one of determining factually which treaty obligations Srpska has accepted, either implicitly or explicitly, and which
acceptances have been approved by the other parties to these agreements.
The Court of Appeals cited several treaties in its review of the
international legal prohibitions against genocide, war crimes and torture. However, it failed to address the question of whether or not these
treaties bind Srpska. This issue must be addressed on remand by the
District Court. While these treaties cited by the Court of Appeals undoubtedly prohibit the torts alleged by the plaintiffs, if Srpska is not
bound by these treaties, then the Court of Appeals may have imposed
an obligation on a state, albeit an unrecognized one, to which that
state did not consent.
B. Customary InternationalLaw
As an alternative to their treaty-based claims, the plaintiffs could
raise their tort claims as violations of customary international law.
Internationally recognized custom can constitute a source of law, as
recognized in the Statute of the International Court of Justice.99 The
Restatement defines customary international law as "a general and
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation."1" As this definition indicates, to become a rule of international law, a custom must be followed consistently by states, but
must also be supported by opinio juris, the view that the practice is
obligatory.
Consistent with the consensual nature of international law and its
limitation of obligations to those accepted by the sovereign, a state
which consistently objects to and fails to follow a custom from the

97. RESTATEMENT §210 (3).
98. RESTATEMENT §210 (4).

99. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1)(b), 59
Stat. 1031, U.N.T.S. 933.
100. RESTATEMENT (THiRD) §102(2).
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beginning is not bound by it, even if the custom should evolve into
customary international law.1"' The application of this exception to
Srpska would be dubious, because "when a new state comes into being
and is admitted into the community of nations, it is bound by all rules
of international law originating in custom."1" Karadzic could argue,
as a defense, that because Srpska has not been recognized by other
states and thereby "admitted to the community of nations," he should
not be held accountable for violating the rules generated by this community.
To the degree that human rights norms have evolved into rules of
customary international law, Srpska would still be bound by the norms
even though it may not be a party to the corresponding treaty. In this
case, plaintiffs would have a strong argument that genocide, war
crimes and official torture violate customary international law."°u
While Srpska is bound by norms of international law, the source of the
obligation differs if it is not a party to the treaties cited by the Court
of Appeals. To the extent that the treaties reflect rules of customary
international law, the distinction makes no difference. If these treaties,
or treaties cited in a future case, do not reflect customary international
law, then the effect of a court's citing them creates, rather than enforces, an obligation under international law.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The ATCA provides a mechanism for U.S. Federal Courts to enforce foreign states' obligations under international law which may
otherwise remain unenforced. Kadic v.Karadzic highlights the degree
to which Courts must take care to apply international law appropriately. Because the effect of state succession on treaty obligations remains unclear, due to the existence of multiple and conflicting
standards, Srpska's treaty obligations are subject to argument.
Applying the Restatement's "clean slate" view, the District Court
must examine whether or not Srpska has become a party to any of
Bosnia-Herzegovina's treaty obligations (which would derive, in turn,
from Yugoslavia's obligations) through Srpska's acceptance and the
accession by the other parties. If Srpska has not accepted the treaty
obligations cited by the Court as evidence of international law, the

101. While states are bound to follow rules of customary international law, they
are not bound to consent to the formation of a new rule. Should that rule eventually
attain status as customary international law, the "persistent objector" will not be
bound by it. Karol Wolfke, Custom in Present International Law (2d rev. ed. 1993)
66-67. For an application of this rule, see the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases
(Denmark v. FRG; the Netherlands v. FRG) 1969 I.C.J. 3.
102. GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 22.
103. See THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS As CusTOMARY LAW (1989).
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Court must further inquire as to whether or not the treaty rules represent customary international law.
If the Court has cited treaties to which Srpska is not a party, and
which does not represent customary international law, then it has
applied international law inappropriately. In the present case, this
issue is largely moot because prohibitions against genocide, war crimes
and official torture are widely regarded as rules of customary international law. Even if Srpska has not become a party to the Geneva Conventions, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, or the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, plaintiffs have a
strong argument that the standards still apply to Srpska and to
Karadzic by virtue of their status as customary international law.
In future cases, the norms embodied by the treaty in question
may not enjoy the status of customary international law. In such an
instance, the Court would be going beyond enforcing international law
by creating an obligation on a state to which the state had not given
its consent. By inappropriately applying treaties to which the
defendant's state may not be a party, or rules of customary international law by which the state is not bound, the Court would be creating new rights which the plaintiff would not have in the courts of his
or her own country. To do so would go beyond an appropriate use of
the ATCA to enforce international legal obligations and become an
abuse of the courts' authority.

The United States' Haiti Intervention:
The Dangers of "Redefined" National
Security Interests
W.Q. BEARDSLEE
I. INTRODUCTION

As the current Administration plans to use United States troops

to provide humanitarian relief in central Africa,' the subject of military intervention will once again become the focus of much debate.
Other interventions, such as Bosnia, Somalia, Panama, Haiti and the
Persian Gulf created controversy in their times. The United States

(U.S.) justified its placement of forces in these regions by claiming
national security interests were at stake. The interests jeopardized by
the events in these regions include a number of subjects not traditionally considered to be within the realm of national security interests.
Because of the recent developments in Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi and the potential for similar crises elsewhere, this "redefinition" of
national security interests should be examined. One effective approach
is to analyze this redefinition in the context of an intervention which
has already occurred. This essay is an attempt to clarify the redefinition of national security interests and then examine this redefinition in
light of the U.S. military intervention in Haiti. This article will examine the redefinition of national security interest, determine that the
U.S. had none in Haiti at the time of the intervention and state an
alternative which would have given more legal justification for the
actions of the U.S. in Haiti.
II. THE FUNDAMENTAL REDEFINITION OF "NATIONAL SECURITY
INTEREST"

A. The traditionaldefinition of national security interest
While universal acceptance of the definition of many terms with
immense geopolitical ramifications is often difficult, the actions of the
United States over recent years have altered almost any traditional
definition of a national security interest. Since World War II, the executive leadership of the U.S. has used the issue of national security to
act in many situations.

1. Charles Aldinger, U.S. Might Modify Troop Plan for Zaire, THE DENVER
POST, Nov. 17, 1996, at 3A.
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In the late 1940's, the U.S. executive leadership developed the
theme of "containment" to counteract any imagined or real threat of
communist expansion. This policy continued under subsequent presidential administrations until the collapse of the Soviet Union in the
early 1990's. While different terms such as "massive retaliation," "flexible response," "detente," and "conventional build up" were used to
describe each leader's policy, the overall theme was "to conduct a long
term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive
tendencies until either the break up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet
power."2
One could argue that the executive leadership potentially defines
its national security interests through the organization of its departments. In line with this view, a description of the Office of the Secretary of Defense provides insights. "Overall international security policy
and political-military affairs" for the Department of Defense therefore
include the operation of NATO, foreign military sales, arms limitation
agreements, international trade and technology, regional security affairs and special operations in relation to low intensity conflicts.'
B. The "redefinition"of national security interests
The current administration's publication describing its stance on
matters of national security includes a number of nontraditional subjects.' While the publication mentions traditional subjects such as the
protection of U.S. citizens abroad, the ability to respond to major regional situations, counter-terrorism and the control of weapons of mass
destruction,5 the document displays a new focus for the U.S. by including drug trafficking, noncombatant evacuation operations, disaster
relief, space, peace operations and environmental areas as being of
U.S. concern.' On an entirely new note, the economic vitality of the
U.S. is also addressed as a component of this national security strategy.' Finally, the White House identifies the protection of human rights
as a key factor in the promotion of democracy. The Administration
expected to target states with "large economies, critical locations, nuclear weapons or the potential to generate refugee flows into our nation"8 as primary national security concerns.
These new security concerns, exemplified by international crime,

2. George F. Kennan, writing as "X" in The Sources of Soviet Conduct, 25 FOREIGN AFF. 566 (July 1947).
3. 1995/96 U.S. GOV'T MANUAL 179.
4. WILLIAM J. CLINTON, A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF ENGAGEMENT AND
ENLARGEMENT (Washington D.C.: The White House, July 1994).
5. Id. at 11.
6. Id. at 9.
7. Id. at 15.
8. Id. at 18.
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narcotics traffic and illegal refugee flow, have been termed "transnational concerns" by some authors.9 While these concerns do not directly affect the security of a state, they can profoundly affect the lifestyle
of U.S. citizens."
(1) Recent debate has focused upon the question of whether the promotion of democracy in other states is a national security interest.
This debate is relevant to the Haiti intervention, as the restoration of
the democratically elected leader of that state was a clearly publicized
goal of the intervention
A number of arguments support the categorization of democracy
promotion as a national security interest. One is that no two democracies have ever had a war between themselves.12 The victory in the
Cold War may also be seen as the direct result of the strength and recognition democratic governments held around the world at the time."3
Furthermore, promoting democracy in the Western Hemisphere forecloses outside powers from gaining influence over a strategically positioned neighboring state.1 ' This expansion of democratic government
to nearby states also helps "create better relations with our neighbors
to the south and provides an improved framework for hemispheric
understanding," including hemispheric prosperity. 5
In sum, many scholars argue and conclude that there is a right to
assist democratic restoration and that it is only the core of a much
broader right of humanitarian assistance."8 The Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS) declares that representative democracy is essential for the peace and development of the region." The
support of democracy has become associated with the maintenance of
peace and security.18 Some equate the deposition of the democratically
elected government by an internal force equal to that of another state
infringing upon the democratic state's sovereignty. 9
It can also be argued that the toppling of a democracy can have

9. Hans Binnendijk and Patrick Clawson, New Strategic Priorities, WASH. Q.,
Vol. 18, No. 2 at 109, April 1995.
10. Id. at 123.
11. U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3413th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (1994).
12. RUDOLPH J. RUMMEL, DEATH BY GOVERNMENT 2 (1994).
13. Tony Smith, In Defense of Intervention, FOREIGN AFF., Vol. 73, No. 6,
Nov./Dec. 1994, at 45.
14. Id. at 37.
15. Id. at 38.

16. Lois E. Fielding, Taking the Next Step in the Development of New Human
Rights: The Emerging Right of Humanitarian Assistance to Restore Democracy, 5
DUKE J. COMP. & INTL L. 329, 330 (1995).
17. Id. at 332.

18. Nancy D. Arnison, InternationalLaw and Non-Intervention; When Do Humanitarian Concerns Supersede Sovereignty?, 17 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 199 (1993).
19. Id.
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serious external effects. As one author notes, "the message to potential
usurpers of power would be that fragile democracies are up for
grabs."2" The Haiti intervention can be seen as a warning to other
usurpers that they will be resisted and therefore provides a deterrent
effect, according to this argument
These arguments do not address a key issue. Regardless of whether there is a right to intervene for the promotion of democracy or human rights, is it within a state's interest to do so? In the Machiavellian universe of international relations, unless national security interests are at stake, states realistically have little incentive to put their
military at risk. While some may urge that a violation of fundamental
human rights creates a duty for the international community to interfere,21 such a controversial statement should not serve as the basis for
a full-scale military operation and intervention.
Another issue central to the Haiti intervention centers on the
(2)
subject of immigration. If large numbers of refugees fleeing a state
appear on the shores of the U.S., the U.S. would have a national security interest defined in broad terms and a right to intervene in the
refugee-sponsoring state as a method of exercising its sovereignty or
controlling its own borders.22
One situation where the internal violation of human rights led to
external effects was in Iraq with its Kurdish population. The exodus of
refugees from Iraq to neighboring states clearly created a threat to
international peace. This, in turn, led to the UN Security Council's
actions in that region. 21 It is crucial to note that the refugees fleeing
Iraq in that situation were seeking to avoid the systematic destruction
of their people. While there were human rights violations in Haiti, the
refugees fleeing to neighboring states sought economic betterment, not
the avoidance of genocide. As a result, it is difficult to compare the two
situations effectively and immigration as a national security interest is
difficult to find in the Haiti intervention.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE HAITIAN PROBLEM AS COMPARED
TO THE NEW DEFINITION

Many arguments can be made to support the right to assist the
restoration of a democracy when it is a violently overthrown or ob-

20. Fielding, supra note 16, at 364.
21. A. CARRILLO SALCEDO, SUMMING UP IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROLE OF

THE SECURITY COUNCIL; PEACE KEEPING AND PEACE BUILDING 327 (Rene-Jean Dupuy

ed., 1993).
22. Smith, supra note 13, at 43.
23. Jon E. Fink, From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: The Blurring of the
Mandate for the Use of Force in Maintaining InternationalLaw and Security, 19 MD.
J. INT'L L. & TRADE 1 (1995).
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structed as a legitimate democratic government.2 4 The violence in
Haiti leading to the downfall of the democratically elected government
could be formulated as a potential threat to the international peace,
allowing the UN Security Council to adopt enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, as it later did. Some experts now
argue that a new right supporting the unilateral intervention of one
state into another for the purposes of humanitarian intervention actually exists.25
A procedural question remains, regardless of whether or not the
U.S. will recognize the immigration and democratization aspects of the
Haiti situation as national security interests. Without a treaty obliging
the U.S. to intervene in Haiti in certain circumstances, the basis of a
right to intervene remains unclear. Some argue that the UN Charter
obligates the U.S. to take the actions it did in Haiti. This argument
fails because it would then logically follow that every state in existence
is therefore obligated to intervene in such situations.
Another problem with the U.S. intervention in Haiti lies in establishing a suitable standard for intervention. It was obvious the Cedras'
regime was a non-democratic military junta. However, in the future,
the characterization of a regime as non-democratic may be more difficult to evaluate. It would be easy to imagine a situation where the
democratic character of a government was ambiguous and unclear. The
lack of a clear standard creates difficulties, as then all states will be
subject to judgment from the UN or other states as to whether their
government is truly democratic for UN standards.
The democratic government overthrown in Haiti existed for less
than a year. Prior to Aristide's election, the Duvalier dictatorships had
served U.S. interests for two generations. The policy motivations for a
shift from support for dictatorships to an invasion to protect a democracy remains unclear. It is important to note that no Cold War type of
security interest was at stake in Haiti at the time of the intervention.
Perhaps the intervention was the result of the lack of a Soviet threat.
The U.S. is now able to act by methods and in areas it was unable to
before, due to the potential reactions from the Soviets. Regardless,
absent the threat of Soviet expansionism, the U.S. could not continue
to operate under its Cold War rationale. How then can the U.S. consider a non-democratic Haiti a threat to national security interests when
it tolerated and even supported Haitian dictatorships for decades?
This reason alone refutes any reasonable assertion that the U.S.
had national security interests, redefined or traditional, at stake when
it militarily intervened in Haiti. On a larger scale, the actions of the
U.S. then suggest that every non-democratic state should fear military

24. Fielding, supra note 16, at 331.
25. Id.
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intervention in the U.S.'s continuing promotion of democracy in other
sovereign states.
Many alternatives existed to the immigration problem. It had
been controlled and could foreseeably be controlled in the future by
using the U.S. Coast Guard or other armed forces to deter refugees.
One could also argue that the U.S. could easily absorb the refugees.
The current Administration exacerbated this problem itself by continuing to impose the economic sanctions." These sanctions affected the
already poverty-stricken state by creating massive shortages of food
and fuel and spurring refugee immigration to the nearest states. While
the dictators' actions against their people undoubtedly impacted refugee flows,27 the immigration problem was further exacerbated by the
Administration when it repealed the previous policy of returning refugees to Haiti and instead allowed for "on-ship asylum." The result
was a exponential increase in the number of refugees seeking asylum
and immigration to the U.S.
The OAS served an important role in the restoration of democracy
in Haiti. The OAS resolutions denouncing the violations of human
rights in Haiti called for intervention and the restoration of the government. It is important to note, however, that the U.S. is not a party
to the OAS Human Rights treaty.28 Accordingly the U.S. had no duty
nor the legal obligation to follow the course of action that the OAS
advocated for the protection of human rights.
Some argue that the approval of the UN Security Council condones the actions of the U.S. in Haiti. Officially, the operation was
controlled by the UN. This still does not relieve the U.S. of responsibility for its actions. The UN Security Council standards for such interventions are ambiguous, unclear and the subject of much criticism.2 9
The fact that the U.S. financed and executed the operation makes the
UN Security Council actions nothing more than a formality the U.S.
followed to promote its own interests. As a result of these analyses,
one can conclude that no national security interests existed in Haiti.
However, if the intervention was to occur regardless of this lack of
national security interests, then the issue becomes how the U.S. and
UN could have justified their actions.

26. Steven Greenhouse, Lawmakers oppose an Invasion of Haiti Now, THE NEW
YORK TIMES, July 10, 1994, at Sec. 1, p.3, Col. 1.
27. Smith, supra note 13, at 42.
28. O.A.S. HUMAN RIGHTS CHARTER, 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970).
29. See Fink, supra note 23.

1996

HAITI INTERVENTION
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE

Article 51 of the UN Charter allows for UN members to defend
themselves individually or collectively if an armed attack occurs
against a member."0 In the Haiti situation, the UN Security Council
acted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,31 which includes Article
51. However, the UN Security Council did not specify under which
Article it was authorizing the military intervention. It would be more
justifiable from a legal standpoint had the U.S. and the UN Security
Council acted specifically under Article 51, allowing for collective self
defense. Article 51 does not specify whether the armed attack required
for such self-defense must be internal or external in nature, nor even
from a different state.
One could argue that the implicit meaning of the Article requires
external actors, as the U.N Charter renounces intervention in domestic
matters." Regardless, the UN Security Council would have at minimum had a sound legal argument supporting the Haiti intervention
under Article 51. The language of "armed attack" was left obscure by
choice. 3 This was arguably done to allow states to act in self-defense
in a number of situations. In Nicaragua v. U.S., the court held that
indirect aggression could rise to the level of "armed attack."' In fact
there is little agreement on the definition of this phrase and many authors define it as one that can fall short of an invasion by government
troops.3 " If this phrase was meant to encompass only an attack by an
external state with armed troops, then the drafters would have clearly
stated this. Such a distinction is a vitally important one, and the
drafters' choice of language for this section leads one to conclude that
"armed attack" is meant to include situations such as Haiti, where a
military junta takes control of the government by force.
That such actions are allowed by Article 51 cannot be disputed.
This section of the UN Charter was added to ensure that regional or
collective security organizations could use force until the UN Security
Council took measures to restore international peace and security.3"
Therefore, Article 51 of the UN Charter would allow the U.S. to intervene in Haiti as a response to the "armed attack" upon a member of
the regional, collective security group of the Organization for American
States.

30. U.N. CHARTER art.51.

31. U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3413th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (1994).
32. U.N. CHARTER art.2, 17.

33. Brian K. McCalmon,

Note, States, Refugees and Self-Defense, 10 GEO.

IMMIGR. L.J. 215, 225 (1996).

34. Nicaragua v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J.at 103-104, 195.
35. McCalmon, supra note 33, at 227.
36. Malvina Halberstam, The Right to Self-Defense Once the Security Council
Takes Action, 17 MICH. J. INTL L. 229, 242 (1996).

37. Charter of the Organization of American States, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 119 U.N.T.S.
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The U.S. therefore could have exercised its policy without the
initial involvement of the UN. Collective self-defense allows states
which have a mutual assistance agreement to come to one another's
defense. 8 It also requires the UN members who exercise the right of
self-defense to report the action to the UN Security Council after the
defensive measures have been taken.39 The U.S. could have then intervened under the OAS as a mutual assistance agreement and then
reported these actions to the UN Security Council. While this essay
finds no national security interests present which would justify the
U.S. intervention in Haiti, it was possible for the U.S. to do so without
having to use the UN Security Council initially. The use of Article 51
would be a stronger legal justification for the intervention in Haiti
than the ambiguous and unclear reasoning the UN Security Council
relied upon. This ambiguity supports the contention that the UN Security Council was used merely as a "stamp of approval" for the exercise
of U.S. policy.
It is also interesting to consider that some commentators have
determined a state's negligent creation of refugee flows to another
state constitutes an armed attack under Article 51. This argument
would also support the U.S. intervention with a different but perhaps
stronger justification than that actually relied upon.'0
V.

CONCLUSION

This essay found no redefined national security interests present
in Haiti at the time of the intervention. While immigration may have
been a concern, it was not taking place on a scale that could not be
controlled by the U.S. and reached a crisis as a national security interest. The immigration problem was also the result of U.S. and UN actions in that area. The promotion of human rights and democratization
remain controversial as national security interests. This article found
that these cannot be realistically or logically included as national security interests. This article also found flaws in the legal justification
both the UN Security Council and the U.S. used to support their actions.
Perhaps these defects in policy and reasoning explain why Haiti's
military junta stepped aside only when they learned U.S. planes were
in the air. 1 This late acquiescence to the UN and U.S. can perhaps be
explained by the fact that the junta did not understand that human

3, as amended February 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607.
38. LELAND M. GOODRICH & EDVARD HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 301 (1949).
39. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
40. See McCalmon, supra note 33.
41. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, U.S. INTERVENTION IN THE POST COLD-WAR ERA, DEPT.
OF STATE DISPATCH, Vol. 7, No. 30, July 22, 1996.
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rights, immigration and the promotion of democracy might constitute
national security interests to the U.S. Many conflicts occur when states
misunderstand the security interests of other states. This confusion
over the redefinition of national security interests could likely lead to
violence and the Haitian intervention could be seen as a dangerous
precedent. While violence against U.S. troops was avoided in the intervention, the next situation may not be so peaceful. Unless the U.S.
clearly states its "redefined" national security interests, it risks the
potential for conflict and violence in its future. If such redefined interests do cause conflict in the future similar to the Haiti situation, the
U.S. and UN should better justify its actions under Article 51 of the
UN Charter.
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Justifying Ethics: Human Rights & Human Nature is a thoughtful, well written and ultimately frustrating attempt to rationalize some
of the struggles confronting those attempting to incorporate human
rights into domestic and international legal structures. In its strongest sections (and there are many of them) Gorecki directly addresses
such difficult issues as the search for objective justification of moral
utterances. If such justification could be found, incorporation of human rights would be far less problematic than it currently proves to
be. Unfortunately for both human rights proponents and readers of
this book, the solution is not that simple. Concluding that objective
justification is not possible and is indeed an impediment to the struggle for incorporation, Gorecki attempts to rationalize an approach for
incorporating some human rights in some situations. His suggested
approach begs fundamental questions and is far less successful than
his earlier insightful analysis and articulation of how to think about
human rights generally.
Any author attempting to address the idea of human rights must
define the term. For Gorecki, "human rights" are at heart, moral
rights, but only in a limited sense of morality as a system of rights and
duties. These moral rights may become legal rights, but only when
some positive law implements them.
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As moral rights, human rights are acquired through a process of
contagious social learning and are therefore dependant on the society
in which they are generated. Every society is a large, ongoing referendum of evaluations of moral rights; any particular rights acceptance
depends on a complex set of social and ecological concerns; concerns
which will differ both from place to place and from time to time. By
adopting this definition of human rights, Gorecki takes the position
that all human rights are neither universal nor constant, but are subject to important and "dangerous" historical limitations. In addition,
he acknowledges that human rights under this approach are subjective, based on personal pronouncements of right and wrong.
Gorecki is clearly not happy with this result. If any human rights
are to gain acceptance as universal, they cannot be perceived as
changeable. Instead, some external, objective source of justification is
necessary to validate them. Does any source of objective justification
of human rights (morality) exist? To test this, Gorecki identifies potential sources of justification, including human nature, divine will,
reason and cognitivism. For each of these sources, he considers
whether its claim to justify human rights can be rebutted by defect of
logic, lack of persuasive force, or evidence that the event claimed to
create the norm has not occurred.
It should come as no surprise that Gorecki concludes that none of
the suggested sources objectively justify human rights, but his analysis
of the issue is the heart of the book and a valuable contribution to the
dialogue. For example, in his analysis of human nature as a potential
source, Gorecki identifies two possible elements that could provide
objective justification. First, there exists an identifiable category of
universal human needs and wants, constituted of the biological basics
of existence; food, water, air, etc. If the recognition of this category as
universal leads to a universal "rule of recognition" i.e., because these
needs are universal we should give them to everyone (or at least not
deprive anyone of them) the human right to these basics would be
objectively justified. However, for Gorecki, such recognition does not
occur and the minor premise of everyone having universal biological
needs does not carry the persuasive force necessary to become a universal human right. Societies can and do deprive individuals of even
these basic needs. Thus, human nature will permit actions even in
contradiction to a universal human need and therefore cannot serve as
an objective verification of human rights.
In a similar fashion, Gorecki discounts the existence of any universally accepted moral norms which could serve as justification. For
example, although most would concur that "no killing" is a "widely
accepted norm, society sanctions killing in many contexts. Thus, the
norm itself cannot be deemed universal and human nature cannot
provide a source of universal ethical inclinations.
These examples grossly oversimplify the author's careful consider-
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ation of each potential source of objective justification. His analysis is
cogent and exhaustive; drawing heavily on philosophy, religion and
history, Gorecki presents a convincing argument that objective justification of human rights is not possible.
This poses a serious problem for human rights proponents. Justification aids recognition and implementation of rights. Human rights
face particular problems in these areas given that conflicting ethnic,
economic and political interests lead to dramatically different articulations of rights, and a general vagueness of sources and weakness in
the enforcement of rights prevents even broadly acknowledged rights
from having much force. Therefore, the need for justification of rights
is great, and yet, we have now been told, impossible. This then is the
core of the problem; rights which the author would like to see recognized and implemented cannot be justified and will depend on the level
of development in any society. How then can broader recognition of
all rights be encouraged? Unfortunately, in his attempt to address this
problem, Gorecki's rigorous analysis fails. The remainder of his argument posits facile solutions to intractable problems.
Essentially, Gorecki falls back on the inherent goodness of humans. Humans are polymorphic. Certain individuals who are exceptional will always exist in every society. Quoting Stanislaw Ossowski,
Gorecki states that if these individuals push a human rights agenda
"we may expect that the attitudes, today somewhat exceptional, could,
in different circumstances, spread to a degree determining the new
shape of the whole of social life." Humans are capable of holding conflicting views and are capable of changing their positions on ethical
issues. This plasticity provides hope. "[Olne should fight for what
ought to be done without speculating" about nature, reason, divine
orders, etc.
In the face of a potentially insurmountable obstacle to the implementation of human rights, Gorecki now has a way forward. It is possible to acknowledge the impossibility of locating an objective source of
justification of ethics or rights while still arguing that efforts towards
recognition and implementation should continue.
The issue then arises of what rights should be fought for? If no
rights are objectively justified, how do we select among the many put
forward for recognition? Are any more "worthy" than others? What
rights should be the focus of a struggle to turn the moral idea of some
to the moral idea of many, and thus, eventually (in theory) into the
moral idea of the entire species? This struggle must include two components; that of spreading the norm itself through "moral contagion"
and fighting for the implementation of the norm by states. Clearly,
these efforts will require tremendous energy and dedication from activists and others interested in enhancing human rights protections. If
success is to be had for any rights, the field of potentially enforceable
rights needs to be narrowed from the entire spectrum currently avail-
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able to a more workable field.
In order to restrict the field, Gorecki immediately dismisses third
generation rights, which include such things as the right to development. In a somewhat disingenuous argument, he states that while
such claims may "constitute a well-founded moral right" they are, as
human rights, "such an ambiguous, self-contradictory dangerous and
unhelpful novelty, that it would be difficult to opt for their inclusion
into the human rights catalog." The problem of course lies in that
Gorecki himself has defined human rights as moral rights; once recognizing the inherent morality of third generation rights, they are every
bit as eligible for inclusion as any others.
However, limiting human rights to first generation political rights
and second generation social and economic rights, Gorecki then attempts to limit the field further. Recognizing that societies prioritize
rights differently depending on their level of development, he separates
human rights into two categories. The first category includes those
rights that are universally feasible for all societies, regardless of their
level of development. In this grouping he includes the universal prohibitions on genocide, torture, racial discrimination and slave trade. For
Gorecki, these rights, and only these rights, are "actually" universally
human.
The second category includes rights that are only potentially universally human. These are rights which depend on the level of development of the implementing society. Included in this category as such
rights as the right to democracy, unemployment protections, rest and
leisure etc. This admission puts Gorecki clearly back in the camp of
those who deny the universality of rights; if a society has the ability to
claim that its level of development prohibits it from recognizing those
rights which are only potentially universally human, those rights are
not universally human.

.

.

yet.

For Gorecki, this is not an untenable position. Potentially universal human rights will become actual universal human rights through
the same process of contagion that raises the norm to the realm of a
right in the first instance. When enough societies reach a sufficient
level of development and enough states incorporate recognition of human rights into their legal regimes, all those rights which are now
only potentialities will be realities.
Gorecki's ultimate conclusion then seems to be that rights will be
recognized and implemented because it is the right thing to do. We
will have to be ever vigilant to ensure that the contagion process produces acceptable results, but the framework for widespread acceptance
of human rights exists even if there is no readily identifiable external
justification of our ethical positions.
This optimistic view is sure to please many human rights proponents. However, it begs several important questions. By recognizing
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that the implementation of rights will depend on the level of development in the society, a system is created which says some humans have
right A while others do not. Are those who live in less developed countries thereby less human than others because they are not permitted to
assert the same "human" rights? Gorecki recognizes this dilemma, but
attempts to resolve it by separating rights into actual and potential
rights is not satisfying. Either the right exists or it does not. Perhaps
the "actual" human rights defined by Gorecki are more properly understood to be duties of the State. Taking them out of the rights definition clarifies that human rights must exist in all humans no matter
their situation on the planet. Perhaps all rights are only potentially
realizable. This would not preclude societies from recognizing them
but it would eliminate the need to argue that some have rights while
others not based on no more cogent distinction than geography.
Another significant problem lies in Gorecki's reliance on contagion. He assumes that as proponents fight for broader acceptance of
rights considered potentially human, these ideas will spread worldwide. However, he also acknowledges that many societies do not have
the necessary preconditions to incorporate these rights. How then will
contagion occur when the society by his argument cannot accept such
ideas. Further, his agenda for the implementation of human rights is
premised on the belief that "exceptional" individuals will exist in each
society, and further, that their views will be toward the advancement
of human rights. It is just as easy to conceive of such individuals who
would seriously impede the progress of rights. The "plasticity" of humans, the ability to accept and adopt new moral norms, could be
turned against a human rights agenda just as it could be put to work
in its favor.
Gorecki recognizes his fundamental problem. His conclusion that
no objective justification of human rights is possible removes any secure position from which to argue that rights must be recognized and
incorporated into the international legal structure. Unwilling to abandon the struggle, he is left to argue that the search for justification is
in itself useful. The means justifies the means, as the struggle for
widespread recognition of rights will increase contagion of societies
with the norms thus enhancing their persuasiveness. The sentiment
underlying his argument is understandable. The inherent difficulty of
advancing human rights can seem insurmountable. His proposal at
least offers hope for those who advocate broader acceptance of human
rights, while placating those who argue that rights are situation specific. However, this compromise solution ultimately undermines the
work. After setting up the problem clearly and intelligently, the book
adds little by way of practical suggestions to overcome it. The book
leaves the reader hoping for a sequel to remedy that situation.

Book Notes

JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS, MASS EXPULSION IN MODERN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE; Martinus Nijhoff Publishers; The Hague, Netherlands (1995); ($105.00); ISBN 90-411-0072-5;
257 pp. (hardcover).
Throughout history, groups have been forced to leave their place
of residence as a result of direct or indirect action taken by the State
or quasi-private groups acting without government involvement. Recent events in Rwanda, the West Bank and the former Yugoslavia,
evidence the problems resulting from mass expulsions. Mass Expulsion
in Modern InternationalLaw and Practice focuses on mass expulsions
which have occurred in the past fifty years, and presents a comprehensive list of guidelines to assist decision makers in the future.
The first section examines direct methods of expelling aliens,
migrant workers, nationals, permanent residents, stateless persons,
and refugees against the legality of the State's action. Next, the book
considers indirect methods of implementing mass expulsion and the
timing of mass expulsions in relation to war and occupation. The book
concludes with an overview of remedies, enforcement, and prevention.
The book begins by addressing the mass expulsion of persons who
are aliens. After analyzing several regional human rights conventions
in light of customary international law, the author concludes that
international law prohibits mass expulsion. While the text of the European Convention on Human Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights or the African Charter on Human and People's Rights
could not be used to prohibit all mass expulsions, customary doctrines
prohibiting discrimination and arbitrariness, render these conventions
effective in prohibiting mass expulsion.
The book then examines the mass expulsion of migrant workers.
Since most immigration occurs for economic reasons, the author contends that migrant workers comprise the "most important category of
aliens". After evaluating several International Labor Organization
conventions and situations existing in Ghana in the late 1960's, Nigeria in 1983 and 1985, and the Dominican Republic in 1991, the author
concludes that the migrant worker possesses little protection against
expulsion, even from a state where he has worked for many years.
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The book then considers the mass expulsion of groups with special
protections, such as nationals, stateless persons, and refugees as well
as mass denaturalization as a ground for mass expulsion. Because
expulsion of these groups are carried out in a way which does not
provide for individualized determinations and are based upon the
groups' nationality, ethnicity, religion or race, the author concludes
that these expulsions violate international law.
Henckaerts, who supports a broad definition of mass expulsion,
next turns his attention to indirect methods of mass expulsion. According to the broad definition, activities other than official, direct expulsion effectuated through expulsion orders or decrees, including acts of
persecution, violations of human rights, discriminatory treatment and
various kinds of pressure can cause mass expulsion. The author analyzes the use of economic incentives, voluntary return policies, and the
population exchange as forms of indirect mass expulsion. Henckaerts
surveys modern occurrences of population exchange and evaluates its'
feasibility in the former Yugoslavia. When any type of voluntary population transfer occurs, the plan should be carefully monitored by the
international community, well organized, and gradually implemented.
Mass Expulsion argues that voluntary population transfer should be
used only as a last resort, since peace will not occur "by alienating, but
rather by uniting."
Next, Henckaerts discusses the relationship between mass expulsion and war. Mass expulsion of foreigners at the commencement of
war, which is implicitly permitted by the Fourth Geneva Convention,
must be performed in a humane manner, must offer the individual an
opportunity to present their defense, and must provide the individual a
reasonable time in which to leave. Post-war expulsion, as performed by
the Allies to Germans from East Prussia, Pomerania, Silesia and other
parts of Eastern Europe after World War II, raises the issue of the
morality in implementing an program, which under other circumstances, would constitute a crime.
In the wars of Kuwait and the former Yugoslavia, the occupying
power deported and transferred civilians. Mass Expulsion carefully
traces the development of the law of war as it applies to mass expulsion. The deportation of Palestinians from the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip is separately evaluated. Henckaerts considers the actions of
Israel in light of international law and practical matters, using the
situation to emphasize the point that population settlement or plantation policies eventually backfire.
The book concludes with a brief coverage of remedies, relief, prevention, and enforcement. Lack of coordination, the degree of strain on
the receiving country, and the difficulty of enforcing claims against the
expelling state, further complicate efforts to control and reduce the
mass expulsion of individuals. Because countries which resort to mass
expulsion are frequently unable to protect human rights, international
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mechanisms offer an opportunity to enforce and perhaps prevent mass
expulsion. Henckaerts concludes that the framework required to prohibit mass expulsions already exists, needing only the initiative of
human rights experts, diplomats, U.N. representatives, and leaders
worldwide to investigate when questionable situations arise.
Julie Jackson

JOHN WITTE, Jr. AND JOHAN D. VAN DER VYVER (Eds.), RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: RELIGIOUS
PERSPECTIVES; Martinus Nijhoff Publishers; The Hague, Netherlands (1996); ($350.00); ISBN 90-411-0178 (Set of 2 volumes); 597 pp.
(Vol. 1 hardcover); 670pp. (Vol. 2 hardcover).
This two volume collection contains forty essays examining the
place of religious freedom, as it pertains to human rights, within historical and present day frameworks. The essays limit there scope to
Judaism, Christianity and Islam and present a variety of human
rights topics related to these religions in both a comparative and a
case study method. As John Witte Jr. hopes, the books facilitate an
understanding of what religious human rights mean through discussing various view points on the topic and attempts to "exorcise the demons of religious intolerance."
The authors of the essays include preeminent legal and religious
scholars whose focus, especially in the first volume, breaks the topic
down into three general areas: historical and theoretical inquires that
lay differing standards of rights; rights and the structure of religious
communities and traditions; and inconsistencies of religious leadership
in view of theoretical climate. Within these areas the authors give
equal voice to the three religions and their respective interpretations of
history, textual foundations, roles of women, and present day applications of religious human rights.
The second volume of the book focuses on the modern day, global
application and interpretation of religious human rights. Found within
all three religions is the concept of humans deriving all power and
form from God, thereby creating personal freedoms derived from this
equality. The essays detail a ground swell of support for the notion of
religious autonomy, through the activities of the General Assembly and
several non-governmental organizations, and attempt to justify a legal
foundation within the international arena. The second volume takes on
area studies that seek to discern the present day status of religious
freedoms from the theoretical standard. The areas scrutinized for these
individual case studies include: Middle East, Eastern Europe, Latin
America, Africa, U.K., Central America, and the U.S.
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The candid and balanced nature of the essays allow for a thorough
discussion of the various issues related to religious human rights. Each
religion is given proportional space and the authors do not use the
pages as a forum for public perception, but instead deal with the objective nature of their topics. One essay of particular interest was that of
the draft model on freedom of religion. The model, by Dinah Shelton
and Alexandre Kiss, ambitiously proposes the religious human rights
the world community should codify. The detailed model includes the
following elements: freedom of religion and belief (including those of
atheists); protection against compulsion of belief; manifestations of
religion or belief (including the right to criticize another's belief system); a secular state; equal rights and no discrimination due to religion; religious organizations given non-profit organization treatment;
and civil action enforcement against violations of the code.
The two volume collection spares nothing in making itself an
exhaustive and impressive study of the growing area of religious human rights. Theory and application were applied to a societal timeline
in a most effective manner.
Mike Mauseth

ANNE E. PLATT, INFECTING OURSELVES: HOW ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL DISRUPTIONS TRIGGER DISEASE, Worldwatch
Paper 129, Worldwatch Institute, Washington, D.C. (1996); ($5.00);
ISBN 1-878071-31-9; 62 pp. (pbk).
In Infecting Ourselves, Anne Platt details the increasing spread of
communicative diseases, its sources, and potential solutions. Focusing
on the renewed emergence of infectious diseases, Platt addresses
society's inadequacy in dealing with their cause-microbes. As well as
including several, very detailed charts, Platt dedicates the first five
chapters to the causes and aggravating factors of infectious disease.
She concludes by proposing several ways to alleviate the effect of these
diseases.
In the first two chapters of the book, Platt briefly summarizes the
historical background to, and widespread effects of communicative
diseases and asserts that prevention is the key to solving this problem.
The author suggests that the decline in the level of public health services, such as cutbacks in education, water supply, hygiene, and preventative medicine contributes to the increasing dilemma of the "infectious killers." She further notes that although communicative diseases
take their greatest toll in developing countries, they are increasingly
occuring in industrialized countries, such as the United States. Platt
argues that much of this increase can be attributed to a lack of understanding of the microbes' life cycles, and their ecology. Accordingly, all
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countries, regardless of their level of economic development, are vulnerable to the devastating effects of infectious diseases', and thus, the
burden of addressing this matter is shared.
In chapter three, Platt turns her attention to the impact of social
conditions on infectious diseases. Citing overcrowded populations, Platt
explains the microbes' need for a population large enough to support
its chain of infection-passing from the host to those with whom the
host comes in contact. Further, due to the increased travel between
countries, no single population is immune from infection. Exemplifying
this effect, the author traces the brief history of the spread of
HIV/AIDS, and the rapidity with which it has swept across the world.
Platt acknowledges the measures taken by various countries and resolves that education, regarding the manner in which these diseases
are spread, must continue.
Chapter four addresses the affect of environmental disturbances
on infectious diseases. Platt suggests that developmental measures,
including deforestation, the construction of dams, and changes in the
composition of crops indigenous to an area, have altered the ecosystems which previously kept the effect of microbes in check. As a result
of changing the natural balance in various areas, certain species have
abounded, while their predators have declined. Platt adds that environmental disasters, such as earthquakes and floods, often exacerbate
these conditions, providing prime environments for infectious diseases
to flourish. The author concludes that in addition to keeping their
environmental habitats intact, communities should provide increased
health education, and should require city planners to utilize such information in their projects.
Platt next discusses disease caused by unsafe water, a factor currently responsible for eighty percent of all disease in the developing
world. Citing unsafe drinking water and lack of sanitation, the author
describes various processes by which a person may become infected.
Platt also details specific instances of neglect in areas such as the
former Soviet Union, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the United States. She
further relates the high economic costs associated with improving
unsafe water conditions, and cites this as a factor in the continued
existence of such conditions. Platt determines that increased attention
must be given to waterborne diseases.
Adding to the above problems is the lack of medicine available to
cure the diseases, which Platt addresses in her sixth chapter. The author asserts that numerous strains of diseases become immune to antibiotics as a result of their improper use. Accordingly, new medicines
must be developed and the cost of cure increases. To solve these problems, Platt recommends the sparing use of antibiotics, as well as preventative measures, such as widespread immunizations. She also sees
hope in the testing for new antibiotics and vaccines.
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In the last chapter, Platt proposes solutions to the infectious disease situation. First, she suggests increasing the adequacy of health
care systems; and second, she recommends heightened awareness of
the causes of underlying communicative diseases. The combined effect
of these suggestions will be the prevention of the further spread of
disease.
In its entirety, this work provides a mechanism by which the
novice may determine and understand the underlying causes of infectious diseases. Although often explicit, Infecting Ourselves communicates the necessity for public attention to this matter. Platt makes it
clear that the devastating effect of communicative diseases cannot be
ignored.
Sarah Ellen Scofield

STEPHEN DYCUS, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE ENVIRONMENT; University Press of New England, Hanover, New Hampshire
(1996); ($19.95); ISBN 0-87451-735-4; 286 pp. (pbk.).
Stephen Dycus' National Defense and the Environment provides a
wide ranging overview of the relationship between U.S. environmental
laws and their application by the military establishment. The book is
written in a style which is easily understood by the average reader,
thus, making it a useful guide for students, teachers, attorneys, and
the general public alike. The author uses a minimum of confusing
acronyms and explains legal citations. Case studies throughout the
text provide valuable examples of the practical application of environmental laws in relation to national defense concerns. The book is organized into nine chapters containing general overviews of relevant topics and a conclusion summarizing the potential for harmonizing national defense concerns with protection of the environment. Three
appendices provide a comprehensive listing of environmental cases involving national defense activities, government agencies, and private
organizations. In addition, the extensive and thorough footnotes provide a valuable source of information for those wishing to delve further
into the subject matter.
The end of the Cold War turned attention to the impact of the
defense establishment on the environment at home and abroad. Dycus
focuses on the need to reconcile national security interests with the
need for environmental protection. He points out that official military
policy requires that the defense establishment protect the environment
as much as possible. This task is made more important considering the
Pentagon controls over 25 million acres in the U.S., three quarters of
which are important fish and wildlife habitat. The Department of Energy controls another 2.4 million acres.
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Dycus first reviews the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) and resolves that it applies generally to military activities
abroad with broad exceptions made for a variety of contingencies.
NEPA also reflects Congressional concern for national security yet
contains provisions for secret Environmental Impact Statements.
Dycus concludes there is a need to resolve the conflict between national security and environmental protection during the planning process.
The next section addresses environmental regulation of the defense establishment. Citing various regulatory statutes such as the
Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act, Safe Drinking Water Act, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Toxic Substance Control Act,
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, and the Noise
Control Act, the author credits defense agency officials with efforts to
comply with these regulations.
The author then turns his attention to Pentagon efforts to clean
up environmental damage resulting from the Cold War. Dycus discusses the clean up of operating military bases and Department of Energy
weapons complexes, including the disposal of nuclear wastes and plutonium. An overview of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA) and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) is presented in this context. The
Defense Restoration Account pays for cleanups at operating bases
separately from accounts established by Congress to clean up closed
military sites.
The next section analyzes the special problems associated with
military base closures and realignments. The estimated cost of cleaning up all closed bases runs over $900 million. Funding for these projects comes from two special Defense Base Closure accounts which are
separate from the defense budget. The author addresses the unique
application of NEPA to base closures and realignments. NEPA review
has been sharply curtailed under 1988 and 1990 legislation. However,
political pressure keeps these activities funded since closed base
property cannot be redeveloped until they are cleaned up or until restoration efforts are underway.
Protection of the environment during wartime is also considered.
The law of war, U.S. military rules and regulations, and domestic
environmental laws applicable during conflict are addressed. Examples
of U.S. compliance with international law are also provided. Dycus
points to an Army financed study which concludes that a successful
indoctrination of pollution prevention initiatives into combat doctrine
will enhance the fighting capabilities of military units. In addition,
Dycus discusses specific waivers for "exigent situations" Congress
placed into environmental laws. None have been officially invoked
except during the Persian Gulf War when the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) waived NEPA regulations at the request of the Pentagon. The author concludes that environmental concerns must be
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considered when tactical and strategic military decisions are made.
Dycus highlights the deference given to the defense establishment
when applying environmental laws in the following section. Courts
have been sensitive to issues such as sovereign immunity, plaintiff
standing requirements, and the justiciability of claims. In addition, the
EPA is barred from issuing compliance orders and from filing suit
against other federal agencies for violations of environmental laws.
Dycus discusses the awarding of attorneys fees and the possibility for
criminal sanctions when citizen suits are filed under certain Acts and
regulatory schemes.
Liability for environmental damage caused by the defense establishment is discussed in a related section. Limitations on government
liability include sovereign immunity, the Federal Tort Claims Act
(including the Discretionary Function Exception), and the Feres doctrine. The author also discusses claims against defense contractors and
the "government contractor defense."
The author concludes with optimistic hopes for a balance between
a strong national defense and protection of the environment. Dycus
sees a "confluence of interests" between citizens concerned with protecting the environment and government officials becoming more sensitive to the problems faced. A commitment from all parties concerned is
required to solve these problems. In particular, Dycus points out a
series of legislative, administrative, financial, diplomatic, and individual challenges which must and can be met.
Michael Buchanan

ELJAN MACKAAY, DANIEL POULIN & PIERRE TRUNDEL (Eds.),
THE ELECTRONIC SUPERHIGHWAY: THE SHAPE OF TECHNOLOGY AND LAW TO COME; Kluwer Law International; Netherlands
(1995); ($97.00); ISBN 90-411-0135-7; 193 pp. (hard cover).
The Electronic Superhighway, contemplates the nature of communication via computers and other interactive media by the year 2000.
The authors suggest that the future of the electronic superhighway,
will emerge from the convergence of five specified cultures, ranging
from the entertainment industry to hardware and software producers,
as well as three conceptual models. The cultures and models are discussed in depth, and predictions regarding their future implementation
are made. Present examples of this interaction are provided as well as
the probable future uses revealing how the cultures, models and
technology will be instituted. The authors' concern is how the cultures,
models and advancing technology will ultimately converge in order to
mold our society. Additionally, the authors introduce a host of legal
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questions and ramifications arising from the burgeoning Internet culture.
The book begins with a detailed discussion of the present and
future uses of technology. The authors suggest that various entertainment mediums as well as service and sales companies will undergo
significant change due to the Internet revolution. The authors prognosticate that consumers will experience improved access to goods and
services as well as to information. They conclude that the use of
Internet technology will expand into video consumerism and interactive television programming.
In the first chapter, a brief historical overview of the development
of the Internet is provided. The most important Internet feature is its
ability to bring persons from all distances together and to facilitate
discussions on a wider variety of subjects, an otherwise impossible task
with traditional means of communication. On the Internet, shoppers
are provided better information and better tools for analysis and are
able to make the optimal decision regarding the costs and benefits of
their purchases. Many technologies being developed are planned for
use in the home and will influence how leisure time is spent. The entertainment aspect is expected to become part of consumers' every day
habits. To support this conclusion, the authors cite a recent study of a
system able to personalize television viewing and provide interactive
television and immediate access to a variety of video games, revealing
that the television consumers developed certain information seeking
habits and preferred the interactive and more personalized version of
television over traditional television.
As the electronic superhighway develops, future discoveries will
push the limits of what can be accomplished on-line. For example, a
collection of United States Supreme Court opinions are available from
Case Western Reserve University. Accessing this collection allows legal
scholars to by-pass the more traditional, and often more expensive,
electronic retrieval services. The ability to construct hypertext pages
which link subjects to related information has been dubbed "add-on
scholarship." Add-on scholarship allows one to retrieve and unify scattered bodies of related material. This technology is already being implemented by professors. For example, a class may be given an outline
which is then connected by hypertext to other related study materials
which are presented by noted professionals and other professors
around the nation. Linking this material could remove the need for
textbooks and study aids since students can link to treatises and classes taught by the top educators on that particular subject. If textbooks
become digitized, there will be a profound social and cultural change in
research communities. For example, the probable effect upon legal
journals by digitalized research. If one research institution becomes a
depository for lesser read journals and then distributes the information
over the Internet, lesser read journals could lose valuable subscriptions
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since libraries know they can readily retrieve the journals over the
Internet.
The book next explores the advantages of on-line research and
publication. The authors forecasts a merging of Internet research
services and legal research services. The authors note that legal journals could be subsumed by the Internet. They warn that for the more
traditional realm of legal resources to coexist with Internet research
services, traditional research methods must adjust to compete with the
new media. To guarantee a competitive electronic forum for scholarly
journals will require that elements of the old print medium be maintained inside the new digitized system. To avoid the possibility of tampering with research material, there will most likely be encryption
techniques or algorithms installed at the retrieval cite to detect such
activity. The written publication process requires, filtering of vast
amounts of empirical data and demands an extremely concise style for
presenting results. For example, the researcher is invariably limited in
the length of his dissertation, but electronic publishing removes such
constraints. Likewise, a scientist may quickly publish the method,
results, and crucial moments of an experiment.
The conclusion reviews a series of legal questions concerning the
Internet revolution. The questions relate to courtroom evidence, privacy rights, and the scope of freedom of speech. With regard to evidence,
the authors raise a number of issues, some already answered, relating
to the intangibility of items such as computerized records. The editors
recommend the adoption of a normative framework able to protect
personal data and guard privacy rights. Lastly, Internet providers
must learn how to cope with questionable material on the Internet.
Some schools have banned material it considered offensive, thus raising questions of free speech. The authors conclude that the legal issues
should be addressed now, before the questions become too overwhelming and are unanswerable.
Kathleen Schomaker

ANTHONY D'AMATO AND KIRSTEN ENGEL (Eds.), INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY, Anderson Publishing Company, Cincinnati, Ohio (1996); ($29.00); ISBN: 0-87084-375-3;
203 pp. (pbk.).
Anthologies provide a useful mechanism for introducing readers to
the latest research and the most cutting edge arguments in any field of
study. But the International Environmental Law Anthology provides
the reader with much more than an interesting collection of articles. In
an effort to expose the reader to as many diverse viewpoints as possible, the editors have pulled excerpts from leading works in the field of
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international environmental law. These excerpts, selected to demonstrate an "essential thesis," to provide significant data, or to illustrate
a particular viewpoint, have been reformulated into a cohesive text.
The book is organized into seven parts, with each part devoted to
a separate theme. Following a brief introduction on the historical development of international environmental law, Part II outlines some of
the most common sources of current international environmental law.
The editors then discuss the various roles national customs play in the
development of law and introduce a few more of the unified rules, such
as Principle 21, adopted at the 1972 Stockholm Conference, and the
Precautionary Principle, unanimously endorsed by the Rio Declaration.
These principles are contrasted to more controversial concepts, such as
"sustainable development" which contends that development should
meet society's present needs without compromising the needs of future
generations, and the "common heritage of mankind" which suggests
there are regions which do not fall under any nations jurisdiction, and
therefore are not subject to appropriation.
Other questions discussed in this section include: Is there a body
of "soft law" which recognizes normative restrictions on human behavior, but does not provide any mechanism for enforcement? Must states
be forced to act collaterally because of the extraterritorial effects of
environmental policies? For each of the issues raised, the editors have
provided discussions on both sides of the debate. This approach is
followed consistently throughout the book.
The next three parts of the book focus on specific functional areas
of international environmental law, including hazardous activities
(transboundary pollution, trade in hazardous wastes and technologies,
and environmental warfare); protection of species and ecosystems
(biodiversity, desertification and deforestation); and the global commons (oceans, atmosphere, and Antarctica). Once again, the issues are
first defined and then the reader is provided with excerpts which provide a forum for deliberation.
After becoming familiar with the substantive issues, the editors
encourage us to consider more abstract issues of ethics and equity.
Part VI discusses how old ideas of exploiting resources on a "first-come
first-serve basis" are being succeeded by notions of shared responsibility. More and more, nations are being challenged for adhering to policies that allow them to pollute according to their own self-determined
standards. These equity arguments are followed by a discussion of
whether there is a "shared international morality" with respect to
environmental issues. Christopher Stone, for example, contends that
there is no moral imperative so overwhelming that any nation would
subordinate its national interest in favor of the "good" of the environment. This, of course, is because political and economic interests always tend to prevail.
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In the final section of the book, the editors shift from the underlying theme that international laws, seeking to further global environmental values, may serve to restrict the sovereignty of independent
nation states. Instead, they suggest that some international laws may
interfere with state policies, even those which have been formulated
with the specific intent of protecting the environment. This apparent
inconsistency takes the reader to Part VII, which summarizes the
entire discussion of the "dynamically changing area" of global environmental protection law. The editors conclude that it is important to be
aware of trends and innovations currently taking place, for it is only
by remaining receptive to new ways of thinking that we will be able to
resolve the issues evolving out of the concern for preserving our global
environment.
This anthology addresses issues of fundamental importance to the
area of international environmental law. The extensive "cut and paste"
approach that the editors employed in the development of their text
could have led to a disjointed discourse. On the contrary, the text is
very readable and flows smoothly from one excerpt to the next. This
unique approach to controversial legal issues may stimulate ones interest in international environmental law. But as the editors themselves
suggest, this text may be more useful to the academic, than to the
practicing attorney.
Vicki Spencer

MARGARET A. SCHULER (Ed.), FROM BASIC NEEDS TO BASIC
RIGHTS; Women, Law & Development International, Washington,
D.C. (1995); ($21.00); ISBN 95-79859; 554 pp. (pbk.).
From Basic Needs to Basic Rights contains thirty-four articles,
essays and case studies by women's rights activists and scholars from
the international community. Various interpretations of existing challenges in the field of women's human rights along with suggestions by
the authors for the development of solutions to those challenges are
presented throughout the book.
A foreword by Noeleen Heyzer notes that while significant strides
have been made in the area of women's rights, the majority of women
and girls continue to remain excluded from fully participating in society and from the prevailing vision of "universal human rights."
The editor, Margaret Schuler, expounds on this theme by summarizing how the current international frameworks of law and policy
have imposed limitations on the free exercise of women's rights.
Schuler places emphasis on the fact that women's rights have made
only minimal progress in penetrating the traditional paradigm of hu-
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man rights. Consequently, Schuler considers full integration into the
human rights system, with all its accompanying protective mechanisms, as the next goal for the women's human rights agenda. Moreover, she argues that respect for the principles of indivisibility and
universality of human rights supports full integration and requires
that the global community take a more active part in working towards
this goal. According to Schuler, the instrumental tools needed to further integration include: an expansion of the current definition of human rights; an expansion of the existing scope of state responsibility
and; an expansion of the effectiveness of the human rights system to
enforce women's rights.
Like Schuler, the authors in From Basic Needs to Basic Rights
also envision a new definition of human rights. The authors argue that
by expanding and reformulating the traditional patriarchal character
of human rights the goal of redefining human rights can be achieved.
Additionally, the authors believe that strategies addressing advocacy
and action can be developed once new interpretations of human rights
are articulated.
Five vital themes of the women's human rights agenda are explored by the authors. They include: gender and hierarchy; economic
and social rights; cultural, religious and ethnic identities; sexual and
reproductive rights; and activism to advance women's human rights.
This booknote summarizes selected articles and demonstrates the
cross-section of scholarship and activism occurring in the global
women's human rights movement today.
Included within the section on economic and social rights is an
essay by Rebecca P. Sewall entitled "Reconstructing Social and Economic Rights in Transitional Economies." Sewall argues that by instituting a global economic shift towards a structural adjustment model
international financial instiutions and industrial nations have directed
the economic and social rights of women in developing countries. The
implementation of the strucutural adjustment model has been used in
several countries undergoing market transition to free market economic systems and has frequently resulted in the abandonment of employment-based rights in those countries.
Sewall argues that this occurs because in command economy systems which have existed in areas like Central and Eastern Europe
employment is considered to be a right, and in free market economies
it is considered a privilege granted only when an individual gains
access to the market. States undergoing transition typically lack any
civil or political rights framework to protect women workers and citizens from excesses or wrongs occurring in the free market system. As a
result, transitional states are left with inadequate mechanisms to
protect and enforce rights.
The author suggests that solutions exist through changes in the
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lending policies of international financial institutions. For example,
anti-discriminatory contingencies on loan eligibility could theoretically
protect women from discriminatory employment practices that occasionally arise in structural adjustment systems.
Included within the section on religious, cultural and ethnic identity & human rights is a paper by Sima Wali entitled "Women in Conditions of War and Peace: Challenges and Dilemmas." Wali notes that
during war and times of conflict, women who are forced to migrate lack
protection from their home country, and are therefore forced to rely on
the international community and a destination host country for protection. International instruments that address refugee concerns provide little protection for displaced women and girls. Wali argues that
the absence of protection from the international community contributes
to women refugees becoming victims to some of the most egregious
forms of human rights abuses.
Wali additionally argues that gender bias is created by the failure
of these international instruments to distinguish between male and
female refugees. The author posits that programs and policies which
address the inherent powerlessness of uprooted women and girls and
the adoption of universal humanitarian policies specifically addressing
the needs of female refugees can both be effective methods to bias
elimination.
Gita Sen's article, "Rights and Reproductive Technologies" explores the development and availability of reproductive technologies.
Sen argues that social and economic circumstances such as class and
race determine which reproductive technologies will be developed, how
they will be tested, and where they will be distributed. Sen also argues
that women living in areas unlikely to provide reproductive
technologies or the medical services to accompany such technologies
may be denied important human rights. The author suggests implementation of an ethical approach to the development, testing, and
dissemination of reproductive technologies as a method of improving
universal access to these services.
A common theme in these articles, and many others throughout
the book, is the belief that the integration of women's rights into the
human rights system can occur only through an expansion of the human rights paradigm. The push to develop a human rights definition
incorporating the recognition of female refugees, legal structures protecting employment-based rights of females in transitional areas, and
reproductive technologies currently unavailable to certain sectors of
the population are all examples of actions that the authors believe will
collectively result in the advancement of the international women's
human rights agenda.
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